

ABOUT THE NEW SILVER COINS RELATED TO THE NABATAEAN MINISTER “SYLLAEUS”

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Abstract

The aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive review of the available information on Syllaeus, an official of the Nabataean empire, and his probable date of death. Only two contemporaneous sources, Strabo and Flavius Josephus, mention Syllaeus and his activities. The article discusses the original sources in detail and the context in which they were written, which has led to various conjectures in scholarly literature that lack evidence. In addition, the research reveals the publication of two previously unknown Jordan National Bank coins from Syllaeus's collection, shedding lighter on his life. The study suggests that both the Romans and King Aretas IV showed an interest in having Syllaeus executed in Rome.

KEYWORDS: Nabataean, coins, Syllaeus, Romans.

Introduction

To fully understand the significance of Syllaeus, who served as the powerful minister of Nabataean King Odobas III between 30-9 BC, we need to clarify several key points. These include Syllaeus' close relationship with the king, his role during his expedition with the Roman army in Arabia, his connections with King Herod and Salome, his actions in Rome, and how he defended himself against accusations from Aretas IV and King Herod. Additionally, we need to examine Syllaeus' involvement in the 12 BC revolt in southern Syria, his friendship with Aretas IV, and the debate surrounding the date of his death (either in 9 BC or 6 BC). There are also conflicting reports about whether Syllaeus ruled as king after Odobas' death, which must be examined thoroughly. Lastly, we will discuss Syllaeus' relationship with geographer Strabo and the issue of the different types of coins that bear his image (silver, bronze etc.).

Only two historical sources, Strabo and Flavius Josephus, mention Syllaeus and his actions, with Strabo being the only one who lived during Syllaeus' time. Despite Syllaeus' close relationship with the leader of the Roman expedition against the Arabian Peninsula, Strabo blamed him for the failure of the campaign, which was supposed to extend into the

southern region of Arabia. Strabo was unaware of the offshore wind and tide in the Red Sea, which caused the destruction of several Roman ships. Additionally, the Roman army lacked experience in navigating the Red Sea. In the first century AD, Josephus wrote about some of Syllaeus' personal incidents.

The Nabatean coins from the period of Syllaeus mainly date back to 9 BC, which is when Syllaeus was said to have returned from Rome to Petra. These coins do not depict any known historical events but simply feature the initial letter of Syllaeus' name (S). However, it raises questions as to why Syllaeus would use the image of King Odoabas III on these coins if he issued them. Additionally, there were coins that featured portraits of King Aretas IV on the other side. It is possible that King Aretas IV and Syllaeus ruled the kingdom jointly in the first year, or that Syllaeus did not have enough time to produce identical coins with King Odoabas III's image due to his sudden death.

In Strabo's account of Rome's expedition to Arabia Felix, which occurred in 26 or 25 BC and was led by Gaius Aelius Gallus, Egypt's first prefect and Strabo's patron, Syllaeus is mentioned. The mission consisted of 10,000 Romans and allies, with 1,000 Nabataeans led by Syllaeus and 500 Jews, as stated in Sidebotham's 1986 work. The plan was to transport the troops from Egypt to Arabia by ship and then march south, with the assumption that the Arabians were not skilled fighters, making the journey relatively easy (Anderson 2010: 392; Bowersock 1983: 46-9).

As per Strabo, Emperor Augustus sent the expedition to Arabia to explore a region that was not well-known to Rome. Egypt had recently become a Roman colony in 30 BC, and Augustus wanted Gallus to establish either an alliance or conquer the locals. The primary target was the Sabaeans, who had amassed wealth through the incense trade that passed through their territory en route to Nabataea. The journey would enable the Romans to obtain incense directly from Arabia, which would be lucrative since the Nabataeans imposed a 25% tax on any goods passing through their territory (Anonymous 1989: 19).

Due to their lack of knowledge of the region, the Roman expedition needed local guides, and the only ones available were the Nabataeans, who had the most to lose if the mission succeeded. This put the Nabataeans in a difficult position, as they had to choose between losing their monopoly or angering Rome. According to Wenning, Syllaeus had to guide the Romans to prevent either of these outcomes, but also to ensure that they failed entirely. Syllaeus's goal was to let the Romans make some progress against the Sabaeans but not enough to destroy them completely (Wenning 2007: 33-36).

Strabo accuses Syllaeus of leading the Romans to land at Leuce-Come, despite the availability of a land route from Petra that could have been used by trade caravans. However, Mayerson argues that Gallus is to

blame for this decision, as he failed to obtain the necessary military intelligence about the area. Mayerson also suggests that Gallus lacked military experience in the region, and that the failure of the expedition was due to both his mistakes and Syllaeus' alleged treachery (Mayerson 1995: 17-24).

After halting at LeuceCome, many soldiers became sick from contaminated water and food. The sick soldiers needed time to recover, and so the army stayed there for the summer and winter of 26 BC. Strabo claims that Syllaeus guided the expedition through places where there was no water, forcing the army to carry it with them. Despite these challenges, the Romans managed to capture several cities with few casualties. Gallus continued on to the city of Marib, which he besieged for six days. However, due to a lack of water, the siege was abandoned, and Gallus turned back just two days away from the incense-producing region. The journey back home took only sixty days, while the outward journey had taken six months. Strabo attributes the failure of the mission to Syllaeus' treachery.

Despite later accusations of treachery against Nabataea and Syllaeus, Rome did not take any immediate action against them after the failed expedition. Strabo notes that when Syllaeus was eventually accused of wrongdoing, it was for different reasons. The lack of response from Rome can be explained by the fact that they had other military campaigns taking place in Galatia, Spain, and Germany at the time, and were likely preoccupied with those. Additionally, it's possible that the Romans blamed the harsh conditions of the expedition rather than their guide for the setbacks they experienced.

Historians have conflicting views on whether Syllaeus was truly responsible for the events that took place. While it was in the Nabataeans' interest for the Roman expedition to fail so that they would remain dependent on them for frankincense, the Nabataeans also benefited from the success of the expedition. Their allies, the Himyarites, were able to conquer the Sabaeans the following year while they were still recovering from the Roman attack. According to Strabo, the Nabataean plan included both success and failure, but blaming Syllaeus for engineering both outcomes is unfair. The Romans were entirely reliant on Syllaeus, and they stayed in Leuce-Come as guests of a Nabataean leader named Aretas (Bowersock 1983: 48, Everatt 1972: 44). Additionally, as Bowersock (1983: 49) argues, Syllaeus himself had a lot to lose if the mission failed, because success would have meant personal promotion in Rome.

Going from purpose to opportunity, it is plausible that Syllaeus was aware of easier ways but chose a more challenging one (Gibson 2004: 42; Accettola 2012: 19). The path he used, however, was obviously an established trading route that had fallen into neglect (Gibson 2004: 42), and there is evidence that the re-opening of this route benefitted

Nabataea in the years after the trip (Accettola 2012: 19). Bowersock considers the land approach as as, if not more, difficult (1983: 47). Strabo also recognised the dry circumstances as an issue that the guides could have assisted in avoiding (Anderson 2010: 393), since a guide may have assisted the Romans in making the required changes (Accettola 2012: 20). Nonetheless, the Romans were hardly the first to suffer in desert operations. A considerably bigger calamity had occurred in 53 BC, just over thirty years before the Arabian expedition, in the battle of Carrhae. Later historians attributed the Parthian campaign's Roman military ineptitude on treason (Plutarch Crassus 21-2, referenced in (Bowersock 1983: 48). Strabo's evidence against Syllaeus is far from conclusive.

Furthermore, an analysis of the other sources leads us to question Strabo's conclusion that Syllaeus was to blame. Cassius stresses the hardship faced by the weather and sickness rather than any treachery, and Josephus likewise omit to mention Syllaeus' participation in the Antiquities despite describing the mission itself. Strabo's interest on Syllaeus can be explained in part by Gallus, his sponsor (Dio Cassius, LIII, 29, 3ff.; Richardson 1999: 230). According to Anderson's perspective, Strabo used the character of Syllaeus to support his main argument that certain lands, such as Arabia and Nabataea, needed Roman rule to address their significant flaws. Syllaeus serves as a literary device in Strabo's narrative, which justifies the Roman imperial rule over these territories. In this interpretation, Syllaeus represents the flaws of the Nabataean society, as they allowed someone as untrustworthy as him to gain so much power. Therefore, the portrayal of Syllaeus in Strabo's work may not necessarily reflect the actual historical events, but rather serves to advance the author's argument about the need for Roman rule in these territories (Anderson 2010: 393).

SYLLAEUS UNDER KING OBODAS III:

Regardless of who was to responsible for the voyage to Arabia, we do know that Syllaeus was quickly elevated to chief minister under Obodas III. According to Dussaud, his title was *epitropos* (Hill 1922: XVI), which implies top minister. Following this, he serves as an envoy to foreign courts, including Herod's in Judaea and Augustus' in Rome. A bilingual Nabataean and Greek inscription depict Syllaeus as 'brother of the king' Obodas III. As we will see, Syllaeus relied heavily on Obodas' patronage in his plots against Aretas IV (Fig. 1).

Figure 1 the bilingual inscription in Nabataean and Greek (Kawerau und Rehm 1914, 387).



The historical sources, namely Strabo and Josephus, suggest that there is a disagreement about whether Obodas III was a weak king for allowing Syllaeus to hold such significant power. According to these sources, Syllaeus was able to act as a *de facto* ruler because of Obodas' perceived lack of strength and interest in governing. This debate centers on whether Obodas was responsible for Syllaeus' rise to power or if other factors, such as political or social circumstances, played a role. This assessment is supported by Bowersock (1983: 46). Strabo suggests that a common weakness among Arabian kings is their lack of interest in public affairs, which is also attributed to Obodas III. In addition, there are other factors that may have contributed to Syllaeus' rise to power, such as Obodas' old age and frailty. Josephus' account of his visits to Judaea depicts Syllaeus as a young man, and it is suggested that this age difference may have played a role in Syllaeus' increasing power. According to Josephus, Syllaeus himself acknowledged Obodas' frailty when discussing Herod's incursion into Nabataea with Augustus (see below).

There are grounds to doubt the accuracy of the information we have about Nabataean politics from Strabo and Josephus. Their sources likely came from Athenodorus, who made errors due to his lack of understanding of the tribal system that underpinned Nabataean politics. Athenodorus failed to recognize that certain responsibilities, such as foreign policy, were traditionally assigned to the chief minister, which was the case with Syllaeus. Therefore, Obodas' apparent lack of involvement in public affairs may have been due to fulfilling his constitutional role, rather than any inherent weakness or indolence on his part. The fact that a significant building program was undertaken during Obodas' reign suggests that he was an active king, as Syllaeus alone could not have accomplished such projects (Wenning 2007: 34-35).

Aretas IV accused Syllaeus of poisoning Obodas when he died in the winter of 9 BC (Bowersock 1983: 51; Strabo, *Geography*, 16.4.25-26). The idea that Syllaeus would have assassinated Obodas, the king of Nabatea, doesn't make sense because according to Josephus, Syllaeus was in Rome when Obodas died. Additionally, Syllaeus already had a lot of power under Obodas, so there was no reason for him to take such a risky action. However, it's important to remember that the accusation against Syllaeus only emerged during a power struggle between him and Aretas IV. Josephus also notes that Augustus, the Roman emperor, initially rejected the accusation because of his hostility towards Aretas. To understand this situation better, we need to look at Syllaeus' interactions with Herod the Great, the king of Judaea (Knoblet 2005: 142).

SYLLAEUS AND HEROD THE GREAT:

Historically, the Nabataeans and Herod had a strained relationship, as they had refused to provide him with refuge when he was in danger. However, to everyone's surprise, Herod became the ruler with the help of Augustus, despite this history of conflict (Gibson 2004: 42). When Syllaeus was appointed as the chief minister under Obodas III, he was also sent as an ambassador to the court of Herod, who was Nabataea's most important neighbor after Rome. This event is the reason why Josephus first mentions Syllaeus in his book *Jewish Antiquities*.

According to Josephus, while Syllaeus was in Judaea as an ambassador, he developed a romantic interest in Salome, Herod's widowed sister. Salome was also reportedly attracted to Syllaeus, but when Herod found out about it, Syllaeus left abruptly. He returned a few months later and proposed to marry Salome, arguing that it would create a strong alliance between Judaea and Nabataea, as he was a powerful figure in Nabataea. However, Herod demanded that Syllaeus convert to Judaism, which would result in his execution in Nabataea. Salome was accused of immorality for her association with Syllaeus, and the negotiations ended in bitterness for both sides.

Following the failed negotiations with Herod, Syllaeus allegedly supported bandits who raided Herod's territory as a way of working against him. Our source of information on this matter is Josephus, who relies on the account of Nicolaus of Damascus, Herod's representative in the dispute that followed (Gibson 2004: 42). According to Josephus, the trouble between Syllaeus and Herod began in 12 BC while Herod was in Rome. Trachonitis, a region that had been added to Herod's territory by Augustus, was a source of concern as its inhabitants had a history of becoming bandits (Josephus *AJ* 16.355; Bowersock 1983: 50-51). The inhabitants of Trachonitis were prone to turning to banditry because the land was unproductive and unsuitable for farming. Herod was able to keep the situation under control while he was in Judaea. However, while

he was in Rome, the inhabitants spread a rumor that Herod was dead, which led to a revolt in the region (Richardson 1999: 280).

The insurrection was quickly put down by Herod's army, although forty of its commanders fled to Nabataea. According to Josephus, Syllaeus welcomed them and enabled them to utilise a stronghold in Nabataea to exact revenge on Herod (Everatt 1972: 44). They invaded Judaea as well as the adjacent territory of Coele-Syria and the Decapolis from there. While Josephus does not mention it, it is conceivable that Syllaeus was the originator of the insurrection in the first place. Such activities might be justified by Syllaeus' animosity for Herod, as well as the fact that the transfer of Trachonitis to Herod had dealt a blow to the Nabataeans' influence (Bowersock 1983: 50). This idea may help to explain why the bandits fled to Nabataea. Their escape to Nabataea, on the other hand, might be explained by the fact that it was the nearest area that was not under Herod's control.

Herod returned to Judaea to put an end to the Trachonitis insurrection and to execute the families of those sheltering in Nabataea. Herod also established an Idumnean colony in the area (Gibson 2004: 43). Unfortunately, Herod's harsh response only made matters worse, since the bandits were now obligated by ancient custom to get revenge on the person who had murdered their family. According to Josephus, the raids on his fields persisted and were as damaging as a war. This was due to the fact that, safe as they were in Nabataea, the number of brigands had increased to almost a thousand men (Josephus, AJ 16.276-81; Bowersock 1983: 51).

Herod asked that the Nabataeans surrender these outlaws as well as the money he had loaned to Obodas III, a total of 60 talents (Josephus AJ 16.346; Anderson 1735: 299). When Herod requested that Syllaeus pay a sum of money to compensate for the bandits' actions, Syllaeus delayed and claimed that the bandits were not from Nabataea. Herod then sought help from the governors of Syria, who ordered that the demands be met within thirty days. However, when the deadline passed, Syllaeus had not handed over the prisoners or the money. It seems that Syllaeus then went to Rome to appeal directly to Augustus. Josephus next mentions Syllaeus when he is already in Rome (Bowersock 1983: 39).

After the deadline passed, Herod attacked the bandit stronghold in Nabataea with an army and defeated a group of Nabataeans who had come to help the bandits. Herod then sent a report of his actions to Roman officials in the region. However, it should be noted that Josephus's account may have been influenced by Herod's chief defender in Rome, Nicolaus of Damascus. Messengers were sent to Syllaeus in Rome, who then convinced Augustus that Herod had launched an unprovoked attack on Nabataea, killing many nobles and causing widespread destruction. Augustus, angry at this news, treated Herod as a subject rather than a friend of Rome (Sicker 2001: 96-99).

SYLLAEUS AND ARETAS IV:

After Herod lost the favour of Augustus, Syllaeus advised the Nabataeans to refuse to hand over the bandits or the owed money. Taking advantage of Herod's weakened position, the inhabitants of Trachonitis rebelled again. Additionally, Obodas III died, and Aenaeas, a descendant of Malichus I, claimed the crown and changed his name to Aretas IV to reinforce his claim. Aretas IV's claim to the throne was questionable, and the name change might have been an attempt to bolster his legitimacy.

At the same time, it appears that Syllaeus was attempting to seize authority. He stayed in Rome and convinced Augustus that Aretas could not be trusted (Everatt 1972: 44). He was aided in this by the fact that Augustus was already enraged that Aretas had assumed the throne without his permission. This suggests that Augustus considered Nabataea to be a client state at the time (Gibson 2004: 42), and hence believed he should have been consulted on the succession. As a result, when Aretas brought presents to Augustus along with a warning that Syllaeus was deceitful, his messengers were turned down. While Aretas was in charge in Nabataea, he lacked the support of Rome that he required to govern efficiently. With Augustus' judgements about Aretas IV and Herod, neither Judaea nor Nabataea had a ruler with complete authority of his country. As a result of the bandit attacks from Nabataea and the Trachonitis insurrection, as well as the power struggle between Syllaeus and Aretas IV, the region sank into turmoil. After some time, Herod appointed Nicolaus of Damascus to represent him in Rome before Augustus (Knoblet 2005: 142).

SYLLAEUS IN ROME:

Josephus reports that when Herod's representative in Rome, Nicolaus, arrived there, he found that Augustus refused to meet with ambassadors from Herod due to his anger towards Herod. However, Nicolaus discovered that some of Syllaeus' supporters had turned against him and provided evidence that Syllaeus had poisoned some of King Obodas III's friends. Nicolaus saw this as an opportunity to accuse Syllaeus before Augustus and indirectly raise the issue of Herod's attack. This was a clever strategy for gaining access to Augustus, which he could not achieve directly as Herod's ambassador. Thus, attacking Syllaeus became a means to an end for Nicolaus (Josephus, AJ 16.294).

As a result, Nicolaus joined forces with Aretas' emissaries, accusing Syllaeus of poisoning Obodas III and others, having adulterous relationships with Roman and Nabataean women, supporting bandits in the region, and failing to return Herod's loan (Josephus, AJ 16.335-55). Syllaeus was accused of deceiving Augustus regarding Herod, even though he wasn't present in Nabataea. This suggests that Syllaeus may have been vying for the throne, given his significant influence in Rome.

During this period, Nabataea was under Roman rule, and aspiring kings, like Herod, had to travel to Rome for approval (Everatt 1972: 44).

When Augustus inquired for more information about Syllaeus' deceitful behavior, Nicolaus took advantage of the situation to talk about Herod's actions. Nicolaus portrayed the raid on Nabataean land as an effort by Herod to retrieve the funds that Syllaeus had borrowed. The attack was depicted as a debt recovery operation rather than a military invasion. Nicolaus also provided factual figures for the Nabataean casualties and revealed that Herod had consulted with Roman governors before launching the attack. As a result, Augustus demanded that Syllaeus tell the truth (Smith 2013: 124-5). When it was revealed that Syllaeus had given inaccurate information, which resulted in Augustus punishing Herod unjustly, Augustus was infuriated. Syllaeus was then dispatched to repay the money he owed to Herod and subsequently faced consequences. After reconciling with Herod, Augustus considered giving him the kingdom of Nabataea, but after learning about Herod's heirs and realizing that he was old and weak, he decided to leave the kingdom to Aretas IV to maintain stability. Consequently, Aretas was officially declared as the king of Nabataea (Josephus, AJ 16.355).

If one were to rely solely on Josephus' *Antiquities*, they would assume that Syllaeus was executed in 9 BC. However, Syllaeus is mentioned again in Josephus' *Jewish War*, where he is said to have conspired against Herod. In War 1:574, Josephus notes that Syllaeus "disregarded Caesar's orders," implying that he avoided execution and managed to evade paying the money he owed. Based on the coins, there may have been a brief period during which both Aretas IV and Syllaeus held power, before Syllaeus once again overstepped his boundaries in 6 BC. Josephus also alleges that Syllaeus was responsible for the deaths of several of Aretas' associates. Furthermore, Syllaeus refused to repay what he owed to Herod and instead bribed Augustus' treasurer and one of Herod's bodyguards, Corinthus (Josephus AJ. 16.282). The conspiracies were ultimately uncovered, and those implicated were tried initially in Syria and then in Rome. It is probable that Syllaeus was executed in 6 BC, having managed to evade death in 9 BC after being exposed as a deceiver to Augustus (Strabo, *Geography*, 16.4.24).

THE SYLLAEUS COINS:

Several coins were found that were dated from the turbulent period after Obodas' death, and they displayed the impact of Syllaeus and his followers in Nabataea during that time. During a period when Syllaeus was in Rome and Aretas had not yet been officially recognized as the ruler by Augustus, Syllaeus may have been the one who was closest to receiving recognition from Augustus. The coins were likely produced to highlight this fact and initially served as a challenge to Aretas. However, subsequent coins indicated a more collaborative relationship between the two (Schwentzel 2005: 154-55; Kropp 2013: 477; Meshorer 1975:

36- 40). The coins that featured Syllaeus may have utilized images of Obodas III to lend credibility to Syllaeus' claim to the throne. A discovered inscription in Miletus, erected by Syllaeus as a tribute to King Obodas, presented Syllaeus as a person of high rank and "brother to the king." The inscription indicated the date in the form of a year during Obodas III's reign instead of using Aretas or Syllaeus' rule as a reference point. Syllaeus' use of Obodas' portrait on coins may have been an attempt to justify his seizure of power based on his relationship with the previous king. However, it seems that he lacked the confidence to depict himself as the king in his own right on the coins.

The silver coins linked to Syllaeus weighed approximately 2.2g, which was significantly lighter than the typical weight of 4.5g for the silver coins of Obodas III and Aretas IV. Among the coins connected to Syllaeus, an even smaller coin was discovered, weighing just 0.86g, which was worn and perforated. The reason for this difference in weight could be attributed to the power struggle that ensued after the death of Obodas, where Syllaeus required silver to gain the support of the army and in Rome. Consequently, there was a shortage of silver to produce coins, and the available silver had to be divided into smaller pieces for minting coins.

The silver coins have letters that stand for names, but not complete inscriptions. The prominent Aramaic letters are H and S, but they are unlikely to be numerals or dates as there are no relevant dates available. Some have suggested that the letters refer to Aretas and Shuqilat, but there are issues with this theory. Shuqilat's name doesn't appear on coins before AD 18, and the portrait on the coins looks more like Obodas than Aretas IV, with its distinctive strong chin. It's understandable why Syllaeus would make coins with Obodas' portrait based on the inscription, but it's unclear why Aretas IV would do so. The bronze coins that are linked to Syllaeus also feature the image of Obodas and the monogram of Syllaeus. A recurring design on these coins is two cornucopiae, which is similar to the symbolism found on other coins. King Aretas IV also used the image of cornucopia on some of his coins, as it was a symbol of fertility and abundance that had been adopted from the Hellenistic culture and embraced by the Nabataeans.

Figure 2a Description of the first coin's obverse and reverse.





Obverse Description	Diademed head of Obodas III right
Reverse Description	Aramaic shin (Syllaeus) and het (Aretas) within wreath
Weight	1g
Metal	Silver
Diameter	11 mm
Die Axis	
Comparison	Schmitt-Korte and Price "Nabataean Coinage III", NC 1994, pl. 10

Figure 2b Description of the second coin's obverse and reverse.

Obverse Description	Head of Nabataean ruler Obodas III, with hair in cascading rows of curls; dotted border
Reverse Description	Eagle standing left and the Aramaic shin (Syllaeus) and ḥā' (Aretas IV)
Weight	2g
Metal	Silver
Diameter	15 mm
Die Axis	
Comparison	Meshorer 1975, Coin No. 40

If both Aretas and Syllaeus are seen together on coins, it may suggest that they were allies rather than enemies. Syllaeus was previously dismissed from Rome in 9 BC, and although Aretas was the king, Syllaeus still had enough support to cause trouble. This resulted in a situation where neither Aretas nor Syllaeus could remove each other from power. This explains why the letters "Ḥ" and "S" appear together on coins, first with the portrait of Obodas during the succession dispute, and then with Aretas' portrait after his succession was confirmed by Rome (Schmitt-Korte and Price 1994, 101). The existence of Obodas' image indicates Syllaeus' and his supporters' influence. The little silver coins were still in circulation 10 or 11 years into Aretas' reign (SchmittKorte and Price 1994: 102). In War 1:574, Josephus also alluded to this alliance when he

stated that Aretas was just Syllaeus' king, implying that any earlier wars had ended.

CONCLUSION:

According to historical and archaeological evidence, Syllaeus was a significant figure in the history of the Nabataean culture. During the reign of Aretas IV, the relationship between the Nabataeans and the Romans grew stronger. It can be argued that the Romans saw Aretas IV as a suitable economic partner, while he benefited from their military power. However, the Romans were aware of Syllaeus' ambitions, which eventually led to his downfall.

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