

# Exploring the Phenomenon of Nascent Collective Bargaining in Botswana and the Inexperience Challenges of Industrial Relations Parties

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## Abstract

Due to unequal power relations in the workplace, the centrality of collective bargaining cannot be over-emphasised. Collective bargaining is the central component of industrial relations; it provides mutual understanding and partnership in the workplace. A thriving economy has kept Botswana stable, but collective bargaining has not been as successful. Although trade unions have the freedom to organize, Botswana lacks knowledge and experience in collective bargaining, and the platform of collective bargaining has not been utilized effectively (Tshukudu, 2022). The country institutionalised collective bargaining in 2008, and its track record has been unsatisfactory. The study used exploratory research design to explore collective bargaining in the public sector in Botswana. The study used fifteen participants that were selected from the public service. The findings of the study demonstrate that collective bargaining is still new in Botswana, hence bargaining parties lack capacity in terms of proper and full implementation of collective bargaining. The study recommends capacity building for social partners. Training of bargaining parties on collective bargaining needs to be prioritised. The study also notes that for full development of collective bargaining, bargaining parties should avoid politicisation of collective bargaining.

**Keywords:** Botswana, Collective Bargaining, ILO Employment Relations, Pluralist Perspective.

## 1. Introduction

Botswana's economy has been thriving, which has kept the country steady for a time, but collective bargaining is not as stable. Despite a lengthy history of industrial relations that precedes its independence, Botswana lacks knowledge and expertise in collective bargaining, and while trade unions are free to organize, the country's collective bargaining machinery has not been utilized effectively (Tshukudu, 2021). Collective bargaining was institutionalized in Botswana since 2008, but its results have been disappointing. The government of Botswana changed several of its labor laws to conform to ILO regulations in accordance with worldwide norms. As a result, the Public Service Act No. 30 of 2008 was created in order to ratify several ILO conventions. Despite the requirement for the establishment of social dialogue institutions like the PSBC, these are not functional, and trade unions are treated as junior partners. The legislation offers protection to trade unions on bargaining rights, but the environment appears to be repressive. This has led to continuous legal battles around collective bargaining, rendering the PSBC ineffective and dysfunctional. The players have a long way to go in terms of making collective bargaining work in Botswana. To this end, the study objective was to establish the general landscape of collective bargaining in Botswana.

Collective bargaining is a process of group decision-making. The ILO (2011) defines collective bargaining as a procedure for jointly determining laws that control labor-management interactions and the terms and conditions of employee employment. The process of reciprocal exchange that characterises the negotiations gives both sides a say in the terms and circumstances of work (ILO Flagship Report, 2022). It concerns "joint decision-making, problem-solving, and joint responsibility in conducting relations between employers and employees" (Zvobgo, 2019, p.5). Employers and employees are given a voice and a stake in the workplace and society through collective bargaining. It is a "crucial method to regulate the relationship between management and employees and a means to settle disputes through joint decision making" (Zvobgo, 2019, p. 5).

## **2. Theoretical Framework**

English labor historians Sidney and Beatrice Webb are credited with establishing the pluralist school of thinking in industrial relations. The pluralist industrial relations paradigm examines work and the relationship between employers and employees in imperfect labor markets from a theoretical standpoint that is based on the inherent conflict of interest between them (Budd et al. 2004). This approach acknowledges that because labor and capital have different interests, conflict is unavoidable and inescapable. According to Fox (1974), the pluralist school of industrial relations lies in the middle of these

two schools of thought. It maintains that employment relationships are characterized by a variety of competing interests, such as higher wages versus lower labor costs, job security versus flexibility, a safe workplace versus high output, as well as common interests, such as productive workers, successful employers, and a strong economy. Therefore, rather than having one dominate the other, "the equilibrium of capital and labor" is required (Budd et al. 2004).

The pluralist perspective is democratic and has a human face. This is noted by Kaufman, (1988), that under the paradigm of pluralist industrial relations, people are modelled as behavioral or human agents as opposed to just as economic agents. Therefore, conflicting interests are balanced by a complex person and group interactions influenced by institutions, behavioral decision-making processes, norms, and values as well as by market forces, which are frequently flawed and benefit employers (Budd 2004). Thus, conflict and disputes are kept inside frameworks like collective bargaining, which allows both sides to have a say in choices that have an impact on their life at work.

### **2.1 Literature Review on Collective Bargaining**

In Botswana, collective bargaining began to operate in 2011, however the government, as the employer, was never prepared for this change. During one of the collective bargaining meetings, negotiations collapsed because employer representatives had to leave the meeting to obtain a mandate from their principals on issues that were raised during negotiations (Kgamanyane, 2019). This was also noted by Bogosi (2018) that sending parties without the ability to make decisions undermines the level of representation at the PSBC. For collective bargaining to take place, all parties must agree to negotiate in good faith, which necessitates sending representatives with the power and mandate to make final decisions. For collective bargaining to be meaningful, all parties must adhere to the following rules: employers and trade unions must negotiate in good faith and try their best to come to an agreement; additionally, sincere and productive discussions are essential to building and preserving a relationship of trust between the parties (Gernigon et. al., 2000). Furthermore, as both employers and trade unions are legally obligated to engage in good faith negotiations and make an effort to reach an agreement, there should be no unwarranted delays in starting talks (Gernigon et. al, 2000). A study by Bogosi (2018) in Botswana, discovered that the majority of participants (12 out of 16) identified concerns about the representatives' ability to engage in collective bargaining at the national level as a negative aspect. The study by Bogosi (2018) found that sending parties who don't have the decision-making power, at the National Bargaining Collective Bargaining, compromises the level of representation, lowers the bar for the negotiation

process, and that the egos obstruct the bargaining process. Bogosi (2018) found that trade unions have consistently dispatched a high-level delegation or representation, whilst employers have consistently assigned delegates lacking any formal status.

It was once more evident that DPSM was not prepared to collaborate with trade unions during a 2019 meeting that was held to discuss the rules of engagement and the schedule of meetings (Kgamanyane, 2019). The first meeting of the bargaining council, which addressed salary negotiations in 2016–17, included yet another attack on collective bargaining. Thus, at the kgotla summit, President Lieutenant-General Ian Khama declared that the government will implement a three percent pay increase (Tshukudu, 2021). The announcement was made during a sitting of the bargaining council. Due to the President's unilateral stance on negotiable matters, the bargaining council was no longer effective. This shows a lack of regard for and dedication to social discourse institutions. According to Befort (1985), the employer typically ignores the trade unions since they have the power to unilaterally alter laws that serve their interests even after reaching a stalemate in negotiations over required matters. Unilateral change weakens the collective bargaining process by altering the negotiating balance established by laws making trade unions ineffective in the eyes of unit employees (Befort, 1985).

### **3. Methodology**

To answer the overarching research questions, the study employed qualitative research methods. The goal of qualitative research is to provide answers to the "what," "why," and "how" questions regarding a phenomenon of interest (Creswell, 2003). There is a repertoire of qualitative research strategies, which include narrative, ethnography, phenomenology, case study and grounded theory (Creswell, 2007). To understand the overall context of collective bargaining in Botswana, the study employed a phenomenological research approach and was qualitative in character. Phenomenology research strategy gives fresh perspectives on why things occur the way they do from a first-person perspective.

A purposeful selection of fifteen (15) participants was obtained from the public service. Public service trade unions, the Ministry of Employment, Labour Productivity and Skills Development (MELSD), the employer (the Directorate of Public Service Management), industrial court judges, and public service workers (shop stewards) were among the participants. The names of the research subjects, who were named in the study as subjects 1–15, were replaced with pseudonyms. Heaton (2022) argues that this offers confidentiality and anonymity, encompassing not only participant names but also identifiable characteristics like jobs, organizations, institutions,

and geographic locations. The table below displays the demographic analysis of the participant.

**Table 1:** Participants' biographical data

<b>Participant Pseudonym</b>	<b>Category of participant</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Age (years)</b>	<b>Experience (Years)</b>	<b>Interview duration (Hours)</b>
Participant 1	DPSM	Male	43 to 45	10 to 15	2.4000
Participant 2	Trade union	Male	<40	10 to 15	2.1667
Participant 3	Trade union	Male	40 to 42	10 to 15	3.0833
Participant 4	MELSD	Female	>45	10 to 15	1.7833
Participant 5	DPSM	Female	43 to 45	10 to 15	2.2500
Participant 6	MELSD	Female	43 to 45	>15	2.1667
Participant 7	Shop steward	Male	40 to 42	10 to 15	1.5833
Participant 8	Shop steward	Female	43 to 45	<10	2.0000
Participant 9	Trade union	Female	43 to 45	10 to 15	2.7333
Participant 10	Shop steward	Male	43 to 45	>15	1.9333
Participant 11	Industrial court	Male	43 to 45	<10	0.9167
Participant 12	MELSD	Male	40 to 42	10 to 15	1.2667
Participant 13	Industrial court	Male	>45	<10	0.9833
Participant 14	DPSM	Female	40 to 42	<10	1.6500
Participant	Industrial	Male	40 to	10 to 15	0.4167

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**Source:** Author's fieldwork

Data collection is the systematic and well-defined process of obtaining and assessing varied data so that the researcher can, respond to research questions, and analyse findings. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in-person to gather data. The study adhered to research ethics. The goal of the study was explained to the participants, and they were provided with the assurance that participation in the study was voluntary. Thereafter they were asked to sign the consent form.

#### **4. Findings of the Study**

The study's goal was to determine Botswana's level of collective bargaining. According to the current study's findings, Botswana's public sector employs a hybrid form of collective bargaining.

Participants were asked to give a broad assessment of the collective bargaining situation in Botswana. Because collective bargaining is new in Botswana, the main concerns that were brought up focused on a lack of capacity.

##### **4.1 Collective Bargaining New**

Most of the participants indicated that collective bargaining is still at its infancy stage. They remarked that parties are trying to come to terms with a consultative environment, as the employer was used to doing things unilaterally. Now, with the advent of trade unions and collective bargaining, parties need to cooperate in order to make decisions jointly, but the government, as the employer, was never prepared for this change in perspective.

Regarding this, Participant 10 stated:

*"Before the Trade Union and Employers' Organisation Act of 2004, there were no unions, but associations. Therefore, without unions, negotiations were more of the government as the employer consulting trade unions. The shift from a consultative environment in 2011 to a bargaining environment was a challenge for the employer. That's why we ultimately had a strike".*

Similar sentiments were expressed by Participant 12:

*"The new environment now under the Trade Union and Employers' Organisation Act of 2004, is whereby you must sit down engage each other and negotiate. The shift created confusion and tension for the employer".*

The results of the study showed that the bargaining council collapsed as soon as collective bargaining began to work. The Public Service Bargaining Council's demise did not, however, prevent the parties from communicating with one another. Employers and trade unions continue to interact, albeit outside of the appropriate framework. In light of the Public Service Bargaining Council's demise, the trade unions have taken collective action to engage in negotiations with the employer. The comments of the participants regarding how they interact with one another when negotiating pay and working conditions are shown in Table 5.2 below.

**Table 2:** Participants' responses on the status of negotiations

Participant	Response
Participant 1	"With the collapse of the bargaining council we then had to bargain on bilateral bases, deal with unions one by one".
Participant 10	"In the absence of sectoral bargaining structures, we have a problem. What is in existence now, it is whereby unions join together and negotiate with the employer".
Participant 3	"Collapse of the bargaining council gave birth to the aspect of acting jointly or cooperating union, hence the arrangement of the 6 cooperating trade unions, i.e BBLAWU, BOPEU, MANUAL WORKERS, BONU, BOSETU, BTU".
Participant 7	"There is an arrangement where you have a coordinator for 5 cooperating trade unions to bring us together on issues that we have to do as a collective".
Participant 8	"As it is, we negotiate as a block of trade unions with the employer. There are six cooperating trade unions, BOSETU, BLLAHWU, BTU, BONU, Manual Workers and BOPEU. We meet with the employer to negotiate issues that cut across such as issues of salary increments".
Participant 14	"Collective bargaining started to be functional in 2011. We are not happy with the state of collective bargaining, because the structure that is supposed to be used for collective

	bargaining, the Public Service Bargaining Council is not functional. Parties meet elsewhere, outside the formal structure that is recognised by the law”.
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**Source:** Author’s fieldwork

Participants are not satisfied with the current status of collective bargaining, despite the fact that it is a relatively new phenomenon in Botswana. The majority of them said that collective bargaining has not advanced much and has been constrained for a long time. According to the study's results, parties have been meeting outside of the official framework needed for collective bargaining since the bargaining council disbanded. While the fact that parties are still interacting through the six cooperating trade unions (BBLAWU, BOPEU, MANUAL WORKERS, BONU, BOSETU, and BTU) and the employer, parties should move fast to resuscitate the formal structure, that is, the Public Service Bargaining Council. The sections below outline the study’s findings on the capacity of parties to engage on collective bargaining.

#### **4.2 Lack of Capacity**

All participants mentioned that collective bargaining is a novel idea in Botswana. There is a shortage of capacity because it is a new phenomenon, particularly on the part of the government. A lapse in administration was also observed as a result of the frequent transfers and changes of public officials. This has an impact on collective bargaining's effectiveness and overall growth in Botswana's public sector.

Participant 3 stated:

*“There is still a lack of capacity on the side of the employer. There is a gap in terms of comprehension of what ought to be done so far as collective bargaining is concerned. The government keeps on changing administrative leadership. There are frequent changes in the government enclave. They continuously chop their permanent secretaries, replace them, there is no continuity and institutional memory on their part”.*

Additionally, Participant 3 said:

*“On the other side, trade unions have invested in capacity building for their leadership and staff. They have participated in international conferences for the ILO, and general training. Trade unions have vast experience”.*

As the employer, the government is held accountable for its reluctance to invest in capacity building for full development of collective bargaining. Employers who do not



make investments in capacity building show a lack of commitment to collective bargaining. Hence, Participant 4 said:

*“ reluctance to invest in capacity building by the employer, there is imbalance at negotiations table. Usually, there will be variance in terms of capacity and understanding of issues and the negotiation process”.*

Participant 5 commented:

*“On the employer side, officers are not well vested on collective bargaining. There is a need for capacity building. Trade unions are more experienced. When we go for negotiations, you will realise they talk to issues at a higher level”.*

Additionally, Participant 8 pointed out that government negotiators lack bargaining skills and mentioned:

*“Government negotiators are just people without skills, just because someone is the permanent secretary they sent for negotiations without a thorough understanding of collective bargaining”.*

Similarly, Participant 9 said:

*“Trade Unions even told the employer to capacitate the negotiators, because they don’t act as negotiators but bosses of trade unions. The employer acted on that. The training was also extended to trade unions. It was carried out by the ILO Pretoria office”.*

A closer look at the participants' responses shows that politics has an impact on the full development of collective bargaining. Political figures who make important decisions are frequently replaced, which has an impact on current initiatives and ongoing talks. In terms of politics and the frequent change in politicians (cabinet) and government officers, Participant 4 stated:

*“Collective bargaining is affected by politics. Politics always has a bearing on collective bargaining. We negotiated some labour changes with Hon Mabeo, then inherited by Hon Balopi, he then left, in the process came Hon Shamukuni, then Hon Mokhehi. These changes affect the programme altogether in terms of labour administration and history”.*

In agreement with Participant 4, Participant 10 stated:

*“Problem is the frequent changes of senior officers (permanent secretaries and ministers) in government offices. When they come in, one has to start afresh explaining to new officers what is on the table. At times, they do not understand the need for*

*that, hence the buy in of these people becomes a process. At times, you explain and agree, then a year later comes a different officer and you will have to start afresh with them”.*

The findings indicate discontent with the employer’s mandate giver. Due to a lack of capacity, government negotiators act as decision makers. Employer negotiators attend meetings without a mandate, leading to delayed negotiations. It was noted that this is exacerbated by the fact that it is not clear who is the employer’s mandate giver.

In this regard, Participant 1 uttered:

*“There was an era where there was a problem with mandate giving. The former President was responsible for most decisions. The negotiators from the government side came without a mandate. The problem was not with them, but with the higher office. We had challenges then, but from 2018 to now we haven’t had many problems”.*

Similarly, Participant 2 posited:

*“In terms of principles for collective bargaining, no party should go for negotiations without a mandate. If you look at public service collective bargaining, you cannot divorce it from political interference. The mandate for government/DPSM normally comes from the Ministry of Finance. If, for example, you talk about salary increments, ‘PEMANDU’ will have cost implications. You cannot do it without a mandate from finance”.*

Analysis of participants’ responses in terms of who should be the mandate giver revealed divergent views. Participants postulated that the employer lacks the capacity for collective bargaining. They do not understand a fixed mandate and a flexible mandate.

Participant 3 pronounced:

*“It emerged that employer representatives, to some extent, understand what needs to be done. The problem now becomes their mandate givers. There is no clarity as to who a mandate giver for the employer is. At some point the president is directly giving the mandate, at times that mandate is rigid and fixed”.*

In line with the above, Participant 5 mentioned:

*Mandate giver for government should be the Minister or State President. The finance minister should also have a say”.*

In this respect, Participant 8 said:

*“The employer negotiators attend negotiations without the mandate. We have permanent secretaries coming for negotiations without a mandate. Mandate is different; there is a fixed mandate and a flexible mandate. The employer negotiators lack understanding of the mandate and negotiations. The trade union negotiators are trained”.*

There is a concern with a fixed mandate because it leads to protracted and bitter negotiations. When the parties attend negotiations with a fixed mandate, it frustrates the other party and ultimately leads to a cooling off period.

Participant 10 observed:

*“In the past, government negotiators will come to negotiations with a fixed position, for example, 3% then that’s it. They will be immovable in what they have proposed for a whole week. At the end of the week this will then trigger a clause in the rules of engagement of the cooling off period. The employer negotiators would say they want to engage mandate givers. The mandate giver, whoever it is, will still maintain the same position. We spend another week, still no progress”.*

The significant findings indicate that there is a problem with understanding the collective bargaining process. It was observed that the trade unions have invested in capacity building for their negotiators, while government negotiators have limited understanding of collective bargaining. There are always inequalities at the negotiating table because of the disparities in collective bargaining expertise. Additional examination of the data showed that government officials frequently change, which has an impact on institutional memory and continuity. Another thing to note is that it is not clear who the mandate giver is for the government as the employer. It was observed that the President occasionally issues the mandate, the Minister of Finance occasionally does, and the Minister of the State President once did. It was found that employer negotiators tend to enter negotiations with a fixed mandate and sometimes without a mandate. This causes a stalemate because it triggers a clause in the rules of engagement in terms of the cooling-off period. Hence, it is clear that the mandate giver for the government, as the employer, is a complicated aspect owing to multiple accountabilities. There are lots of government officials involved, making it difficult to identify the mandate giver for the government as the employer. The government should be well coordinated so that the many voices of the concerned offices are reconciled to represent one voice at the negotiation table.

##### **5. Discussion of Findings**

The discussion of findings regarding the overall state of collective bargaining in the public sector is covered in this section. Given that Botswana's collective bargaining system is

relatively young, having been implemented in 2008 and going into effect in 2010, it was clear that the public sector operates under a hybrid system of collective bargaining. Parties are thus unable to address this novel situation.

### **5.1 Collective Bargaining New**

According to the current study, collective bargaining is a relatively recent development in Botswana. The results of the current study show that only a small number of industries in Botswana are rationally employing collective bargaining for employment regulation, and that collective bargaining began to work in the country between 2010 and 2011. Trade unions were introduced with the ratification of the Trade Unions and Employers Organisation Act of 2004. Before 2004, trade unions were registered as associations, so they did not have bargaining rights. The above was noted by Participant 10 that:

*“Before the Trade Union and Employers’ Organisation Act of 2004, there were no unions but associations. Therefore, without unions, negotiations were more of the government as the employer consulting trade unions....”.*

According to the current study, the government's role as an employer was limited to contacting trade unions; it was not required to engage in collective bargaining. This is in line with Tshukudu (2021), that though Botswana has a long history of industrial relations, there is limited consultation. The Trade Unions and Employers Organization Act of 2004 marked the beginning of unionization in the public sector. Current labor unions, such as BOPEU, changed their name from Botswana Civil Service Association to BOPEU. Employers and trade unions can now participate in collaborative decision-making. The results of this study showed that Botswana's tardy adoption of collective bargaining has an impact on its employees. Due to the late development of collective bargaining, parties are trying to catch up with the lost time, as the standard of living has left the workers behind. This complicates collective bargaining because trade unions will feel that the workers, as creators of wealth, are left behind. From that standpoint, Participant 9 remarked:

*“Before 2004 there was no bargaining, and because there was no bargaining the cost and standard of living has left us behind. When we now say let’s start bargaining it becomes difficult to have 100 percent of what we need”.*

Participant 14 shared a similar view and stated:

*“Now that bargaining is in place, there is a big gap, because government was deciding alone on what to do, and still, you cannot expect to have 100 percent salary increase. You must do it gradually”.*

The current study's findings also showed that despite the nation's domestication of ILO collective bargaining norms, the government remains unresponsive to collective bargaining. They provided examples of how the employer thwarted attempts at collective bargaining. Werbner (2014) noted and denounced Botswana's propensity to disregard existing laws and court rulings. The paradigm shift from unilateral decision-making to joint decision-making seems to have shocked the government. There is a need to embrace a pluralist approach to collective bargaining. The conflicting interests are balanced by complex individual and group interactions influenced by institutions, behavioural decision-making processes, norms, and values as well as by market forces, which are frequently flawed and benefits employers (Budd 2004). Kgamanyane (2019) said that negotiations broke down during one of the collective bargaining meetings due to the employer representatives' need to leave the meeting in order to get a mandate from their bosses on topics that were brought up during the negotiations, demonstrating the lack of readiness for the paradigm change. This indicates that the government, in its capacity as an employer, is still struggling to accept collaborative decision-making.

## **5.2 Lack of Capacity**

The current study also found that there is a lack of capacity for collective bargaining due to the reason that collective bargaining is a new phenomenon in Botswana. There is a need for continuous training for social partners on collective bargaining. The findings of the current study demonstrate that, due to the lack of technical know-how on the processes and procedures for collective bargaining, parties end up politicising collective bargaining. Politicisation of collective bargaining is counter-productive to the full development of collective bargaining. This is also supported by Ndlozi (2010) that trade unions should be careful in being absorbed in national politics, because they end up neglecting the interest of the workers. Ndlozi (2010) further remarked that though the Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU) was instrumental in placing great emphasis on democratic grassroots-based structures in 1970, it did not benefit from this approach. The lesson from CWIU under COSATU in the 1970s provides a good lesson that workers' issues cannot be mixed with national politics because the latter always prevails. Mogalakwe (1994) also cautions that trade unions should understand the line between capitalism and acting against the system of slavery.

The current study also observed the politicisation of decision-making, which distorts collective bargaining. Participant 10 noted this:

*"Some decisions may be the right ones for the welfare of*

*workers, but might not be popular to enough for political mileage or to support to interests of the ruling class”.*

This implies that, some decision may be good for the welfare of the workers, but not favourable for the interests of the political elites. The interest of politicians in the collective bargaining procedure impedes the smooth running of the bargaining process. The current study found that government/employer representatives always revert to their masters (political elites) for instructions and mandate. The main challenge with politicisation of collective bargaining is that the interest of politicians always prevails over the interest of the workers. Politicisation of collective bargaining is prohibited by the PSA Part XIII (56), “collective bargaining councils within the public service shall not allow politics or anything which may be reasonably regarded as being of political nature to interfere with or influence their activities”. Though prohibited by the statutes, the law cannot completely impose good faith bargaining, it is dependent upon the relationship between the parties. The parties especially the employer should understand the centrality of a pluralist approach in industrial relations. The pluralist approach is against the dominance of one player, it calls for an

“The equilibrium of capital and labor” (Budd et al. 2004). This can only be realised through sound collective bargaining. The employer should view the workers as behavioural or human agents rather than just as economic agents (Kaufman, 1999). The current study's findings demonstrate that political interference cloud collective bargaining and leads to bad-faith bargaining. Though the public servants serve the agenda set by politicians, the employer should consider reducing political interference in collective bargaining.

## **6. Summary of the Study**

In a nutshell the study found that collective bargaining is a new phenomenon in Botswana. Collective bargaining has been stunted for a long time and there is little growth and progress. It was evident that the required platform for collective bargaining the PSBC collapsed and parties have been meeting outside the required formal structure. The study also found that, parties lack the capacity for collective bargaining. Collective bargaining is marred by unitary decision making, politicisation of decision making, lapses in administration owing to frequent changes and transfers of public officers. All these factors have affected the success and complete development of collective bargaining in Botswana’s public service.

It is hoped that the study offer a practical guide to social partners on better relations for sound collective bargaining in Botswana. The study is also significant to

sensitise the government and social partners to appreciate that collective bargaining is meant to attain industrial peace and democracy, not at any price. Parties must demonstrate commitment to collective bargaining in respect of the latter and spirit.

The study recommend that parties prioritise capacity building on collective bargaining. The complete development of collective bargaining is hampered by disproportionate numbers of semi-skilled workers, especially when it comes to collective bargaining. There is a need for a wide range of technical skills, including those related to the collective bargaining process, bargaining in good faith, decision-making, negotiation and on collective bargaining institutions such as bargaining councils, which should be included in capacity building.

Regarding the study's limits, despite its strength, the research was limited by a few impediments. The study was carried out in Gaborone, which is home to government ministries and trade union headquarters. Geographical dispersion and budgetary constraints prevented the inclusion of trade union members and government workers outside of Gaborone. As a result, the sample could not accurately reflect the population as a whole. Creswell (2014) has identified several limitations of qualitative research, including the inability to generalize findings, the lack of numerical representation of data, and the use of a small number of participants. The study used participants who are skilled and experienced with collective bargaining in order to minimize this limitation.

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