

Pancasila as the Single Principle: Its Urgency for the Importance of Indonesian Muslims

Makrum¹, Taufiqur Rohman², Ahmad Asrof Fitri³, Teti Hadiati⁴

Abstract

This paper aims to explore and explain the urgency of the Single Principle of Pancasila for the benefit of Indonesian Muslims. This writing was inspired by President Soeharto's speech in front of the session of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia on August 16, 1982, which raised, among other things, the urgency of the Single Principle of Pancasila for the national unity and integrity. However, this, later, received strong protests, especially from Muslims, because it was considered that it would make Pancasila a religion. In fact, the main mission of the Single Principle of Pancasila is to solve the basis issue of the community organizations before the state of Indonesia was passed on to the Post-45 generations. Using a historical-socio-political approach, it can be seen that behind the acceptance of Pancasila as the only principle by Muslims there is a great wisdom, namely the loss of concern or suspicion that Muslims have not fully accepted a national state based on Pancasila. With this loss of suspicion, the interests of Muslims are getting more attention from the state, among them are: (1) religious teachings are increasingly permissible, even supported; (2) the aspirations of Muslims one after another are fulfilled, such as the enactment of the Religious Justice Act, the National Education System Act, the Compilation of Islamic Law, the broadcasting of Arabic lessons on television; (3) religious life is becoming more vibrant; and (4) Islamic studies are also developing. However, when there was a reform, the policy of enforcing the Single Principle of Pancasila was actually revoked with the issuance of the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly Number: XVIII / MPR / 1998 of 1998, thus opening up opportunities for riots and divisions of the nation.

Key Words: The Single Principle of Pancasila, Muslims, Indonesia.

¹ Postgraduate of UIN KH. Abdurrahman Wahid Pekalongan, Indonesia, makrum@iainpekalongan.ac.id

² Postgraduate of UIN KH. Abdurrahman Wahid Pekalongan, Indonesia, taufigur.rohman@iainpekalongan.ac.id

³ Islamic Institute of Az-Zaytun Indramayu, 45264, Indonesia, asrof.fitri@iai-alzaytun.ac.id

⁴ Islamic Law Faculty of UIN KH. Abdurrahman Wahid Pekalongan, Indonesia, teti.hadiati@iainpekalongan.ac.id

Introduction

This paper aims to explore and explain the urgency of the Single Principle of Pancasila for the benefit of Indonesian Muslims. This writing was inspired by President Soeharto's state speech before the session of the House of Representatives on August 16, 1982, which touched, among others, on the Single Principle of Pancasila. According to the President, in order to maintain the integrity of the nation, the basic problems for civic organizations must be resolved, before the state is "weighed" to the Post-45 generation. If this fundamental problem has not been resolved, it will be even more difficult to restore the integrity of the nation, if there are national crises such those occurred during the 40 years of Indonesia's independence, the last betrayal of the G30S/PKI in 1965 (Munawir Sjadzali, 1995:78).

After the events of the G 30 S/PKI in 1965, the problem of security among religious people occurred and heated up. At that time, several events arose in some areas that disrupted the harmony among religious people, and in turn, interfered the national unity and integrity (Tarmizi Tahir, 1995, 138). It was also considered that the problem of disharmony potentially disturbed the process of national development, so the President, in his State Speech, reminded people about Pancasila as the Single Principle of Indonesia. However, the President's speech was met with strong protests from Muslims. Some of them conveyed the aspirations of Friday's pulpits and rallies. There were also those who held grand meetings, such as, among others, at the Great Mosque of al-Azhar Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta, in September 1982. Among them was an Islamic figure who loudly said that even until the sky fell, it was impossible for his organization to accept Pancasila as the only principle, there was also one who invited the Minister of Religious Affairs to argue openly in the public pulpit. The extreme result of one of their forms of rejection was the Tanjung Priok Incident in September 1984 (Munawir Sjadzali, 1995: 10 and 81).

However, finally, Muslims accepted Pancasila as the only principle for their civic organization. The question is what is the wisdom behind this acceptance for Indonesian Muslims? Using a historical-socio-political approach, this question will be answered in the following description.

Approaches and Methods

This research implemented a historical-socio-political approach, in which the problems discussed are socio-political problems that occurred in the past. By implementing this approach, the author used various explanations about the symptoms related to socio-politics in the past (Winarno Surachmat, 1975:123). In this case, information about the Single Principle of Pancasila was sought, by researching the

motivation, the purpose and objectives of Pancasila determination, and also paying attention to the object of the problem being studied by indicating the chronological-historical framework of the problem. The textual approach was used to track and study the texts of laws, decrees, official documents in the form of reports, written speeches of the President, speeches of ministers, archives, and others, both related to policy and program implementation. These documents were analyzed by the content analysis method, which analyzed the content based on the document.

All collected data then were classified according to the specified theme, and put forward using a descriptive method, that was, a problem-solving procedure that was investigated by describing the state of the research object based on the facts that appear as they were (Hadari Nawawi, 1987:62). This method was chosen in line with the purpose of writing this paper, namely to get an adequate description of the urgency of the Single Principle of Pancasila for the benefit of Indonesian Muslims.

Determination, Socialization, and Acceptance of the Single Principle of Pancasila

The President's state speech before the session of the House of Representatives on August 16, 1982, was followed up in the General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) of the Republic of Indonesia in March 1983 with the ratification of the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia No. IV / MPR RI / Year 1983 concerning Pancasila as the only principle for the life of society, nation and state, and its implementation by religious organizations. In its implementation, the Minister of Religious Affairs as the President's main aide in the religious affairs had the task of socializing it. Therefore, the Minister of Religious Affairs invited religious figures in Indonesia to find ways how to implement the MPR Decree, without reducing the integrity of the creed and faith.

Based on the principle that the MPR did not have any intention to replace religion with Pancasila, or to "ENVISION" Pancasila, the Minister of Religious Affairs began to socialize the MPR Decree. The only motivation of the mandate of the MPR Decree was to solve the basis issue of the community organizations before the state of Indonesia was passed on to the Post-45 generations. As the first step was the dissemination of Pancasila as the Single Principles to the forums of Religious People, where representatives of religious assemblies were MUI (Islam), PGI (Christianity), KWI (Catholicism), Parisada Hindu Dharma (Hinduism), and Walubi (Buddhism) (Munawir Sjadzali, 1995:78).

At the invitation of the Minister of Religious Affairs, the forum convened a meeting in December 1983, and succeeded in formulating mind ideas as the contribution to the government, in this case the Ministry of Home Affairs, for the drafting of the Public Relations Bill. Meanwhile, the NU Alim Ulama National Deliberation which also took place in December 1983, after a strong debate and a convincing argument, finally made a decision that NU could accept Pancasila as the only principle for the organization, with the understanding of the intactness of *aqidah islamiyah ahl al-sunnah wa al-jama'ah*. A few days before that, the NU family of the Cipete Group had also taken a similar decision. These decisions were finally confirmed at the NU Mukhtar in Situbondo in December 1984 (Munawir Sjadzali, 1995:79).

Muhammadiyah was not as fast as NU in determining attitudes, but it was also not *a priori* to reject, but rather clarified on the position of Islam Pancasila if Pancasila was accepted as the only organizational principle. Muhammadiyah carried out some efforts through all levels: by meeting the Chairman of the Muhammadiyah Central Board (PP), KH.A.R. Fachruddin, with the President; approaching the ministers concerned, in particular the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religious Affairs; and by meeting the leaders and factions of the House. In recent times, it was not Muhammadiyah who asked to be accepted, but even invited by the leadership of the DPR, by the Special Committee (Pansus) and by the factions, as the DPR circles also invited other religious figures and groups, to be asked for their views.

Furthermore, on every occasion, President Soeharto always emphasized the need for a single principle, for example during a *bihalal halal* with ABRI officers on July 17, 1983 (Light Hope, July 18, 1983). Also in his mandate in front of the participants of the Pepabri central meeting on September 26, 1983 (Light Hope, July 27, 1983) and when receiving the leadership of the KNPI on September 20, 1983 in Bina Graha (Daily Independent, August 15, 1983).

In commemoration of the Death of the Prophet Muhammad, December 1983, President Soeharto reiterated the need for a single principle for political parties and the Golongan Karya, as well as for all community organizations in Indonesia.

"The use of Pancasila as a principle of community organization is in no way intended to reduce the meaning and role of religion in the life of the nation. ... However, it is a must for us together to bind the various forms of activity in the same base of repulsion and direction, which is to build a socialistic Pancasila society-religious... we see the need to further strengthen Pancasila as a political principle and a principle of national society" (Time, February 4, 1983).

The Minister of Religious Affairs, Munawir Sadzali, on various occasions tried to convince Islamic figures that Pancasila did not conflict with Islamic teachings. Unlike the President who put forward many political-state considerations, Munawir used the postulate of *naqli* and *aqli*. In commemoration of *Isra' Mi'raj*, May 9, 1983 at the Istiqlal Mosque, the Minister of Religious Affairs reiterated once again that the acceptance of Pancasila as the only political principle does not contradict the teachings of Islam (Munawir Sadzali, 1985:61).

According to the Minister of Religious Affairs, there are several basic values in Islamic teachings that guide social and state life: (1) balanced attention between spiritual well-being and worldly happiness; (2) recognition of individual rights, equality among human beings and equality of justice; (3) a deliberative system in handling joint problems; (4) leadership is a mandate and responsibility; and (5) the necessity of being obedient to (the) the leaders (Munawir Sadzali, 1985:62). These basic values have essentially been well proclaimed and harmonious in Pancasila. After these basic values were proclaimed, Islam did not give preference to the standard political pattern. The Muslims are given the freedom to determine the pattern of society and state according to their respective situations and conditions and in accordance with the culture behind their lives (Munawir Sadzali, 1985:66). This is why, in countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, there is no uniformity of the constitutional system (Munawir Sadzali, 1985:66). "The existence of this freedom does not mean that the teachings of Islam are incomplete, but rather shows the flexibility and height of Islamic teachings that are universal, so that they can be described and applied to all times and places" (Munawir Sadzali, 1985: 66). The freedom bestowed by Allah on the Indonesian nation and other nations, allows the Indonesian nation to choose Pancasila as its principle in the life of society, nation, and state. And this is the right choice, so it is worth being grateful for.

"... thank God the Indonesian Muslims that the Indonesian nation has determined Pancasila as the foundation for its state life ... The state of Pancasila is not a secular state... In the Pancasila state, the government directly participates in fertilizing the spiritual welfare of its citizens and the security of interfaith harmony. For this purpose, from the beginning of the independence period, the Ministry of Religion was established" (Munawir Sadzali, 1985:66).

The President's remarks in the commemoration of the Prophet's Birth were very important, because at that time the Public Organization Bill was being worked on by the government. In this regard, The Minister of State Secretary Sudharmono "pressed" mass organizations to accept the single principle of Pancasila;

"... the necessity to accept Pancasila as the only principle is an absolute requirement for the guarantee of life and its existence, including the protection of community organizations and elements in society ... There are still elements in society that have not accepted the single principle of Pancasila is a source of vulnerability for national resilience" (Time, December 4, 1983)

In his remarks at the opening of the Muhammadiyah Mukhtamar, December 7, 1985 in Surakarta, President Soeharto first praised Muhammadiyah:

"... who does not know Muhammadiyah? since our nation was still in the shackles of colonialism in the past, Muhammadiyah has been known by the Indonesian people, especially in the fields of religious teachings, politics and social... All of this shows that Muhammadiyah has a special place in the hearts of the Indonesian people ... Muhammadiyah has a very rich experience and great potential to participate in inflaming the spirit of the community in making this national development a success ... " (Association of Speeches of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1985, The Field of Polkam, Ekuin, and Kesra, 1986: 448)

After presenting the services of Muhammadiyah, the President then invited Muhammadiyah to participate in National Development. Development is the practice of Pancasila, so naturally Muhammadiyah has been practicing Pancasila. Therefore, as emphasized by the President, there is no reason for Muhammadiyah to reject Pancasila as the only principle. Pancasila does not contradict the teachings of Islam (Association of Speeches of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1985, The Field of Polkam, Ekuin, and Kesra, 1986: 449)

"The affirmation of Pancasila as the only principle not only means glorifying the precepts of Pancasila which are fully in accordance with the teachings of the religion we adhere to, but also confirming our unity as a nation. We are a plural nation, both in terms of ethnicity, religion, race and class. Without a philosophy of togetherness like Pancasila, we will suffer for the fate of a divided nation. Pancasila is no match for religion. Pancasila is not a substitute for religion. Pancasila underlies our common life in society, nation and state, which cannot be recognized based on the values of a tribe, a religion, a race or a class. Pancasila does not regulate the deepest things in our personal lives as religious people, such as our faith and worship in Allah Almighty. On the contrary, Pancasila actually guarantees the best practice" (Association of Speeches of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1985, The Field of Polkam, Ekuin, and Kesra, 1986: 447-8).

After affirming the importance of Pancasila as a single principle, the President went on, addressed to Muhammadiyah: "The affirmation

of Pancasila as a principle does not mean the shrinking of the muhammadiyah charity field, but instead pushes forward to deal with the wider fields" (Association of Speeches of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1985, The Field of Polkam, Ekuin, and Kesra, 1986: 450). Closing his welcome speech, the President expressed his "personal relationship" with Muhammadiyah: "As a person who has studied Muhammadiyah, I also hope that Muhammadiyah will grow bigger, stronger and more charitable in very broad fields" (Association of Speeches of the President of the Republic of Indonesia in 1985, The Field of Polkam, Ekuin, and Kesra, 1986: 450). A happy-end finale unexpected by the muktamirins, who immediately greeted him with a standing ovation. In the muktamar, Muhammadiyah "succeeded" in establishing Pancasila as the only principle after being "islamicized" first.

Meanwhile, the acceptance of the single principle of Pancasila by HMI (Islamic Student Association) went tough. Initially, in preparation for the 15th HMI congress, May 1983, in Medan, the HMI Board had not given a full guarantee that they would receive. As a result, the permit for the implementation of the congress did not come down even though the regional envoys had arrived. There were also only two government officials present: Minister of Tourism Abdul Gafur and assistant minister of tourism. The Minister of Education did not come, nor did the Vice President who was planned to open Congress (Light Hope, May 23, 1983).

Abdul Gafur, who was also the former Chairman of the Jakarta branch of HMI, tried to influence participants to accept the single principle of Pancasila, but did not get a welcome. In fact, he was accused of being a "government lackey" who had "lost" his HMI (Light Hope, May 28, 1983). In this highest forum of HMI, Lafran Pane, one of the architects who founded HMI, also appeared. Lafran Pane asserted that "HMI is essentially an organization of nationalist struggle and only then an Islamic struggle. There was no reason for HMI to reject Pancasila," he said. The Congress decided not to amend article 4 of the Articles of Association which reads, This organization is based on Islam. In other words, it refused to list Pancasila as the only principle. The reason put forward was that there was no Laws to regulate it yet (Light Hope, May 28, 1983).

Realizing the reactive potential of the radical HMI, the government began to "work" on its members who were seen as accommodating. Through various lobbying carried out by Abdul Gafur and Akbar Tanjung, they managed to convince HMI to find a "safe way." In the Plenary Session of PB HMI on April 5, 1985 in Ciloto, West Java, HMI accepted Pancasila as the only principle. This decision was later confirmed at its congress in Padang in 1985. The implementation of

this congress was delayed by several months due to the "creation of conditions" (conditioning) by the government. In the congress managed to appear accommodative figures, after the government's "green light" for them and a "red light" for its opponents.

Some Islamic figures who opposed the single principle of Pancasila included Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the former leader of Masyumi. He delivered an open letter to President Soeharto, questioning why the government forced organizations in society to accept Pancasila as the only principle. Meanwhile, another Islamic figure, Deliar Noer, was one of the most active Islamic figures who rejected the single principle of Pancasila when his bill was discussed in the DPR. He put forward the reason that Pancasila as a single principle denied differences. Whereas "differences in similarities" are natural rights in the life of society and state. "However, in similarity there is diversity, and in diversity there is similarity. In social life, a balance between the two is needed." (Deliar Noer, 1984: 49). The idea of a single principle, said Deliar Noer, lead to the recognition of the need for a single-party system. Although this possibility was not mentioned, but the implications could be so. Furthermore, he mentioned several implications that would arise if a single principle was applied, namely (Deliar Noer, 1984: 58):

- a. disclaim the diversity of a society that develops according to their respective beliefs;
- b. to encourage people of the same faith to group their neighbors and exchange ideas of others based on beliefs, including the understandings adopted by each other;
- c. disclaim the relationship between religion and politics, which for a particular religion, let alone Islam, means contrary to its teachings. This means a push for secularization in politics;
- d. shifting the problems that need to be solved without including a typical and open basis of measure and judgment. This invites either disobedience in argumentation or hypocrisy in attitude;
- e. contains a tendency towards a single-party system. Even if this one-party system is not formally realized, then the meaning of a party system that recognizes the existence of more than one party can be said to be abolished, at least it has a formal meaning. As a result incarnates a veiled one-party system;
- f. hinder the possibility of developing understandings, such as those derived from religion, that may strengthen Pancasila in our country. As a result, people will be harmed by the lack or absence of alternative thinking for the development and development of our country.

As is well known, the criticism of these Islam figures was fruitless. At the very least, formally, Pancasila was successfully promulgated, and Islamic community organizations, whether they wanted it or not, had to accept it. The establishment of Pancasila as the only principle for the organization of community does not mean that Pancasila will replace religion and religion is impossible to be coveted; between the two there is no conflict of values. Civic organizations formed on the basis of religious similarities, setting their goals, and describing them in their respective programs, according to the nature of their specificity, and with the expansion of development, religious life and belief in God Almighty, must be increasingly realized in the social life of society (Explanation of Constitution, Number 8 of 1985).

With the quote from Explanation of Constitution Number 8 of 1985 above, the issue of the impact of the only principle of Pancasila, which was originally worried by leaders of organizations with religious characteristics, can actually be removed, because religion is not required to be based on Pancasila. In fact, it is asserted that religion cannot be tolerated; and Pancasila will not be held by religion. Thus, if paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Law are assembled (not separated), then the only principle is in society (which has various religions), state and nation (belonging to various religions). Meanwhile, religion still comes from faith according to their respective religions as previously formulated in a memorandum signed by the heads of the Religious Councils in Indonesia: MUI (Islam), PGI (Christianity), KWI (Catholicism), Parisada Hindu Dharma (Hinduism), and WALUBI (Buddhism).

Pancasila as the only principle community organization, had required thought and discussion both by officials between agencies with the coordination of the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, as well as by community leaders from leaders of religions in Indonesia. With an accommodating and consultative approach, the problem can be solved with a formulation that is acceptable to the government, the DPR, and religious leaders. Anwar Haryono, One of the Chairmen of the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII) said, "The government is now showing an accommodating nature to the aspirations of the people; which is different from the days of Guided Democracy in the past" (Hasballah Mursyid, 1995: 202).

The Wisdom of the Single Principle of Pancasila for Indonesian Muslims

After Muslims accept Pancasila as the only principle for religious community organizations, there are several wisdoms that can be taken. First, the disappearance of suspicion and the realization of the harmony of relations of the Islam people with the state. In the early days of the consolidation of the New Order government, government

officials and the ABRI were plagued by a sense of trauma to the defiance of Muslims in the past. Because, since the colonial period, Islam has appeared as an ideology of struggle and a symbol of resistance to the invaders. This ideology and symbol of value became one of the reference sources for the nationalism movement in Indonesia at the beginning of the XX century. Similarly, during the Japanese colonial period and the period after it.

During the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) convened, there was an ideological debate between Islamic figures and nationalist-secular groups about the basis of the state: Islam or Pancasila. A compromise was finally reached in the form of the Jakarta Charter. But later, the contents of the Jakarta Charter were changed thanks to Hatta's lobby and the sincerity of Islamic leaders. In the session of the Constituent Assembly, such a debate reappeared: Islam or Pancasila. This debate had not yet resulted in a solution when Bung Karno at the urging of the military announced the Decree on July 5, 1959.

As known that in the 1950s, the Darul Islam uprising aimed at establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) and began in West Java under the leadership of Kartosuwiryo, spread to Aceh with Daud Beureueh - and to South Sulawesi with Kahar Muzakkar - as its leader. At the same time, there were also rebellions between the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) and the Universal Government (Permesta) in Sumatra and North Sulawesi, both of which involved Islam and Islamic figures, such as: Moh. Natsir, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, and Burhanuddin Harahap. These latter figures were personally involved in Permesta, even though they were the leaders of masyumi.

All of the above events were imprinted in the officials of the New Order and ABRI governments, so many observers called government officials and ABRI as "Islam-phobi". That is why, when there was a desire to rehabilitate Masyumi, the government did not allow it. This trauma was further imprinted in the early days of the New Order when issues raised about the importance of the state based on Islamic ideology. The 1967-1968 MPRS sessions stagnated because the issue of the status of the Jakarta Charter reappeared on the surface. Similarly, it was the work of Islamic political parties afterwards that became the "opposition of the government". PPP (United Development Party) in the sessions of the DPR / MPR always faces the FKP, FABRI, FUD, and the government, as well as tacking every bill and Draft Decree of MPR which is considered detrimental to the interests of Muslims. In the elections, for example, the PPP, which became an "opposition party" with its Islamic label, faced the Government and Golkar as a "government party" with its development label.

However, in its development, the trauma that suffered from the government slowly disappeared, when the ideological problems of nationality in general never again came to the fore. Islam, which is the principle of PPP and Islamic mass organizations, is no longer an alternative system to Pancasila, even both are included in the AD / ART of each mass organization. PPP has always questioned the Draft Decree of MPR and the bills submitted by the government in the DPR which are seen as contrary to Islamic teachings, but the arguments that are often submitted are always based on the precepts of Pancasila and the articles of the 1945 Constitution.

The emergence of extreme Islamic movements is not widespread in society, because Muslims do not support it. However, the government still needs to conduct a political test with the application of the single principle of Pancasila. After Pancasila is "islamicized" first, then all mass organizations and social organizations list Pancasila as the only principle. "Flow politics" no longer has a place. KH. Ahmad Siddiq, Rois Aam NU statement, may be able to represent him, "The form of the Indonesian State with the foundation of Pancasila ideology and the constitutional of the 1945 Constitution is the final form of struggle of Muslims. As a consequence, past traumas began to be abandoned. The state began to see (political look) Islam and the people with a clear heart. The visits of government officials and ABRI to Islamic boarding schools are one example. Government officials, ranging from the President, Vice President, ministers, governors, to the lower levels, enthusiastically support every Islamic religious activity. The President and Vice President often open and close meetings of Islamic mass organizations. On the other hand, officials have always emphasized the need for the role of Muslims in the success of national development. The lively ritual events (worship) in the fasting month are another example.

Lt. Gen. Harsudiono Hartas, then the Head of the ABRI Police, during the 1993 MPR General Assembly, pointed out that the ABRI did not question the number of Islamic figures in the MPR. ABRI's "suspicious attitude" has been erased. The insight into the nationality of Islamic figures is beyond doubt. He said, "I consider there are indications that the awareness of national insight and the insight of the Archipelago (Muslims) is getting higher. Now, they are no longer individualistic, no longer attach importance to their groups or factions..." (Editor, No. 3, October 10, 1993, p. 26).

The relationship that allowed for more harmony between Muslims and the government in the 1980s was inseparable from the dominant role of intellectual transformation. The emergence of a new Islamic intellectualism can be seen as representing an effort that gives hope for a resolution to the problem of the disharmony of relations between

Islam and the government. So far these efforts have been made mainly through various statements of new Islamic political thought and action that are seen as more in line with the reality of Indonesia's socio-cultural and religious diversity. This intellectual work was pioneered by a new generation of Islamic thinkers and activists who since the early 1970s sought to develop a new format of Islamic politics, which emphasized substance, not form. In the model developed by these new intellectuals, Islamic and Indonesian understanding, two important elements that give cultural and structural legitimacy to the formation of the "Indonesian national unitary state" are synthesized and integrated harmoniously.

The political developments that existed during the New Order period can also be seen indirectly as a result of the expansion of the students through education. It must be admitted that Indonesian Muslims, generally, had only very limited access to the Dutch colonial education system. However, with the achievement of independence, Muslims gained wider opportunities for education. The wider opportunity began to actually be realized, especially since around the 1950s with the establishment of state universities, and more specifically Islamic universities, such as the State Islamic College (PTAIN) established in the 1950s in Yogyakarta and the Academy of Religious Sciences (ADIA) was established in 1957 in Jakarta which later changed to IAIN. This expansion of educational opportunities has been fruiting massively since the 1970s in the form of a "grand harvest of undergraduates", precisely Baccalaureate (BA) and Complete Bachelor (Drs). (Azyumardi Azra, 1999: xiv). This Intellectual Boom continued in the 1980s with a Ph.D. harvest.

Muslim scholars in the 1950s were unable to express themselves and their Islamic faith due to the repression of Sukarno and the PKI, but since the early 1970s began to surface. The muslim scholars who graduated, whether from public, private, or IAIN universities, began to enter the workforce. And in their respective workplaces, they began to actualize their Islamic faith through religious teachings and the establishment and development of Islamic institutions. As a result, it was during these times that the emergence of phenomena such as Islamic religious activities and the construction of mosques on campus began to emerge. The recitation and construction of mosques or mushalla in offices, which in the 1990s rolled into recitation activities in mosques, hotels, industrial environments, and other public places, was the result of their role.

This kind of development and activities can actually be seen as a reorientation of Muslim leaders and activists as a result of the political developments that existed in the time of the Orde Baru. This reorientation can simply be referred to as a shift from "Political Islam"

to "Cultural Islam". At the level of thought, this reorientation has strong support, among other things, from nurcholish Madjid's idea of renewal through the principles offered, such as "Islam yes, Islamic Party no", or "Islamic Party No, Islamic Party Yes." This prompted the "deconstruction" of muslim political institutions to increasingly find momentum.

From the perspective of the government, this kind of change in the orientation of Muslims, more or less reduces, if it cannot be said to eliminate, the government's own suspicion of Muslims. This change in orientation provides an opportunity for government officials -even especially President Soeharto himself- to rapprochement Muslims through various policies and political actions that for Muslims are seen as appeasements -something of a relief. So, from this began to emerge the policies of the Orde Baru government that benefited Muslims.

Second, Islam people as a development resource. Muslims as the majority of Indonesia's population have great potential for the success of development, as a source of legitimacy for the political system, and a source of vote support in every election. The potential of Muslims like this, since the beginning of consolidation, has been realized by the New Order government. It's just that, according to the development of Islamic relations with the state, in the early days of the New Order, the government co-opted Islamic mass organizations that were only loyal to him. In this case, the government then withdrew GUPPI (Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islamiyah), Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Satkar Ulama, and Persatuan Tarekat Islam, as well as established the Islamic Da'wah Council (MDI) in 1978 and the Women's Da'wah Organization, al-Hidayah, in 1979. According to Soecipto Wirosarjono, the purpose of attracting Islamic mass organizations is clearly for political purposes (Pennant Society, 1-10 March 1990) They tried to attract as many masses as possible, and because the Indonesian population was predominantly Muslim, the government approached it through Islamic mass organizations (Pennant Society, 1-10 March 1990).

The move was based on the experience of the 1971 and 1977 elections, in which the PPP with its Islamic symbol became a very serious challenge (Golkar DPP, 1981), so the government began to "islamicize" itself. In the 1982 elections, the campaigner was passed down by many scholars. The atmosphere of the campaign was created as efficiently as possible, beginning and concluding with the recitation of the holy verses of the Qur'an. The signs of government are written in Arabic, and they also provide material donation to the mosques (Suryadinata, 1992: 110).

As a source of legitimacy for the political system, Muslims have sought to be "embraced" by President Soeharto since the 1980s. After the

1977 elections, President Soeharto began to feel the diminished support of the ABRI, at least the support was not as strong as it used to be. According to Leo Suryadinata's account, in mid-December 1977, before the presidential election was held, several generals held a meeting to evaluate the leadership of President Soeharto. The generals only expressed their support for President Soeharto in the 1978. in The General Assembly of MPR after a long discussion (Suryadinata, 1992: 110).

Along with the change in relations between Islam and the State after the critical reprocal period (1982-1985), President Soeharto began to co-opt the interests of Muslims. It was first seen in his work establishing the Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila in 1982. At the end of 1990, without being planned by President Soeharto, arose the idea to form ICMI, and by "coincidentally" the initiators wanted Habibie as chairman. So, when Habibie consulted and asked him for permission, Soeharto welcome him.

Based on the explanation above, the change in the state's perception of Islam to be positively influenced by several factors simultaneously. At first, the elimination of trauma about the myth of muslim defiance made the relationship between the two even more intense without mutual suspicion. This is supported by the increasing understanding and religious experience of state officials, including President Soeharto, who needs an additional base of support for his political legitimacy (status quo). The change in Islamic relations with the state at the state level was largely determined by President Soeharto, considering that the politics of the New Order gave the President a dominant position (Second, no. 044, 5-11 January 1994, 20).

When asked by reporters, "Did the policy change come from Mr. Harto? Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara replied:

"Of course. Like water with soil. Water, without soil to hold back, it goes down, anyway? On the contrary, the ground without water will be arid. The problem is, if we regulate the Indonesian nation, and pay attention propositionally to only 12 percent, of which 88 percent is not, what will happen? So now the real politics run by the government is not benefiting Muslims, but back to the right proportions" (Editor, 17 March 1994, 18).

The support base of Muslims should be viewed in its majority so that it becomes a source of political legitimacy, vote support for the Government, and the success of national development. In the case of the establishment of ICMI, for example, viewed from this context, the goal was not due to President Soeharto's ambition to preserve his power. Because, for the latter, in accordance with the new order

political model that was created, it only depends on President Soeharto, not on society (Muslims).

As it is known, after the power was in the hands of the New Order government, especially in the last 10 years (between 1988 to 1998), many Muslims' wishes have been fulfilled in establishing infrastructure and facilities for the completeness of worship and the development of Islamic life, both in the fields of worship, religious teachings, education and law, all of which were initiated by President Soeharto. This is in accordance with the President's statement in front of the House of Representatives on August 16, 1986 that the State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila, is not a religious state, nor a secular state.

Some examples of the government's success in fulfilling the importance of Muslims in building the religious field, including: first, the establishment of the Bakti Muslim Pancasila Charity Foundation (YAMP). According to Indonesian procedures, the establishment of houses of worship is the responsibility of the community, while the responsibilities of the government in general are only donation and promotion. However, realizing that there is still a lack of houses of worship for Muslims, most of whom belong to the weak economic class, a group of Indonesian citizens who are Muslims who happen to be occupying important positions in the government, including President Soeharto, initiated the establishment of the Yayasan Amal Bakti Muslim Pancasila (YAMP) with the first goal of establishing houses of worship or mosques for underprivileged Islamic communities.

YAMP was founded by President Soeharto on February 17, 1982, which moved to collect and distribute funds derived from deducting the salaries of civil servants and ABRI members who were Muslims. The funds deducted from the salary range from Rp. 50, Rp. 100, Rp. 500, to Rp. 1000. With such a deduction amount, it is presumably not up to 2.5 percent of the income to be classified as the use of zakat obligations; and therefore, the deduction acts as an almsgiving and infak of its givers. These deductions are essentially voluntary; but because it was directly deducted from the salary, it became mandatory in practice for every civil servant and member of the ABRI. As a result, it can be said that not a single muslim civil servant and ABRI can be separated from the cuts.

Despite the possibility of grumbling from a number of muslim civil servants and ABRI about the salary deduction, the results that YAMP managed to realize for the benefit of the Muslims were phenomenal. Until 2004, YAMP had spent Rp 168 billion to build 940 mosques, each of which cost between 120 and 140 million rupiah. The number of mosques continues to grow, although the speed of increase is not as

large as when President Soeharto was still in power. YAMP to this day has built mosques with distinctive architecture in 30 provinces, 216 cities/regencies, and 52 small cities such as Wamena. Also in a big city like New York, when YAMP in 1995 donated 150 thousand US dollars to complete the funds for the purchase of a former warehouse which was later converted by the Indonesian Muslim community of New York into the al-Hikmah Mosque. YAMP in 1996 also contributed 100 thousand US dollars to the construction of a mosque in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.

In the post-Suharto period, the YAMP still survived, but the collection of deductions on the salaries of civil servants and members of the Muslim armed forces has stopped according to President Habibie's instructions dated July 16, 1998. As one might expect, since then, YAMP has had difficulty in raising funds to continue its programs. In 2005, for example, YAMP was only able to provide funds for the construction of 12 mosques, because in addition to the less funds that could be distributed, also due to the soaring prices of building materials and labour wages. However, YAMP had succeeded in building 999 mosques before Suharto died in 2008,

YAMP is seen as one of the best sides of President Soeharto. By its achievements and contributions, YAMP has played an important role in the process of improving the Islamic faith of the people. Presumably, such a role of the YAMP has not been rivaled or replaced by other foundations among the people, or even in the environment of Islamic organizations. Indeed, at least in the last two decades, the spirit of issuing zakat, infak and almsgiving (ZIS) or other forms of philanthropy has continued to increase among Muslims. At the same time, there also appeared various ZIS institutions and Islamic philanthropy that were more professionally managed. If the revitalization of YAMP and the acceleration of other Islamic philanthropic institutions can be carried out, then it is not only the construction of mosques and hospitals that can be organized, but also the advocacy and empowerment of marginalized communities that tend to continue to grow in number in recent times (Azyumardi Azra, *Republika*, May 3, 2007).

Second, the delivery of da'i to remote areas and transmigration sites. The program, known as the "1,000 Da'i Movement", is a training and delivery of da'i to remote areas and transmigration sites. Transmigration is an absolute part of the implementation of national development. For spiritual welfare for transmigrants, religious counseling and learning are needed, while most of the transmigrants come from areas whose population is Muslim. To this end, President Soeharto has initiated the delivery of 1,000 da'i people to remote areas and to transmigration sites, provided that:

1.as transmigrants, the dais are treated like other transmigrants, as well as transfer financing and so on;

2. the dais before being dispatched to the transmigrant areas were laid out first and their families for one month at the expense of the Darmais Foundation.

In cooperation with the MUI, 2,777 transmigrants have been trained to become da'i, and 968 of them have qualified as priests. For three years, the da'i received assistance of Rp 100,000 per month from YAMP and means of transportation (bicycles). In addition, in another pattern, YAMP also financed another 1,000 da'i through the Majelis Dakwah Islamiyah (MDI).

Third, the rehabilitation, addition, and construction of hajj dormitories. In 1991, the Ministry of Religious Affairs had launched a crash program of non-budgetary funds sourced from the remaining of ONH funds for the rehabilitation and addition of hajj dormitories in embarkation areas as well as the construction of hajj asama in transit areas. The details of its rehabilitation and addition are as follows:

1. Pondok Gede Hajj Dormitory, Jakarta, with a cost of Rp 565 million rupiah;
2. Haji Juanda Dormitory, Surabaya, at a cost of 117 million rupiah;
3. Ujung Pandang Hajj Dormitory, at a cost of 291 million rupiah;
4. Hajj Dormitory Polonia, Medan, at a cost of 100 million rupiah.

The construction of the Hajj Dormitory is as follows:

1. North Sulawesi at a cost of 200 million, plus from the 1991/1992 State Budget of 183 million, to 283 million rupiah;
2. Central Sulawesi amounting to 150 million rupiah;
3. East Kalimantan amounted to 200 million rupiah, plus from the 1991/1992 State Budget of 159 million rupiah to 359 million rupiah;
4. Yogyakarta amounted to 200 million rupiah, plus from the 1991/1992 state budget of 213 million rupiah, to 413 million rupiah;
5. Central Java amounting to 200 million rupiah;
6. NTB of 200 million rupiah;
7. Expansion of the existing Hajj Dormitory in Central Kalimantan from the 1991/1992 State Budget fund of 183 million rupiah.

Fourth, the provision of compensation and the construction of living monuments for the martyrs of the victims of the Mina disaster as well as the construction of terowongan.. In the 1990 hajj season there was

a disaster in the Muaisim Tunnel that asked for victims, including 631 Indonesian pilgrims. To ease the burden on the heirs of the martyrs, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has distributed: (1) compensation from domestic organizations and entrepreneurs, including from the Yayasan Dana Gotong Royong Kemanusiaan amounting to Rp 1,554,000 for each victim; (2) compensation from the Saudi Arabian Social Institution of Society in the amount of US \$ 4,000 or equal to Rp. 7,600,000, - for each victim.

In addition, President Soeharto has initiated the establishment of a living monument to the Mina disaster, in the form of the construction of four hospitals in four pilgrim embarkation areas: Jakarta, Surabaya, Ujung Pandang, and Medan. On February 28, 1991, located in Bina Graha Jakarta, the President signed the inscriptions of the four Hajj hospitals, each with the names of Jakarta Hajj Hospital, Surabaya Hajj Hospital, Ujung Pandang Hajj Hospital, and Medan Hajj Hospital. The signing of the inscription also meant the start of physical construction of the hospitals.

Haji Hospital Jakarta with a capacity of 200 beds on 1.5 ha of land; Haji Hospital Surabaya with a capacity of 150 beds on 2 ha of land; Ujung Pandang Hajj Hospital has a capacity of 150 beds on a land area of 3 ha; and Medan Hajj Hospital with a capacity of 375 beds on 6 ha of land. To finance the construction of these four hospitals, in addition to the available cost of 3.5 billion rupiah, President Soeharto as the Chairman of YAMP contributed 2 billion rupiah, while the rest was by the governors of their respective APBDs and the participation of Muslims, especially members of the Indonesian Hajj Brotherhood Association. Of the four hospitals, two hajj hospitals in Medan and Ujung Pandang have been inaugurated in April and May 1992, respectively. At the suggestion of President Soeharto, the Saudi Arabian government built another tunnel next to the al-Muaisim tunnel, Mina.

Fifth, improving the quality of religious education. In order to improve the quality of religious education, the New Order government, in 1985, issued a Joint Decree (SKB) of the Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Education and Culture, and Minister of Religious Affairs, which recognized madrasahs as equal to public schools. Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (MI) is the same as elementary school, Madrasah Tsanawiyah is the same as SMTP, Madrasah Aliyah is the same as SMTA. In order to be recognized as equally as public schools, the curriculum of the madrasahs must be 70% general knowledge and 30% religious knowledge. As a result of the SKB, many students who graduate from Aliyah with 70% of the curriculum consisting of general knowledge, can be admitted to public universities. On the contrary, with only 30% of religious knowledge from the curriculum, it is felt that students who

graduate from Madrasah Aliyah are not adequate to be expected to become strong and ready students at IAIN.

Realizing the weakness of the Aliyah pattern of the SKB 3 Minister, in 1986 with the permission of the President, the Ministry of Religion organized a pilot project or experiment by opening 5 Special Program State Aliyah Madrasahs (MANPK): in Kota Baru, Padang Panjang, West Sumatra; Ciamis, West Java; Special Region of Yogyakarta; Jember, East Java; and Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi. The difference between MANPK and MAN SKB 3 Minister is that in MANPK this 70% of the curriculum consists of religious knowledge, and only 30% general knowledge, with the understanding that MANPK graduates, who only get 30% of general knowledge, cannot be accepted in public universities.

In 1990 the first graduates from MANPK reached 5 x 40 students with very encouraging results. They not only mastered more religious sciences, but also actively mastered Arabic and English. Therefore, based on the success of the first experiment, in 1990 another 5 new MANPK were opened: in Banda Aceh, Lampung; Surakarta, Mataram and Banjarmasin. With the birth of MAN-MAN PK, it can be started to breed superior IAIN student candidates, which also means an increase in the regeneration of tough scholars.

To strengthen the position of religious education, the New Order government, in 1989, promulgated Law Number 2 of 1989 concerning the National Education System. Given this law, it is: (1) recognized that religious education is a sub-system of the national education system; (2) it is confirmed that religious education is a compulsory subject in public schools: SD, SMTP, SMTA, and Perguruna Tinggi; and (3) guaranteed the existence of religious educational institutions, such as Madrasah Ibtidaiyah, Tsanawiyah, Aliyah, and Islamic Institutes.

Furthermore, in order to improve the quality of IAIN, which is 14 in number, with 90 faculties, the government organizes Postgraduate education for masters and for doctorates for IAIN Lecturers, both domestically and abroad. By the end of Pelita V, it is hoped that IAIN will be able to send a total of 200 to 225 IAIN lecturers for Postgraduate education to various leading high education institutions, both in the West such as in the United States, Canada, England, the Netherlands, Turkey and Australia, as well as in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Among them, it is expected that approximately 40 people will return to Indonesia with doctoral degrees. This is in accordance with the affirmation and commitment of the New Order government that the Indonesian state based on Pancasila is not a religious state, but also not a secular state.

Sixth aired Arabic lessons on TVRI. Since November 1990 it began to air on TVRI arabic lessons which are the international language and language of the Qur'an. At first it was once every two weeks, but then in 1992 it was once a week.

Seventh, the application of Islamic law. In order to implement Islamic law, the government in 1989 promulgated Law Number 7 of 1989 concerning Religious Justice. The Religious Court has been in Indonesia since before the Dutch colonized the Indonesian homeland. However, during the colonial era, the religious judiciary was subjected to castration and became an onion fertilizer judiciary, for example: (1) since 1882 the Religious Courts in Java and Madura were castrated, not authorized to interfere in the division of the inheritance of Muslims. The same discrimination has also been treated at the Qadli Density and the Greater Qadli Density in southern and eastern Borneo since 1937; (2) The decision of the Religious Court needs to be confirmed by the General Court, and also the execution or execution of its decision is carried out by the General Court; (3) Religious judges shall be sufficiently appointed and dismissed by the Minister of Religious Affairs, unlike judges from the General Judiciary, Military Courts, and Administrative Courts whose judges are appointed and dismissed by the President.

With Law No. 7 of 1989 all the defects of the Religious Court disappeared: (1) The Religious Courts in Java and Madura and southern and eastern Kalimantan were re-imposed their authority to also handle the division of inheritance for Muslims as well as religious courts in other parts of Indonesia; (2) the decision of the Religious Court is final, it no longer needs to be confirmed by the General Court; the execution (execution) of religious court decisions is carried out by the Religious Courts themselves, no longer by the General Courts. Therefore, in the Religious Courts the office of Bailiff should be held; (3) as with judges in other judicial circles, judges in the Religious Courts are appointed and dismissed by the President, no longer by the Minister of Religious Affairs. They became state judges with equal standing, rights and facilities to judges in other judicial circles. At least, in theory, in accordance with Law Number 14 of 1985 concerning the Supreme Court, religious judges can occupy the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia; (4) in order to provide psychological peace for Muslims seeking justice, the offices of judges, clerks and bailiffs in the Religious Courts can only be filled by persons who are Muslims. Law No. 7 of 1989 has become more important because in many countries where in the Basic Law it is firmly stated that Islam as the state religion, the position of the Religious Courts in these countries is not as solid and respectful as the Religious Courts in Indonesia.

Furthermore, to improve all aspects of the implementation of Islamic law for its people, the government formed a project of compilation of Islamic Law. As is well known that the Religious Court or Syar'iyah Court even though it has been in Indonesia since before the Dutch colonization, namely in the Islamic kingdoms in the past, but until the 1980s, religious judges did not have standard and uniform legal books for all Indonesian jurisdictions, even though judges from the General Court environment had criminal code books and so on.

Therefore, in handling cases received from justice seekers, references to religious judges are fiqh books that are dozens in number, without any standardization, and which were written by Islamic jurists hundreds of years ago and not in Indonesia. As a result, it can happen that two similar cases are handled by two different judges, getting different decisions, and it is not uncommon for those decisions not to interfere with the spirit of justice living in the community. So in order to develop the law and efforts to provide more legal certainty to justice seekers, in March 1985 the decree of the Chief Justice and the Minister of Religious Affairs on the Establishment of the Islamic Law Compilation Project with the aim of compiling three draft law books to become a uniform handbook for religious judges throughout the country: the first book on marriage, the second book on inheritance, and the third book on the management of waqf objects, infak and almsgiving.

By December 1987, the project had successfully compiled three drafts of the book, and in February 1988 a workshop was organized on Islamic jurists, general jurists, scholars and central leaders of leading Islamic mass organizations. The workshop gratefully accepted both the three drafts of the book with proposals for refinements that had subsequently been implemented. At the closing ceremony, to the workshop participants, the Minister of Religious Affairs expressed his appreciation and gratitude to Muslims to President Soeharto for his initiative to form the Islamic Law Compilation Project. Then with Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 1991 dated June 10, 1991, one week before the President and his family left to perform the hajj, the three compiled books were officially ratified and ordered to be socialized. With this Compilation of Islamic Law, the irregularities -which are two similar cases handled by different judges, get very different decisions as a result of different legal references- can be resolved.

During the last 15 years of his rule, President Soeharto also supported and approved the birth of the Association of Muslim Scholars throughout Indonesia (ICMI), the construction of Bank Muamalat Indonesia, the establishment of the Indonesian Hajj Brotherhood Association (IPHI), and the very successful Istiqlal Festival. He also initiated the development of the mosque library.

Cover

The willingness of Muslims to accept Pancasila as the only principle for religiously-leaning civic organizations brought about a very significant change in the improvement of relations between Muslims and the government. This is because Muslims prioritize a substantive understanding of Islam over formalists, thus dispelling the government's suspicion of Muslims. As a result, many interests of Muslims are accommodated, even supported by the government.

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