

RE-DEFINING THREAT TO NATIONAL DEFENCE: CASE STUDY OF INDONESIA-MALAYSIA BORDER DISPUTE IN WEST KALIMANTAN

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Abstract

The country's border areas are not immune from threats to national defense, both traditionally and non-traditionally. One of the country's border areas is Entikong, which is located in West Kalimantan, Indonesia. This area is directly adjacent to the State of Sarawak, East Malaysia. State border areas tend to be considered vulnerable to military threats such as territorial invasions. However, territorial defense can be threatened by non-traditional threats that can affect state sovereignty through the nationalism of its people. This study uses qualitative methods by analyzing primary and secondary data from field observations, interviews, and the results of focus group discussions with a number of informants who have been determined using a purposive technique. Non-traditional security problems in the Entikong area are people's economic problems, narcotics smuggling, foreign commodities, identity crises, and others that can affect state sovereignty and people's sense of nationalism. There are challenges in efforts to deal with non-traditional security issues, such as from the aspects of budget, technology, area size, to inter-agency coordination. Therefore, not only the military aspect, currently non-traditional threats need special attention. Seeing that the biggest threat is from the economic aspect, the improvements that can be made to prevent threats to state sovereignty are derived from the economic aspect and defense efforts by authorized state institutions. This requires coordination, commitment and support from the

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central/provincial/regional government, military and local civil society.

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
Introduction

Threats to national defense in the border region are complex because the threats present are not only traditional but also non-traditional. Even though the discussions about threats to national defense in the border region are still dominated by everything that is traditional, such as how to prevent possible military attacks from neighboring countries that could make the country lose its territory, in its development the attention to strengthening national defense in border areas is also taking into account the potential growth of non-traditional threats. Just as Indonesia when losing Sipadan and Ligitan Islands in 2002 because they lost to Malaysia in the International Court of Justice proceedings, this is also the case with the United States which lost to the Dutch East Indies in the dispute over Miangas Island in the international arbitration process in 1928.

The International Court of Justice's decision to surrender Sipadan and Ligitan Islands to Malaysia was a valuable lesson for Indonesia, because Indonesia's defeat was caused by weak diplomacy and Indonesia's inconsistency in implementing effective control over the two islands (Djalal, 2003). Indonesia previously projected that these two islands could become part of several outermost islands of Indonesia bordering Malaysia, but Indonesia was wrong in perceiving the status quo which was perceived as not carrying out any activities on Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, while Malaysia not only put up a sign of their existence but also built and cared for the two islands (Adryamarthanino, 2022).

The problems that occurred over Sipadan and Ligitan are not the only ones that have arisen in the border dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. Because as of August 2021, there are at least 9 points of outstanding boundary problem (OBP) with Malaysia on the Indonesia-Malaysia land border on the island of Borneo (KERKAMTAS SOPS TNI, 2021). With the existence of several land border points in Kalimantan that have not been agreed upon by the two countries, Indonesia is facing a challenge to ensure that the territory that is currently in the status quo can be maintained as part of the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

Picture 1. Map of Outstanding Boundary Problem between Indonesia – Malaysia



Source: (Ditjen Strahan Kementerian Pertahanan, 2019)

Indonesia's struggle to obtain and clarify areas with OBP status in West Kalimantan as part of the state's sovereign territory is faced with a fairly complex situation, namely when Indonesian people in border areas are still faced with underdevelopment and poverty. The difficulty of getting access to markets, education and health from the territory of the country itself, makes some Indonesian citizens at the border still choose to fulfill their needs for goods, education and health from neighboring countries (Malaysia) (Kiwi, 2022; Kurniawati, 2016; Siregar, 2022). The choice of Indonesian citizens to obtain goods and services from Malaysia is not only because they are easy to obtain, but also because of their good quality and relatively cheap prices. The people at the border are still underdeveloped, in fact they have been criticized by residents at the border, including with threats that they will become Malaysian citizens (Kurniawati, 2016).

Indonesian citizens who live on the border do not find it difficult to gain access to goods and services from Malaysia, because those who live on the border of West Kalimantan (Indonesia) and Sarawak (Malaysia) were relatives with each other. Although administratively the Indonesian people at the border are separated from their families in Malaysia, but as relatives and families, they still live side by side and help each other, this is where the process of social and cultural interaction that has been going on since before the two countries were established (Indonesia and Malaysia) is also being maintained by them.

In relation to several areas where the border points are still in dispute and discussion with Malaysia, which are still OBP status, the attitude and orientation of the people can be a determinant of the position of state sovereignty. The condition of the people at the border is something that needs attention, especially considering their condition at the border who feel closer to Malaysia than to Indonesia. Learning

from the Sipadan and Ligitan Island cases where at that time the Indonesian government failed to carry out effective control and adequate management of the two islands, at this time threats to national defense from border disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia also need to be seen from potential non-traditional threats.

In its development, threats to national defense are growing very complex, because threats to national defense do not only come from (traditional) military threats but also come from non-military (non-traditional) threats (Indrawan & Aji, 2018). Likewise for studies on national borders, where threats to national security and defense can arise not only from traditional threats but also from non-traditional threats (Suryadi & Timur, 2018).

The development of state security studies has been in a phase that tends to develop, because after the second world war attention to state security is not only seen from military or traditional threats, but also non-military threats, in other words other studies have also seen the need for a redefinition of security problems and threats. One of the focuses of attention from non-military threats is how the state is also responsible for human safety from social, political, economic threats, epidemics and natural disasters (Caballero Anthony, 2016; Brown, 1986). From this view, there is a similarity in that one of the non-traditional threats to national defense, as happened in West Kalimantan, is sourced from economic problems.

Methods

This study uses a qualitative method, in which the study of threats to national defense is analyzed in depth from various primary and secondary data that are considered relevant. Primary data were obtained from field observations, interviews and the results of focus group discussions (FGD) with a number of informants who had been determined using a purposive technique, i.e. the informants were determined because they knew about threats to national defense arising from the still existing issues of state border disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia in West Kalimantan. Meanwhile, secondary data was obtained from the media, scientific publications, as well as reports and presentations by the Institute during the FGD.

Informants in this study were the Director General of Defense Strategy - Ministry of Defence, Assistant Officer V Indonesian National Army (TNI) Headquarters, Head of the West Kalimantan Provincial Border Management Agency, Commander of the Entikong Border Security Post in West Kalimantan, Entikong Sub-District Head in West Kalimantan, Director of Legal & Territorial Agreements from Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, as well as Assistant Deputy for Cross-Border Management from the National Border Management Agency.

The research data that has been collected is then sorted and validated using source triangulation techniques, this process is carried out to obtain valid and credible data. After validation, the data is then analyzed by looking at the tendencies of the same or different data to be objectively criticized.

Discussion

NTS issues in Indonesia-Malaysia Border: Case study of Entikong, East Kalimantan

Entikong Sub-district is one of 15 sub-districts in Sanggau Regency and is located at the forefront of Sanggau Regency which is directly adjacent to the State of Sarawak, East Malaysia. Definitively, Entikong District was established based on Indonesian Government Regulation Number 39 of 1996 and was inaugurated on January 6th, 1997 by the Governor of West Kalimantan, where previously Entikong was part of the Sekayam District area with the title Sekayam District Representative. Entikong District, which is located in the border area between countries, is a very strategic area in terms of many aspects, including geographically located on the border area route, directly adjacent to the State of Sarawak (East Malaysia), located on the Trans Borneo route which connects Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei Darussalam, and has Entikong Shared Land Use Agreement (PPLB) which is the only official land port in Indonesia as the gateway for entry and exit to/from Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei Darussalam.

According to the Head of West Kalimantan BPPD, West Kalimantan Island has natural wealth and beaches with great potential. Camar Beach, one of them, is famous for its white sand and is a tourist spot. Before the lock down, hundreds of visitors, including Malaysian citizens, also enlivened the beach. The beach has a wealth of jellyfish and sea turtles which are endangered and endemic to the region. So for countries like Malaysia, this area is very tempting. However, on the beach the Navy command post and other accommodations have been placed, so that the issue of territorial disputes has been assessed as not a problem.

The non-traditional security conditions in Entikong were explained by several informants. From the results of the FGD with the Entikong sub-district head, Malay traditional leaders, Dayak traditional leaders, and the Head of National Border Post (PLBN) Security, it was explained that the economic aspect was one of the problems that occurred in Entikong. The trading conditions of the Entikong people before the

lock down during the pandemic were busy because Malaysian citizens often visited and Indonesian citizens from Entikong also often visited Malaysia. Most of the goods contained in Entikong also come from Malaysia, such as gas, rice, oil and others. In addition, the prices of groceries to gas from Malaysia are cheaper than basic necessities from Indonesia itself.

As a result of the lockdown caused by the pandemic, people inevitably use domestic goods, although some still use goods from Malaysia. It can be sure that people get goods from Malaysia illegally. Usually, people get these goods from the mouse path, for example by meeting at the border. Even though the economic conditions of the Entikong community are currently difficult, the community can still find work in other sectors, such as working in oil palm plantations or others. Meanwhile for people who are not working due to not being able to enter Malaysia is posing a new threat and there is concern that the crime of theft will increase.

Communities around the borders of Indonesia and Malaysia have strong kinship ties, both Malay and Dayak communities. They both have relatives in Tebedu/Serian (Malaysia) and also those in Malaysia have families in Entikong or other areas in Indonesia. In Entikong, there is a string culture in the form of mutual visits by families from Malaysia to Indonesia and from Indonesia to Malaysia. The border communities of Entikong and Malaysia understand their boundaries beyond having cross-country kinship relations. Even though there are some people who transact with Malaysian Ringgit, this is due to the need for transactions in border areas. Likewise in Tebedu Malaysia, people can still transact with Indonesian Rupiah.

According to Main Assistant Officer V Cooperation in the field of security and border SOPS TNI (PABAN V KERKAMTAS SOPS TNI), the problems between Indonesia and Malaysia were quite extensive, namely in 1967 there were problems in the border area and there was also a rebellion. Therefore, it is the Minister of Defence who takes care of this. In the Riau area, there are several Malaysian dan Singaporean snack shops. Until now, it is still difficult for the Operations Staff of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (SOPS TNI) to reach several areas due to bad and damaged roads. This access makes food prices there more expensive. If people bring rice from Java Island, it is definitely more expensive than buying rice from neighboring countries.

Regarding nationalism, there are villages in Entikong that transact with Malaysian Ringgit and interact more frequently with people from Malaysia at the border. There are cases where a child considers himself a Malaysian citizen. This condition is very unfortunate, plus some people in the village are indeed very attached to the notion of being Malaysians rather than being Indonesian citizens. Although

there were no cases of smuggling during the pandemic, there was a previous case where someone from Tebedu (Malaysia) jumped the fence carrying a bag which, when checked immediately, found narcotics. From there, he was arrested and handed over to the police.

The non-traditional security condition explained by the 51st Air Squadron of Indonesian National Armed Air Force (TNI AU) is that illegal passers have been found using trucks. Then by the Entikong Police Chief Adjunct Commissioner of Police (AKP) Rizky, the problems that arise in the community are minor crimes, such as theft and alcohol. In addition, cases related to illegal cross-border issues include drug trafficking and illegal immigrant workers. Previously, there was a case where a mother and her child aged 5 and 7 years from South Sulawesi became victims. They were promised to work in Malaysia and required to pay 10 million rupiah. They are sent through ports in South Kalimantan, continue their journey overland, and then are left in the middle of the road when they enter the forest.

Similar to the previous informant, the Dansatgas Pamtas Lt. Col. Hendro stated that the problems that usually occur are from the activities of illegal border crossers. In Entikong, there are 19 rat roads that are used to carry out illegal activities, such as narcotics trading, smuggling of goods (gas and groceries), to illegal migrant workers. Apart from that, when it comes to the issue of moving regional boundary markers, this has never happened and is usually only busy in the media. This can happen because the stake sensor battery runs out and must be replaced every 2 years, the stake is damaged due to natural disasters, until the signal is blocked by a landslide or a fallen tree.

According to the Head of the Entikong National Border Post (PLBN), traffic in the Entikong area was very busy until before the lock down was implemented. In addition, more goods circulated from Malaysia due to lower prices. Even so, the amount of goods entering the Entikong area is limited. Local people can trick it by bringing families who come from Malaysia, as well as bringing goods from there. It was also mentioned that one of the problems that occurred in the region was that it was difficult for the community to get education up to the high school level. There is only 1 privately managed Vocational School (SMK), of which there are no public high schools, private high schools, or universities in the Entikong area. To pursue high school education, residents have to travel several kilometers. This causes local citizens to think about continuing their education in Malaysia.

Talking about border issues with Malaysia, according to the Director General of Defense Strategy of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia, Indonesia has lost 948 stakes for the eastern border region. These stakes are not just fixed markers for the village

boundary, but these stakes are embedded with a chip which sends a direct signal to the compost. There are two different understandings regarding this, one is the border to protect people from crossing, while the other is to protect our boundaries. From his point of view, the focus is on how the stake does not shift to defend Indonesia's territorial boundaries. This benchmark is useful for protecting Kalimantan which is rich in natural resources, ranging from coal, oil, gas, and others.

Another problem found in the Entikong area is the inadequate road along the border. The border road that connects the sub-district capital to the village is 42 km long. In addition, inadequate infrastructure is accompanied by low quality human resources because 60% of the residents are elementary school graduates. The limited authority/involvement of the Sanggau Regency Government in the management of the Entikong Shared Land Use Agreement is also a problem in this area. In addition, there is a socio-economic gap between the border communities from Indonesia and Sarawak, East Malaysia, which is still very sharp. Regarding land issues, there is no ready-to-use land when construction is carried out. The Entikong regional budget is also inadequate in terms of land acquisition/acquisition, which on the one hand land prices are increasing and the economy is sluggish in border areas.

Non-traditional security issues in border areas can have an impact on the problems of nationalism of the population living in border areas. What people say that they have Indonesian nationalism can be different when seen in real life. In addition, development in border areas is still a problem, even though the government currently has more attention. Malaysia's much better infrastructure and economic growth not only makes local residents around the border prefer to do their activities in Malaysia, but also contributes to reducing feelings of nationalism.

Addressing the issues: challenges and limitations

The 51st Air Squadron in Pontianak is in charge of carrying out air operations in the form of observing and monitoring. According to the 51st Air Squadron on duty in Pontianak, when conducting observations in border areas, they can detect objects in the mainland that are identified as humans or vehicles, the drone's capabilities range from taking pictures to recording. Night vision capabilities also make it easier for them to carry out air operations. However, the planes that are owned have not yet been destroyed.

The obstacle that arises is that they never know whether the reports of territorial border violations they submit will be followed up or not. Another obstacle is that the units they have are still lacking (not yet

ideal), in which they have to divide the units they have in small quantities for various purposes. To anticipate units being damaged due to negligence or lack of personnel ability, they must be absolutely sure that personnel are able to fly drones properly, they must have a lot of practice with training drones before flying reconnaissance drones.

According to the Regional Border Management Agency (BPPD), when compared, Malaysia is indeed more serious in managing their country's defense. They have a bigger budget than Indonesia. BPPD mentioned the experience of seeing how Malaysia takes care of its borders, which can be said that they are very serious. Border road infrastructure in Malaysia is better and when viewed from above by helicopter, Malaysia has cleared a lot of land, while Indonesia is the opposite. Again, the obstacle is budget support.

The head of the BPPD stated that the reason why Indonesia's border areas have not yet become open areas is that the border area is very wide. The area of the Indonesia-Malaysia border on the island of Borneo is more than 2000 KM, of which approximately 1000 kilometers are in West Kalimantan. Then, the availability of infrastructure networks in border areas is still very low, so that to carry out development requires very large funds and commitment. To build parallel roads, this requires an extraordinary commitment and confiscates a very large state budget. Meanwhile, Indonesia's other development needs are expensive. This is far from Malaysia, where the area is small and the income is much bigger than Indonesia, so that whatever Malaysia plans to do can be realized quickly. For example, in Entikong, there is a hill that needs to be cut so that export-import container cars can pass, but it takes years to negotiate this.

According to the Operations Staff of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (SOPS TNI) about the level of communication and coordination with the RI-Malaysia Border Security Task Force (Satgas Pamantas), the coordination is still considered insufficient because no one can be invited to coordinate. At the factual conditions, there are several posts that only have TNI SOPS and are currently monitoring only areas where there are residents and are tasked with developing residents in these areas. When it comes to immigration, customs and other matters, the coordination is deficient. There are several points that are not monitored by the Police, so the Task Force (TNI) there has a multifunctional role.

Regarding handling, Main Assistant Officer V Cooperation in the field of security and border SOPS TNI (PABAN V KERKAMTAS SOPS TNI) assesses that everything is still limited, as an example is the problem of criminality which can only really be dealt with if caught red-handed. One of the steps is to report the evidence and the main unit will

coordinate at the central level of the Task Force Command. This was not followed up and resolved at the post, but at several posts which were complemented by other agencies. They are indeed quite intense in coordination and communication when problems occur.

So far, it is considered that there is no indication of a threat from neighboring countries such as invasion or aggression. Meanwhile, the current threat is in the form of illegal actions which, if left unchecked, will have an impact on state sovereignty. This threat is usually carried out by Indonesian citizens who support neighboring countries as their love for and nationalism towards their homeland decreases. SOPS TNI has a view and focus on increasing community nationalism. That's why the SOPS TNI operational pattern is not guarding the house like a security guard, but through development of love for the motherland and nationalism. This approach and pattern of operation is different considering that Indonesia's current condition is not like the past which was full of threats to communism.

Regarding mouse paths, according to the West Kalimantan Regional Police Chief, there are more than 72 rat trails which are blindspots that Border Security Task Force (Pamtas) cannot monitor given their geographical conditions which make it impossible. It must be admitted that not all points can be monitored for 24 hours and there are also illegal community activities at these blindspots. In response to this, the troops also become multifunctional, so the things that are not actually under the authority, such as searching, cannot be carried out by the TNI because that is the authority of the Police. The TNI can only arrest. What the TNI can do is in the form of territorial guidance which raises public awareness to avoid illegal activities.

For monitoring, it is still done manually up until now. But in the future, an evaluation will be carried out by including the use of The Main Tool of the Indonesian Armed Forces Weapon System (Alutsista), both for monitoring the outer islands or border areas. It's just that the equipment hasn't been checked at this time and the drone is only in the training stage, so it can't be used for operations yet. If Alutsista is used, then there needs to be a correlation with Environmental and Strategic Development (Banglistra). Before using defense equipment, it is necessary to consider and ascertain the threat first. If the threat has reached aggression and invasion, then the drone can be used for that. The priority for the TNI is defense which focuses on foreign troops or threats. The current condition of drones is that they are only used for larger operations, not for supervising community activities and supervising the community.

Coordination with the 51st Air Squadron has also made communication efforts by trying to deploy sensors in the surveillance area. But until now its use is still an order from the TNI Commander.

There are also many obstacles that arise along with this need, such as budgets for maintenance, use, so that there is a priority scale carried out by the TNI. Needs also become difficult considering that in difficult areas, electricity is difficult to find so that the use of drones becomes more difficult. Indeed, in use, this is much easier as in surveillance because of the wide range of cameras and surveillance at night is made easier by infrared. If you read the literature, it is said that the use of drones is indeed cheaper. But for the long term, the cost is quite large considering there is a need for maintenance costs. This makes the use of drones only used for priority matters.

Looking at the Defense Doctrine, the economy threats enters into non-military threats. Indeed, non-military should have links with other institutions. However, because the army has the main task of defending against all kinds of threats, the scope is only threats that have the potential to disrupt sovereignty. Through President Jokowi's program "Development from the Outside to the Inside", there have been efforts to develop the economy in the border areas which have had an impact on the condition of the people. If in the past there were Indonesian people in border areas who felt they were not part of Indonesia, now this can be more managed.

The task force in the border area has made creative economic efforts for the community that can help the community's economy. One of the trainings conducted for the Rider Battalion is war training. Not only that, there is training to increase sensitivity to environmental potential, so that they can take advantage of the potential of the area in the post to become a creative economy. Through this activity, it is hoped that there will be no serious threat regarding the economic aspects of the community.

In addition, the approach taken also focuses on improving ideology, politics, economy, social and culture, defense, and security (Ipoleksosbudhankam) at the border, so that border areas can be prioritized regarding efforts to increase food security. This is done in order to prevent people from 'taking sides' with neighboring countries due to food insufficiency. The task of coordinating in border areas lies in efforts to develop territorial points. The developing of the territorial points that are developed are geography, demography, and social conditions in which there are economic conditions. They are prepared to develop this by looking at economic conditions and seeing the potential that must be done to develop the economy. It also considers collaboration with academics and other ministries to develop the potential that exists in the region.

Even though currently the Jokowi government has issued Presidential Instruction number 1/2021 concerning the Acceleration of Economic Development in Border Areas, implementation on the ground has not

gone well due to poor coordination between institutions. National Border Management Agency (BNPP) does not have the power to deploy authorized agencies within the border. As a result, they often go their separate ways and are different from the fast-moving Malaysia. The coordination of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) is faster for the execution of matters that are considered important, whereas in civilian institutions it tends to be bureaucratic. If there are no regulations, civil institutions will not act because they are worried that if something goes wrong they will be entangled with the law.

Based on the results of discussions with the Ministry of Defence, to resolve border conflicts, there are agreements with the Malaysian side. One of them is the GBC (General boarder Committee) to address OBP (Outstanding Boarder Problems). Then from within, the Ministry of Defense coordinates with the district, province, and troops. With regard to supervision, so far the troops in this border region have not been proportional to the size of the territory. In contrast to the police, you could say that 1 policeman supervises 1 person. When compared to the military, the Indonesian National Army (TNI) is like one person overseeing tens of thousands of people. So if we talk about our numbers, it's not enough.

To overcome these problems, the Ministry of Defense relies on agreements. Even so, agreements with neighboring countries are tricky. When we comply, they may not. If you go on patrol by foot it is not possible and if you use transportation it is difficult considering the terrain is not possible. When compared, the border conditions in neighboring countries are tidier, in contrast to the Indonesian border. I thought about using satellites to monitor the border. However, the problem is that advanced technology is still difficult to obtain because the state has not been able to provide it. It was stated that currently it only has three UAV drones from the west end to the east. Therefore, in this regard, the agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia is one of the pillars. But in practice, Indonesia is still weak compared to Malaysia.

The Ministry of Defense stated that 125 billion dollars had been planned for 25 years. But in reality only get 55 billion for 25 years. This could be due to central ignorance about how important and vulnerable this country can be to be sidelined by other countries. For example, no less than 80,000 fishing boats from China enter Indonesian waters every year. It's hard to keep tabs on that plus technology you can't afford. Indonesia only has foreign exchange reserves of 150 billion dollars per year, which is less strong than Congo, the Philippines or Singapore. This shows Indonesia's unpreparedness in technological leaps, both from cyber, UAV, or satellite problems, which it currently does not have.

Through defense area planning, this is translated down into detailed defense area planning. Furthermore, the detailed planning of this defense area is made by each army, both Army, and Air, which is given to the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. That is, in securing this area, it is divided into several sub-heads of sub-division, namely the sub-head of the air defense area, the sub-head of the sea defense area, and the sub-head of the land defense area. Later it will be tried to map out the problems faced by each region. After receiving information related to potential threats, coordination will be carried out with the local government. This detailed plan for the defense area should not be considered as a form of ABRI's dual function. Through this plan, Indonesia's geostrategic mapping can be carried out against threats from other countries as an effort to maintain the integrity of the Indonesian state and people.

According to the Entikong Police Chief, regarding narcotics smuggling, because the goods are small and the way of hiding them is not like goods in general, it is logically impossible to store goods in that place, this is a joint concern with agencies in the Entikong sub-district. With several facilities in Entikong, there are x-rays which are useful for goods crossings or people crossings. The Entikong Police are also trying to commit and coordinate with several relevant agencies in the Entikong sub-district or with the West Kalimantan Regional Police regarding narcotics issues. As an additional facility, there are also dogs that are capable of sniffing out narcotic specifications.

Conclusion

The Entikong region which is located on the border between countries is a very strategic area regarding many aspects, one of which is the issue of regional security. Non-traditional security problems in the Entikong area are people's economic problems, narcotics smuggling, foreign commodities, identity crises, and others that can affect state sovereignty and people's sense of nationalism. The economic condition was exacerbated by the pandemic, where the lock down greatly affected when previously the Entikong area was busy being traversed by Malaysian nationals in transactions and visits. In fact, most of the charcoal in Entikong also comes from Malaysia and is cheaper than basic food from Indonesia itself.

Non-traditional security issues regarding nationalism are the transactions of people living in border areas, some of whom use the Malaysian currency, namely Ringgit. Some people are very attached to the notion of being Malaysians rather than being Indonesian citizens. Apart from these problems, other problems include minor crimes, such as theft and alcohol. In addition, cases related to illegal cross-

border issues include drug trafficking and illegal immigrant workers. There are many rat streets that are used to carry out illegal activities and are difficult to control.

To deal with non-traditional security issues that could threaten the sovereignty of the state and its people, various efforts have been planned and carried out by competent institutions. Some of these efforts are like the 51st Air Squadron which is always tasked with carrying out air operations in the form of observation/monitoring. In addition, Presidential Instruction number 1/2021 concerning the Acceleration of Economic Development in Border Areas has been issued, there are agreements with Malaysia, planning for defense areas, and commitment and coordination between agencies to protect border areas. Authorized institutions coordinate with parties at each regional level up to the troops they have.

Even so, there are challenges in dealing with non-traditional security issues. Malaysia is considered to be more serious in managing national defense, especially in border areas with a bigger budget than Indonesia. The technology owned by Indonesia, especially the Entikong region, is inadequate and is still difficult to obtain because the state has not been able to provide it. In addition, institutions in Indonesia often run independently and are different from Malaysia, which moves fast. The coordination of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) is faster for the execution of matters that are considered important, whereas in civilian institutions it tends to be bureaucratic.

Seeing that the biggest threat is from the economic aspect, the improvements that can be made to prevent threats to state sovereignty are derived from the economic aspect and defense efforts by authorized state institutions. Steps that can be taken are such as the need to accelerate the process of building roads along the border that connect cities to villages, such as from Entikong to Suruh Tembawang. From the supporting infrastructure, efforts can then be made to form a management body to create a conducive economic climate in the border areas. This also requires coordination, commitment and support from the central/provincial/regional government, military and local civil society.

The current threat to the country's border areas is not only about traditional threats in the form of military threats from other countries against Indonesian territory, but currently non-traditional threats are also getting attention because they can threaten the sovereignty of the state and the nationalism of its citizens. Seeing the conditions in the Entikong region, economic problems are the root cause of other problems that create non-traditional threats, such as narcotics smuggling, transactions with other currencies, and others. The condition of the area which forms the border with other countries

should be given special attention and urgency by the central government with all the complaints that have even been felt by the authorities on duty in the border areas of the country.

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