Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its impact on Egypt and Sudan

Issa Ahmed Al_shalabi
Associate Professor, Department of Media and Strategical Studies, Al-Hussein Bin Talal University, Jordan, Issa.a.shalabi@ahu.edu.jo

Abstract
The study aims to identify the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its impact on Egypt and Sudan. This study is based on the qualitative method, and reached results the most important were that the Egyptians feel that they are being targeted in their national security, and that the intervention of regional and international countries to help Ethiopia build the dam is an attack on the Egyptian national security. The dam is considered a threat to Egypt and its water security and threatens the most important source on which its financial security depends. Sudan's attitudes have varied since the beginning of construction work on the dam in 2011, from initially refusing to accepting after realizing that its construction would not harm its interests. The study recommends the need to resort to arbitration through a neutral third party or the competent international court and to accept and implement its decisions. The study also indicates that it is possible to reach an agreement regarding the specifications and operation of the Renaissance Dam through direct negotiation.

Introduction
Water security is as important as national security, so, national security concept is no longer standing on just the strategic side; it's now standing hand in hand with water security. Bodies of water have always been a place of conflict, due to its importance in the trade industry and contribution of spheres of influence, except recently, it was shown that the actual conflict was around pure water, whereas salt water has already been settled (seas and oceans according to international environmental agreements).

The conflict over the water resources has started since the 19th century, and specifically in the Middle East, because of its scarcity of water, which are concentrated in the basins of major rivers such as the Nile River.

The countries that surrounded the Nile River used to be colonies of foreign countries, but they became independent. The first agreements regarding the division of the Nile emerged in 1902 AD in Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, which was between the United Kingdom; whom was representing Egypt and Sudan, and Ethiopia, and the agreement stated not doing any projects on the Blue Nile, Tana lake, or Sobat River. After that, an agreement between the United Kingdom and France showed up in 1906, and another one showed up in 1929, and both of these agreements stated that Basin countries share Egypt’s acquired share of the Nile, and that Egypt has the right to object in case these countries establish new projects on the river (Paisley & Henshaw, 2013).

Problem Statement:

The idea of the Renaissance Dam has begun during the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, as the American Reform Office worked during the period 1956-1964 to determine the final location of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the course of the Blue Nile. However, this project stopped as a result of the 1974 military coup, and during 2009-2010, the Ethiopian government surveyed the dam site, and in 2010 Ethiopia obtained a design for the dam (Abdelhady et al., 2015).

In 2011, (WE BUILD) Company offered Ethiopia a contract, then the Prime Minister at that time laid the foundation stone for the project, but Egypt stood against the project because they realized that building a dam will decrease their share of the Nile water. The Ethiopian Prime Minister then refused the Egyptian objection. He pointed out an unknown study that proved the dam will not decrease their share of the water. The dam will only organize the amount of water for irrigation. After that, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia shared the dam design with Egypt, and that gave them an opportunity to study the effects of this project (Noah wodnedrawi, 2021).

However, problems arose after the Egyptians realized the seriousness of the dam on Egyptian water security, as many statements were issued, including the statement of the Egyptian president that it is a matter of “life and survival for Egypt”. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan established an international committee of experts to review and evaluate the reports of the dam study, hoping to reach an agreement. However, the agreement was not reached, so Egypt resorted to American mediation, but Ethiopia withdrew from the talks, claiming that the agreement put forward by Washington included proposals in favor of Cairo regarding mitigating the drought.

The Egyptian position evolved into a threat stage, saying that all options are possible to prevent the building of the dam, but Ethiopia completed building the dam and mobilizing it in three stages without reaching an agreement. The problem of the study draws on the fact
that all the discussions that took place so as to resolve the dispute between the concerned countries did not reach solutions that can satisfy all parties with considerable differences between the respective parties and the views of the international community. And the possibilities to the development of the crisis and its tendency towards military solutions.

The problem of the study can be determined by answering the following questions:

• Does Ethiopia have the right to build the Renaissance Dam?
• Is the Renaissance Dam a threat to Egyptian water security?
• Is it possible to reach an agreement about the Renaissance Dam to prevent military solutions?

**The study objectives:**

The study seeks to clarify Ethiopia’s position and views on the Renaissance Dam, the concerns of Egypt and Sudan about the Renaissance Dam and the problems that may affect their water shares, and the position of international law to reach appropriate formulas to bring the theoretical views closer and find appropriate solutions for all parties.

**Methods:**

This study draws on the qualitative method. The study adopted an inductive approach to conducting a theory from data that are collected. To determine this, the study will employ an analytical and descriptive approach to describe Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and its impact on Egypt and Sudan.

**Tools of the study:**

The study will rely on ready-made data through previous studies, articles and publications related to the subject of the study to reach conclusions and recommendations.

**Ethiopian Renaissance Dam:**

Ethiopian renaissance dam is the water project that has a lot of political debate, and is still in progress. Ethiopia has embarked building the dam in 2011 as part of its future plan to benefit from its water resources in the eastern Nile Basin River. Given the size of the project, it got a lot of debate from the downstream countries (Sudan and Egypt) because it threatens their water security, and they see great dangers towards them (Shrouf, 2021).
The Ethiopian renaissance dam is considered one of the Ethiopia’s biggest dams, and it is a subject of dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia. Its water capacity is estimated at about (74 km/cubic) of water, being built on the waters of the Blue Nile near the Sudanese border. Ethiopia pins great hopes on it to achieve self-sufficiency in the area of electric power (in addition to the possibility of exporting to neighboring countries), to reduce the amount of imported butane, to strengthen the industrial and irrigation sector with the needed energy, and to achieve development in the areas adjacent to the dam (Taye et al, 2016).

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is situated in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, on the Blue Nile (about 40 kilometers east of Sudan) and is a project owned by the Ethiopian Electricity Company (EEPCO) (Pemunta et al, 2021).

In the past, the dam used to be called project X, and after the announcement of it, it got named the Millennium Dam. In 2011, The Ethiopian Council of Ministers renamed it the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, as the dam is strengthening Ethiopia with electric power, and can supply Ethiopia with approximately 45 Giga-watts of electric power (Ramadan et al, 2015).

The cost of the dam is approximately 5 billion dollars, of which 2 billion is allocated for the construction of electricity generation equipment. China is financing the building of the dam, given the dam’s threat to the Egyptian water security; it exerts diplomatic and economic pressures to stop the financing of the dam, and trying all the possible means to stop the construction of it (Abtew&Dessu, 2019).

After almost a year of the Antabi agreement (Which acquired in 2010), Ethiopia started putting the foundation stone of the dam in 2011, the Egyptian embassy in Adis Ababa was informed a prior notice four months after putting the foundation stone which is a violation to law (Noah wodendraw, 2021).

On the other hand, a letter of notice was sent to Sudan through the ministry of irrigation from the ministry of water in Ethiopia after six months from putting the foundation stone for the renaissance dam, which means Ethiopia evaded all previous agreements and international norms that govern international waters, but didn’t care about that because it relied on some concepts such as the concept of absolute sovereignty and many other concepts (Shrouf, 2021).

The international law opinions:
Firstly, the right of upstream countries to build dams:
It’s the country’s original right to use their resources as its stated in the law, but it has to follow the rules and principles of the international
law, whether it was water resources, or others. Countries are not restricted to use these shared resources with other countries, except by harming others (Shrouf, 2021).

Concerning the construction of the water dams, it’s considered to be a given right to the one-stream countries, whether they are upstream or downstream countries, and they have the right to use and exploit the water that’s coming from the watercourse, which would be a good thing in return to its citizens in multi uses, whether it’s employed for electric power generation, irrigation, or else (Hammond, 2013).

Probably, the main reason for building the dams in the first place is to reduce flood risks and provide protection. It is, therefore, the upstream countries’ right to build water dams according to the international law. These states derived this right from the principle of equal sovereignty among the riverine states. It is certain that every river country has the right to use and exploit the rivers water (Al-hilali, 2019).

The just exploitation of the shared watercourse is an acquired right of the sovereignty of each country, and the most important right is the right to build a water dam on its grounds only if it didn’t harm any other country on the watercourse countries. And that is a principle in the international agreements that consider the international rivers. It also requires the approval of all basin countries to build the dam, and the countries that are expected to be harmed (Talozi et al, 2019).

If Ethiopia followed the prior notice and informed the downstream countries, it would have been possible to achieve cooperation between Nile basin countries and improve the relationship between them, and to avoid the conflict that could have acquired if they tried to division the Nile River water (Zakarya, 2019).

Secondly, international laws and international bodies say in building the dams:

The international law have settled the dam building projects over the international rivers and put certain amount of stable rules to follow. Therefore, any country that wants to build a water project, especially water dam building, which is shared between the other countries around the river that has the same rights, there is also rules and procedures adopted by the relevant international bodies (Shrouf, 2021).

Thirdly, the international laws about the dams:

If it was a country’s right to build a dam in order to achieve its required goals, then this right must be in respect of the international law on rivers, which are in fact the rules that the riverine countries have been accustomed to implementing through different times (Al-helali, 2019).
The main rule in the international law is the prior notice and the commitment in the executive procedures in relation to the dam to be constructed, and for that to happen before starting with the executive procedures for building it. The country has to wait for the countries that has a risk of harm due to this dam building, once approved by them, then may the issued country to proceed with the building, and that depends on the conditions of each water project (Shrouf, 2021).

The international law has given the countries which may be harmed due to dams building a proper amount of time to be able to study the resulting effects, from water and environmental aspects, but simultaneously, it’s not allowed for those countries to render it more difficult for the issued country, by being late to respond or creating problems from which it is largely difficult to determine the damage caused (Caflisch, 2000).

Ethiopian opinion on the positives of the Renaissance Dam:

The engineering, construction and procurement contract has been awarded to SaliniKostrotori (Italian construction company), where the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project has been finished since 2017. The people and the government of Ethiopia have funded the project, which will not only serve Ethiopia, but also Sudan and Egypt, whom are dependent on the Nile water, although 85% of its water goes to Ethiopia. It is expected with this project, over 12000 job vacancies can be available, and approximately 20,000 people will be resettled within the implementation of the project (Yihdeg et al, 2017).

Egypt has owned the official ownership of the Nile water for a long time, and is 90% dependent on it. So Egypt has forbidden Ethiopia to build the dam, and a jury of three was formed in January 2012 to enhance understanding and consider the benefits and implications of the project for the three countries. The main dams, mainly intended for power generation, which are expected to have a capacity of 6,000MW, will create reservoirs with a capacity of 74 billion cubic meters (Abdelhaleem & Helal, 2015).

The dam will be able to handle a flood of 37,019 cubic meters per second, reduce the minaret in Sudan by 100 million cubic meters, and facilitate the irrigation of about 500,000 hectares of new agricultural land (Hammond, 2013).

It will also reduce about 40 kilometers of floods in Sudan when it’s completed, and the orderly flow of water from the Renaissance Dam will improve agriculture, and the effect of water evaporation from the dam will be minimal compared to other dams in Ethiopia, which will help to conserve water (Abdelhady et al, 2015).
The evaporation of water will equal the Aswan High Dam among other dams in Ethiopia, with around 19 billion cubic meters. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam will reduce the capacity of the Aswan High Dam, which will provide about six billion cubic meters of water, and the dam will act as a bridge across the Blue Nile, which contains few bridges and pedestrian bridges (Chen & Swain, 2014).

The Egyptian and Sudanese concern about the Ethiopian dam:

Both Sudan and Egypt are considerably concerned about their water shares from the Nile, and particularly the fact that it will reduce due to this dam, especially because Egypt is considered a poor country in water, with the per capita share of water declining below the internationally approved rate of water scarcity of about one thousand cubic meters per capita annually. This indicates that Egypt may fall under a water deficit of around thirty-two billion cubic meters in 2025.

Regarding Sudan, its situation is to some extent better, with its share of 18.5 billion cubic meters of the Nile, and a per capita share exceeding the international scarcity rate. This means that Sudan will remain outside the scope of water scarcity, although with its dependence on the Nile for about 80% of its needs, it remains exposed to the failure of its water resources to meet its current and future development needs, amounting up to 10 billion cubic meters currently increasing with the pressures resulting from the dam (Hamdan, 2015).

This indicates the fragility of the water situation in Sudan and Egypt currently that lead to exacerbating the potential direct water effects of the dam on both of them, in addition to the geological and environmental effects, as well as casting a bleak shadow on its effects on food and energy together, and in general, the estimates indicate the following effects (Sharaqi, 2018):

1. Egypt and Sudan’s loss of water ranging between 14 and 24 billion cubic meters, depending on the dead storage capacity of the dam. Ethiopia has announced that it will be only 14 billion, and it will be impounded by the dam over a three year period; which reduces the annual losses of the two countries of water if they commit to this, although Egypt will lose three times what Sudan will lose according to their shares in the 1959 agreement.

2. Egypt and Sudan will lose the water seeping through the reservoir rocks, the quantities of which have not yet been estimated.

3. Water evaporation losses will increase by 5.9%; which will increase water losses and salinity.

4. The water flow velocity will decrease; which will increase their sedimentation rates.
5. The cultivation of 29.47% and 23.03% of agricultural lands in Upper Egypt and Delta, respectively, may stop.

6. Decline in the areas of land cultivated with flooded and basin irrigation in Egypt and Sudan.

7. Sudan, in particular, will lose the annual alluvium that fertilizes its agricultural lands around the Blue Nile.

8. The level of Lake Nasser will decrease by about ten meters. This will affect the rates of electric power generation from the High Dam, and the reduction may reach between 20-40%.

9. Sudan will be affected by possible seismic waves due to the large quantities of water that the Renaissance Dam will store near its southern borders, which, with the dam’s weight, will amount to approximately 150 billion tons.

10. In the event of the dam’s collapse, as some experts predict, due to the geological nature of the Ethiopian lands, the Sudanese cities will be flooded with a massive flood of its stored water, including the Gezira region, the capital Khartoum, and most of the Egyptian lands.

**Egyptian National Security and War Possibilities**

The Egyptian position is clear and needs no explanation; if their water shares decreases then it means war. The political and military voices in Egypt have started to get higher, encouraging destroying the Ethiopian dam in case Ethiopia didn’t respect their demands. The population of Egypt has recently increased over 100 million capita, and that means they need more water shares than before not less. Not to mention that 95% of the Egyptian land is desert and the Nile water for them is a life or death situation.

It cannot be claimed that the possibility of a military operation is not possible at all, given the orientations of Egyptian foreign policy orientations at the current stage, as the option of war is not only related to the balances of military forces, rather to the patterns of regional and international interactions as well as existing alliances, and the position of the Egyptian regime in these alliances, particularly in the presence of what might be described as a strategic alliance between Ethiopia, the USA and Israel, the latter two being strategic allies of the Egyptian regime, and they have many pressure cards to control its external movement (Aboud, 2021).

The military bases (deployed in the Horn of Africa region) makes a military operation in eastern Ethiopia very complicated, as there are around 19 military bases for 16 countries, and in addition to four military bases which may be established by Turkey, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
If Egypt decided to take the military operation against Ethiopia, it will face big challenges such as (Al Jazeera Net, 2021):

1. The geographic location of Ethiopia is far from Egypt.

2. The situation is Sudan is complicated which will make the decision making and approval harder, besides the relations that Ethiopia has built with civil parties and armed rebel groups, which may push it to stand neutral, and it may refuse to use its lands or military bases to strike the dam.

3. It is possible for this action to impose international sanctions on Egypt.

4. The positive development of the relations of Ethiopia with its neighbors limits Egypt’s opportunities of exerting pressure on it.

5. The large spread of the foreign military bases in the Horn of Africa.

6. The absence of Egyptian military bases near Ethiopia.

7. The negative consequences that will be on Egypt’s relations with the Nile Basin countries and Africa.

The legal status of the Renaissance Dam in light of the United Nations Convention:

According to the agreements of 1929 and 1959, Egypt has historical rights to the Nile River that it has the right to approve any irrigation projects in the upstream countries; they also have the right to veto any projects that would affect the amount of water flowing towards Egypt.

In 1929, an agreement was signed to share water between the Nile Basin countries and Britain in its colonial capacity, where it gave Egypt the right of veto to prevent the establishment of any projects on the Nile that threaten Egypt's water share. Egypt's water share was set according to the 1929 agreement at about 48 billion cubic meters, and Sudan's share at about 4 billion cubic meters.

In 1959, the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser signed in Cairo an initiative that represents the current mechanism that brings all the basin countries under one umbrella that relies on two main principles: realizing benefit for all and harmlessness, but it is a temporary mechanism, not a treaty or agreement, so it does not carry mandatory or legal force (Al jazira, 2020). It aims to increase the share of Egypt and Sudan so that the share of Egypt becomes 55.5 billion m³, compared to the share of Sudan which is 18.5 billion m³ (Abo omra, 2019). As well as Egypt’s right to build the High Dam, Sudan to establish the Roseires reservoir, as well as Egypt and Sudan to retain their acquired rights to the Nile waters. This agreement was also deposited with the United Nations as one of its documents. It also provides all
facilities for the Egyptian government to conduct water studies and research on the Nile River in Sudan, and it can establish works there to increase the waters of the Nile for the benefit of Egypt in agreement with the local authorities (Al naser, 2019).

Ethiopia concluded the General Framework Agreement for Cooperation with Egypt in 1993, in which it pledged not to harm the rights of Egypt, and the necessity of coordination and cooperation between the two countries, according to which they pledged not to harm the historical rights of Egypt, that agreement contained in one of its articles a pledge by the two governments not to do any activity that would harm the other country’s interests in relation to the Nile River, they also pledged to consult and cooperate in projects with mutual interest so as to enhance the volume of flow and reduce the rate of loss from the Nile River, within the framework of comprehensive development plans (Hassan & Rifai, 2020).

Both Ethiopia and Egypt agreed to a way where they can discuss important matters that concerns each of them, Ethiopia seeks to evade the legal implications of this agreement on the pretext that the Ethiopian parliament has not ratified it. This is in response to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 that countries that have signed international treaties which their parliaments have not ratified them are obligated not to take any action that contradicts what they have signed with those treaties (Farah, 2020).

The current contrast between the position of Egypt and Sudan with the Ethiopian position:

The difference between the positions of Egypt and Sudan on one hand and the Ethiopian position, on the other, is represented in the following points (Halima, 2021):

1. The current Ethiopian position on negotiations revolves around sticking to guidelines for the rules and regulations for operating and filling the dam, partially and gradually, with the possibility of changing them in the future as soon as dangers arise, without taking into account any needs of Sudan and Egypt, while refusing to abide by a certain amount of water after the completion of filling and operating the reservoir - a position characterized by clear violations and explicit violations of relevant international charters, laws and agreements, including the Declaration of Principles Agreement.

2. While the current Egyptian/Sudanese position revolves around the necessity of reaching a binding, fair and balanced legal agreement for the rules for operating and filling the dam, taking into account the interests of the three parties, in full consistency with the relevant international charters, laws and agreements, including the Declaration of Principles Agreement.
Conclusion:

The Nile River is vital and strategic to Egypt; it depends on the huge quantity of water that it uses from it, and it was never ready for this quantity to decrease. Any intervention, therefore, by the basin countries, through the dams to be erected, will result into a major problem for Egypt, for its agriculture, and for its economy, and that the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, despite all the assurances that Ethiopia is trying to give to Egypt, does not relieve the Egyptian anxiety, despite dozens of agreements held between the basin countries, most of which were ignored by Addis Ababa, with the aid of the United States and Israel; According to Noah wodendraw, (2021) after almost a year of the Antabi agreement (Which acquired in 2010), Ethiopia started putting the foundation stone of the dam in 2011.

The Egyptians, therefore, feel that their national security is being targeted, and the intervention of regional and international countries to help Ethiopia with building the dam is targeting its national security. Ethiopia took advantage of the chaos that took place in Egypt after 2011, to accelerate the pace of construction of the dam, because Egypt was busy settling its political situation after the fall of the President Hosni Mubarak's regime, and then the arrival of the Muslim people to power, before the coup against them, prompting the Israeli entity to put pressure on Egypt by assisting the Ethiopians and advising them to move forward completing the construction and filling of the dam. It is not influential in the regional political scene, and because the historical Israeli ambitions in the Nile are still strongly present.

In the certainty that the follower of the Renaissance Dam crisis closely from its three legal, political and technical aspects, Ethiopia can be directed to an explicit condemnation and a clear accusation that it: First, a rogue state in its violation and disrespect for the rules and the international agreements, and among these agreements the United Nations Charter of Human Rights - especially the right to live. Secondly, it is practicing a kind of genocide against human, plants and animal life, with the massive damage it may cause, up to the point of compromising lives, land, property and livelihoods; like drowning, starvation, thirst, and deprivation, all of which require - in the event that the means for peaceful conflict resolution have been exhausted, in accordance with the Declaration of Principles Agreement, and the Security Council is informed of developments in the situation and threats - Resorting to other options, including the right to legitimate self-defense (life and existence) in accordance with Chapter 7 of the Charter of the United Nations, especially since the intransigent, Ethiopian position and the unilateral approach, with its dangerous repercussions on the life and existence of the two downstream countries, is a type of aggression that must be averted and stopped.
However, Ethiopia did not care. According to (Al-Shrouf, 2021), Ethiopia did not care about any international decisions or agreements and argued some concepts such as the concept of absolute sovereignty and many other concepts.

Ethiopia is neither friendly nor true to its promise. Rather, it is an independent country because of the circumstances that took advantage of bad conditions during the events of 25th January in 2011 and beyond for many years, and started to strike Egypt after planning it for many years, threatening its security, the water and the most important source on which it depends on it, the Nile River; According to Shrouf, (2021) given the size of the project, it got a lot of debate from the downstream countries (Sudan and Egypt) because it threatens their water security, and they see great dangers towards them.

Ethiopia was deceptive in its policies and put it under the fait accompli, hence Ethiopians intentions appears from both parties toward each other but despite Egypt’s awareness of the intentions of the Ethiopian positions and its intention to harm Egypt, it kept repeating that Egypt trusts Ethiopia and it didn’t harm Egypt, but it proved to the contrary, its main goal is to harm the Egyptian water and national security. According to that, the League of Arab States issued a resolution confirming Egypt’s historical rights to the Nile waters, rejecting any unilateral Ethiopian measures, and stressing the necessity of Ethiopia’s commitment to the principles of international law, and welcomes the agreement to fill the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam prepared by the US government, and affirms that the draft agreement proposed by America and the World Bank is “fair, balanced and achieves the interests of the three countries.” And that this decision would urge the Arab countries to "take the necessary measures to persuade Ethiopia to sign the draft agreement prepared by the United States." But Ethiopia issued a statement expressing its total rejection of this decision, moreover; Egypt was not spared the intentions of the countries that intervened or were a major party in this issue. This led to an increase in the negotiating capacity of Ethiopia and made it find pretexts to evade the agreements, according to Farah, (2020). Ethiopia seeks to evade the legal effects of the agreements under the pretext that the Ethiopian Parliament did not ratify the Treaties Act of 1969.

Sudan’s positions have varied since the start of construction work on the dam in 2011, between refusals at first to acceptance after that when it realized that the construction of the dam would not harm its interests. With the issuance of the Arab League’s decision, that decision prompted the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reserve the draft resolution because Egypt included it in the Council’s work without consulting with Sudan. This project does not also serve the
spirit of dialogue and negotiation to reach an agreement between these three countries on operating and filling the dam. Sudan has submitted a proposal to amend the text of the draft resolution in line with the goal of encouraging the parties to continue the dialogue and to stay away from everything that would escalate the dispute and polarization that would not serve the desired goal. This draft has not solved the situation between Egypt and Ethiopia, which may exacerbate the crisis.

**Recommendations:**

1. The necessity of resorting to adjudication through a neutral third party or the competent international court and accepting and implementing its decisions.
2. Reaching an agreement on the specifications and operation of the Renaissance Dam through direct negotiation.
3. Presenting the problem from the perspective of Egypt and Sudan to international bodies and organizations, and expanding the number of countries supporting the Egyptian and Sudanese positions.
4. Implementation of bilateral water agreements between Egypt and Ethiopia concerning the Renaissance Dam and in future Ethiopian projects.
5. Taking a unified Egyptian-Sudanese position on the issue of the Renaissance Dam.
6. Water cooperation with the Nile Basin countries, especially southern Sudan, to implement the proposed water projects.

**Future Work:**

The study recommends conducting research on the expected scenarios of the Renaissance Dam and what will lead to matters, especially with regard to the political aspect and the Egyptian and Sudanese reactions to Ethiopia's measures.

**Bibliography**


Journal of Namibian Studies, 33S1(2023): 1106–1120 ISSN:2197-5523 (online)


