

Regime Compliance And Boundary Disputes: Nigeria–Cameroun Debacle Over Bakassi Peninsula

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Abstract

The study was to determine Nigeria's adherence to the ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Green Tree Agreement on the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakassi Peninsula. The research intended to investigate whether Nigeria's compliance to the two regimes was predicated on the personal interest of the then president or the interest to secure a permanent seat in the Security council of the United Nations. The method adopted for the study was the survey design through questionnaire and Chi-square. Although the boundary crisis which may have snowballed into a fratricidal war was nib in the bud through conflict management regimes by the ICJ. It objective of the study aimed at whether Nigeria complied to the regimes due to the interest of the then president and its aspiration to secure a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. It was concluded that above factors were contributory to Nigerian compliance to the regimes in the settlement of the dispute, by demobilizing soldiers and lowering of the Nigerian flag. The study recommended among others

that the option of resettlement of the displaced people of Bakassi was preferable to declaring war.

Keywords: Bakassi Peninsula; Boundary; Cameroon; Disputes; Nigeria; Regime Compliance.

Introduction

After the decolonization of Africa by the West, several crises have erupted between the former colonies due to the arbitrary partition of Africa by the Colonial West. Annan (1998), asserts that one of the causes of conflicts between colonized African nations was the arbitrary nature of the partition of the boundaries by the colonialists. He stressed that African states were partitioned in an arbitrary manner, such that people with sharp different cultural backgrounds and traditions were carved out to become citizens in the same states. These divergent cultural ties and tradition inherited have posed as a bane to the peaceful co-existence in the achievement of national unity.

The colonialists did not take into consideration the peculiarities of the peoples' history, culture, tradition, customs, ethnicity, language, demography and socio-cultural permutations. This is demonstrated in the observation that people of same ethnic genealogy are often found to be at opposite streams of residence and location but administered by different colonial powers. This assertion is buttressed in the words of Lord Robert Gascome-cecil Salisbury, former British Prime Minister, that:

"All the time of partitioning and expanding British rule in Africa, we (the colonial powers) have engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's feet have ever trod; we have been giving a way mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we never know exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were, (ICJ) Reports, 1994, cited by Judge Ajibola and Adams, 2010).

Similarly, Sir Lord Lugard, the British Consular General was quoted by Ede (1981) when he said had said that:

In those days, we first took a blue pencil and ruler and we put it down at old Calabar and drew that blue line to Yola.... I recollect thinking when I was sitting having an audience with Emir (of Yola) surrounded by his tribe, that it was a very good thing that he did not know that, I with a blue pencil had drawn a line through his territory... 294.

It is pertinent that border crisis has erupted mostly in the colonial territories due to the arbitrary demarcation of the boundaries. And the numeric equation of these boundary crisis has been on the increase between African States, especially after independence. Bonchuk (2006) observed that while realties determine Africa's international boundaries, most of them are demarcated with boundaries. Nevertheless, the African experiences over border crisis, in relation to international boundaries are also experienced in other hemispheres. For example, the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the re-integration of the Greek Cypriots; Japan's assertion over Kurile Island seized by the former Soviet Union after World War II. The Indian-Pakistan conflict over Kashmire, (Barach and Webel, 2002). Not left out in the series is the recurrent conflict between Sinai Peninsula and Palestine over the West Bank, in Jerusalem. The Israeli conflict with Egypt over the Gaza strip and some other vicinities.

The issue of boundaries calls to the mind, the element of stability in consideration of its importance in the maintenance of border relationship between states. Unfortunately, the reverse becomes the case when the partition ignites protracted crisis. Boundary disputes have become the recurrent decimals that causes crisis among states, irrespective of the sophistication of geographic tools in the determination of boundaries between states. Starr and Most (1978), asserts that the binary view of borders remains a central problematic international interaction. They both claim that they look like two sides of the same coin, with one side submitting with risks while the other side issues with opportunities in relations with other states. Gross (1973), asserts that international relations between states who are adjacent to themselves is like a continuum with conflict at one end while cooperation is at the other end.

Considering that the boundaries of several states in colonial Africa have not been demarcated or re-

demarcated because of the absence of markers by the colonialists, there have been the uncertainty of defining the boundaries and this poses difficulties in regime compliance over border disputes between adjoining states. Also, it poses the difficulty to agencies of these states who are saddled with the responsibility of defending international boundaries. A situation which creates room for border disputes. The crisis caused by the indices mentioned above are further deepened because of the methodology of the markers. They used linear boundary methods which were established on strict geometric indices, that demarcates boundaries from the base line of the coast of one colonial state into the hinterland. The colonialists did not take into consideration the fundamental feature of ethnicity in the demarcation of boundaries between adjoining post-colonial African states. According to Bonchuk 1997), such boundaries were superimposed on the people, thereby displacing people with the same cultural affinity from their original locations and it has affected their socio-economic, political and cultural dwelling. The focus of this paper, **Regime Compliance and Boundary Disputes: Nigeria-Cameroon Debacle Over Bakassi Peninsula** therefore suffices. The interest in the maritime resources deposit, which particularly include fish and wildlife between the Benguela and Warm Guinea Currents has constituted border crisis in the Bakassi Peninsula. This crisis could be compared to the organization of the Berlin Conference of 1884 which depended on treaties entered into between the colonialists and their colonial subjects, reports from European representatives in the respective colonies.

The colonial powers had diverse interests in the Peninsula. While the Dutchmen focused at harvesting of shrimps, the English men who withdrew their expansion towards the East of the Niger River rather secured unfettered access to the Calabar sea passage for commercial activities. During the pendency of their possession of the Calabar sea channel, the British among other agreements, entered into an agreement with their German counterpart in 1913 where they both agreed to establish a demarcation of the boundaries between Nigeria and the Cameroun, which of course before now was not in existence. The intent was for merely administrative convenience in pursuit of their business

interests. Foremost, was the treaty entered into between Britain and Germany for the settlement of the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun that spaced from Yola in present day Adamawa state in Nigeria to the sea, which demarcated Bakassi Peninsula to be under the control of Germany, while the regulation of navigation on the Cross River side of the peninsula, ceded the navigation route of the off shore boundary area of the peninsula to the British. To buttress the above assertion, Article 21 of the Anglo-German Treaty, 1913 provided for the location of the extant boundary by the two former colonies. It states thus:

From the centre of the navigable channel on a line joining Bakassi point and king point, the boundary shall follow the centre of the navigable. Channel of the Akpayafe River as far as the 3-mile limit of territorial jurisdiction. For the purpose of defining this boundary, the navigable channel of Akpayafe River shall be considered to lie wholly to the East of the navigable channel of the Cross River and Calabar river (Article xxi, Anglo-German Treaty, March 1913).

From the foregoing provision of Article 21 of the Anglo-German Treaty, it is obvious that there were no initial boundaries between the two former colonial colonies, rather the boundary was determined by the imagination of the colonial masters at the time who were Britain and Germany. At the end of the First World War, the German side could not sustain her invasion into Africa as she lost Cameroun which was under its jurisdiction. Cameroun at this time was delineated into two colonial constituencies by the, the League of Nations and these territories were left in the control of Britain and France to be administered as mandate territories. In July, 1919 the Franco-British Declaration delineated Bakassi Peninsula and the Anglo-Camerounians to be under the jurisdiction of British mandate, where the indirect rule was introduced as it was in Eastern Nigeria and Southern Cameroun by the 1913 Anglo-German Treaty. After World War II, another agreement was entered into between France and Britain to a systematic code of the 1919 declaration. It placed the North and South Cameroun as trusteeship territories under the United Nations Organization (UNO). Also, the agreement re-ratified the former treaties between Britain and Germany, and Britain and France respectively in

relation to the borders between Nigeria and Cameroun. During this period of exploration by the colonialists, the authority over Bakassi Peninsulas was not questioned by the Cameroun, thereby no crisis erupted between them. Nevertheless, after the independence of Nigeria large deposits of crude oil was discovered in the Bakassi Peninsula, caused both countries to go into a fierce battle in the claim and establishment of ownership over the oil and surrounding waters of the peninsula.

The crisis that became so severe that various means of resolving it, even the employment of the use of force proved abortive. It was thereafter that, Cameroun instituted a suit at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1994 against Nigeria, and the case was determined in their favour in 10 October 2002.

By the provisions of Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), there could not have been the execution of the ICJ ruling in the case, because it states that:

1. No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.
2. The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List for the purpose of implementing a treaty.
3. A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall not be presented to the president for assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a majority of all the Houses of Assembly in the Federation.

In consideration of the complex nature of the case, and the extant provisions in the Nigerian Constitution, the court ruling may not have had the intended therapy to heal the wounds caused by the dispute and therefore bring peace between Nigeria and Cameroun. It rather took intervention of the UNO through its then Secretary General, Kofi Annan who brokered peace between the two countries to ensure compliance in the implementation of the ICJ ruling over the Green Three Accord of June 12, 2006 which was the crux of the dispute. The focus of this study is the examination of whether the

Green Tree Accord of New York on June 12, 2006 could halt further hostilities between Nigeria and Cameroun.

Statement of the Problem

The ruling of the ICJ was supposed to be a day of merry for Nigeria and Cameroun between the reverse was the case. They were supposed to be compliant to the ruling in respect of the provisions of Article 2 (3) of the UN Chapter which stipulates that all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. But the problem which is visionary is the validity and sustainability of the compliance regime, taking into consideration the non-consideration of certain fundamental criteria in the prosecution or the peace process. These include the aborigine status of the Bakassi people, self-determination principle, compensation, and restitution. More so, the crisis created restriction of trading activities, military invasion by Cameroun and annexation of Nigerian territory; seizure of fishing equipment from Nigerian fishermen, eviction of Nigerians from their villages among other vices (Eminue, 1996). Irrespective of the implementation of the ICJ judgment, it became doubtful whether there would be any semblance of peace in the disputed area. It becomes more worrisome on whether since there is no universal government to enforce the ruling of the ICJ, can the subject of the crisis being the Green Tree Agreement serve its purpose as a security regime to resolve the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun over Bakassi Peninsula.

Objective of the Study

The study aims at the following objectives:

1. To determine whether Nigeria's compliance to the ICJ ruling was related to the person interest of the then President Olusegun Obasanjo.
2. To investigate into whether Nigeria's compliance to the Green Tree Agreement is related to that aspiration of Nigeria to seek a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Hypotheses

The hypotheses for the study are as follows:

1. H_{01} : There is no significant relationship between Nigeria's compliance to the ICJ ruling and the personal interest of the then President, Olusegun Obasanjo
2. H_{02} : There is no significant relationship between Nigeria's compliance to the Green Tree Agreement and its aspiration to seek for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Review of Related Literature

The review of literature in the study is focused on the understanding of the policies that Nigeria and Cameroun adopted and the infiltration of third party trading in the determination of the dispute. The literature review is centered on both theoretical review and empirical review. Conflict can be comprehended to be issues which create unrest that leads to discomfort between parties to a dispute. And these disputes are caused by different circumstances. It could through certain characteristics peculiar to the various environments. Boyd (1980), considers dispute in another manner. He stated that "it is boundary per which causes conflict, but rather, it is the state policy which causes it" (162). This presupposes that boundaries could be one among the factors that causes conflict, which influences policy thrust of a state. Conflict can be caused by political believe between countries, as it is the experience between Palestine and Israel. It can also occur between a people in the like the Arabs and the Jews, and or, in a situation of threat in border areas of neighbouring states due to mutual suspicion. Bassey (2001), in his work, "Territorial Imperatives and Border Problems," stated that with the general nature of border, it usually divides and unites, brings together the domestics and unified them as well. He stated further that there are obstacles and meeting points, walls and openings, tools of defence and attack. Border lands can be used to actualize either of the variables and could be by military attacks at neighbours or used to make peace on the hand.

The exercise of state sovereignty and its challenges could be taken from the Treaty of West Phalia of 1648, where the endeavour to establish a paradigm of state sovereignty began. On the other hand, sovereignty could be drawn the feudal system where state power was considered in the form of territory. Territory signifies state identity which attracts allegiance form the citizenry.

It is an important tool in international transactions between neighbouring states. According to Oppenheim (1955), as quoted in Shaw (1986:1) "state without a territory is not possible". In their observation, they confirm the thesis that territory is the nexus of international relations. Next to be considered is state boundaries because of its importance, as they separate the authority of states and the allegiance of their citizens. State boundaries are symbolic and empirical in display. It therefore commands stability. Gottmann (1973), noted that:

Territorial sovereignty is, in general, a situation recognized and delimited in space, either by so-called natural frontiers as recognized by international law or by outward sign of delimitation that are undisputed or else by legal engagement entered into between interested neighbours...

It is regrettable that there is no absolute reality that boundaries establish stability because they have often been created between states even when clear demarcations are earmarked.

Strassalo (1989), has explained the different interpretations of border when he stated that;

Borders divide and unite, bind the interior and links the interior, they are barriers and junctions, walls and doors, organs of defence and attack. Frontiers areas (border lands) can be managed as to maximize either of such functions. They can be militarized, or against neighbour, or made into areas of peaceful interchange (393).

Starr and Most (1978), submit that "shared international boundaries are like cousins with one side issuing with 'risks' and the other with 'opportunities in interstate interactions. Boundaries were endeavours to actual exactitude in demarcation, and were discovered on the presumption that these are natural impressions like water ways, fields, mountains, rocks, hills, among others, and are more dependable and are preferred to man-made boundaries which may include; walls roads, trenches. On the contrary, Boggs (1940), stated that:

A line marked by nature did not always imply that it constitutes the best line to separated neighbouring people. The crest of a mountain

range may not be a natural frontier where people of some language and traditions inhabit both side of the mountain:(20).

Boundaries may be categorized into different forms, inclusive of both natural and artificial boundaries. In the words of Boggs (1940),

Physical boundaries are those that follow natural feature, geometric boundaries involve the use of straight lines, acres, meridian, etc. Anthro-geographic boundaries were those closely related to human settlement factors, which the compounded boundaries comprised all the elements of other type, (22)

From the foregoing, it could be asserted that the colonialists demarcated their territories to conform with their intents, but these showcased cartographies. Given the absence of an exact construct to assume in the study of regime compliance, the game theory may suffice in the circumstance. This is where actors assure rational choice by optimizing their utilities. According to Schelling (1980:4), "The premise of rational behaviour is a potential one for the production of theory, where the resulting theory provides good or poor insight into actual behaviour is ... a matter for subsequent judgement,"

There is hope in compliance regimes due to the general presumption that states are involve international obligations on the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Our attempt is to consider the expectations of regime compliance by states in their respective obligations, which may have metamorphosed into applying force or otherwise. But Young (1992), Rosenau and Czempiel (1992), reported that, research has proven that compliance is not verifiable because of time. They said this is because nations compliance to international treaties is undermined. They state can violate them at will to protect their interest. This is in contradiction to the 1993 Oslo Accord, and by extension, Article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter which provide that states who enter into agreements are expected to review their behaviour in relation to their expectations with each other in consonance with the contents of agreements. Henkin, (1979), puts is that they should, to a considerable extent comply with the undertakings they have consented to agree upon.

However, the potency of regimes depends on approved agreements for the resolution of conflicts. Therefore, the array of these machinery is numerous to include prevention, collective security, peace-keeping, peace-building and arbitrations. Empirically, boundaries disputes were reviewed of the experiences of other states. The issues of boundary disputes are universal. For example, Canada and the United States of America which is considered to be the longest border, originated from the Paris Treaty of 1783 and it brought to end the war between Great Britain and her colonies, from where the United States was established. The Jay Treaty of 1794 established the boundary commission that demarcated the boundary.

Haas (1980), observed in his works, Linkage and International Regimes, that, concerning the hostilities in Bahrain and Chad over the Hawar Islands and Maritime boundary, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over the Qaruh and Union al Maradim Islands, Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the Persian Islands, United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar territory, United Kingdom and Argentina over Falkland Island, Brazil and Uruguay over Arroio Invernada, and India and Pakistan over Kashmir, in contemporary international systems, more non-governmental groups of all kinds maintain continuous contact with their counterparts elsewhere and seek to shape the foreign policies of their home countries. He emphasized that, "there seems to be greater reluctance to use force in the resolution of disputes since the focus is now on arrangements for institutionalized collaboration on issues characterized by complex interdependence (367).

On the whole, if the above views are anything to go by, it then could connote that our focus has to be redirected. More so, it rather seems self-evident that parties to a dispute to pursue common interests. Since compliance regimes do not offer cogent solutions to definite boundary disputes, it is explicable to engage in an empirical study states who are participating in the proceedings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in their respective obligations in compliance with the outcome of the court's decisions. Lindblom (1968), asserts that, "standard economic analysis argues against the continuous recalculation of costs and benefits in the

absence of convincing evidence that circumstances change after the original decision “(14). The assertion of compliance seems to imply that it is a function of interest, but the implication here is that, states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent. If it is so, then states should refuse to sign pacts that are against their national interest and or by the provision of Article 2(3) of the United Nations, decide to neglect becoming members of the organization.

Etzioni (1971), observes that, “compliance is a universal phenomenon that exists in all social units and serves as a major element of the relationship between those who have power and those over whom they exercise it.” He pointed out that those who have power manipulation means, which they command in such a manner that certain power holder find following the directive rewarding, “while not following it incurs deprivations” (4). Barkun (1986), in his treatise “Law Without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Societies and the World Community”, observes that, “from the point of view of the particular interests of any state, the outcome of a decision or judgement may fall short of the ideal” (62). But that if the decision or resolution is legitimate, sensible, comprehensible, and with a practical eye to probable patterns of conduct and interaction, compliance problems and enforcement issues are likely to be manageable. On the other hand, if the issues of non-compliance and enforcement are regular, the difficulty becomes that, such judgement may not be in the interest of those who are sanctioned, thereby causing them to be non-compliant.

Saadra (1972), stated that, beyond the Nigeria and Cameroun debacle over Bakassi Peninsula, is the Ethiopia-Kenya boundary dispute over Gadaduma Well in 1963. However, the dispute was non-violence rather connected to pre-independence colonial activities. To resolve the dispute in 1970, Kenya had to recognize that Ethiopia is the owner of the Gadaduma Well at the 1963 Pact, between Britain and Kenya” (248). He further observed that the decision of Kenya to cede the Gadaduma Well was for the eager intent to seek Ethiopian support to fight Somalia.

Also in the same vein, Algeria and Tunisia were caught in a territorial dispute in 1956 over the discovery

of crude oil in El Boma, which in Tunisia. The gist of the dispute was that crude oil discovered along the boundary and there was the expectation for expansion. Rather than go further into the dispute, Tunisia preferred to agree to a joint venture, which was not opposed by Algeria. Boulding (1962), in his words says, "the most important factor enabling Tunisia to abandon its territorial claim was however, the pragmatism of president Bourguiba which was reflected in the flexibilities of his policies. Similarly, Benin-Niger had dispute over Lete Island in 1963. The dispute which predates their independence, was inherited at independence in 1960. Since both governments were not comfortable in going into a dispute, they both had to maintain status quo ante bullem. At the takeover of President Halbert Maga of Benin Republic, regime in 1993, hostilities resumed between Benin and Niger Republics. According to Saadra (1972)," the two government later decided to withdraw from the struggle following their acceptance of the report of a Joint Demarcation Commission of 1965.

Contrarily, it was a different approach between Eritrea and Ethiopia in respect to the non-violent methodology. In 1952, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 17, thereby federating both countries into a single Ethiopian state, with Eritrea been granted semi self-governance. But Emperor Haile Selassie and Derg aborted the rights and in 1974 Selassie was deposed. War erupted against the Ethiopian authority in the 1970s and 1980s till the Algiers Peace Accord which brought it to an end in 2000.

Theoretical Framework

The Game Theory was adopted for the study. It is the rational conflicts which is characterized by strategy. Games theory was originally formulated by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. The manner in which they developed it, game theory is taken to be a formal theory with definite consequences. In his strategy and conscience, Anatol Rapoport sorts to give clarification on the conceptual basis of the game theory and to assert its application to the defence strategy of many choices in disputes.

Bobrow (1972), posits that game theory deals with situations which have the following properties:

1. They involved two or more “players” (individuals, nations, etc.). whose interests conflict, at least.
2. Each player has two or more choices (strategies) as to how to proceed in the game.
3. A play of the game consists of a single simultaneous choice of a strategy by each of the players.
4. The outcome of the game is determined once each player has chosen a strategy; and
5. Each possible outcome is associated with a particular pay off or return (positive or negative) to each player”.

According to Doel and Venthoven (1993), “A game is a mathematical simulation of the interaction of the behaviour between various individuals in which a logical connection is made between the goals of the subjects, their actions and the results they achieve, (60).

Game theory is relevant to the study due to its analysis because, though it does not provide a formal calculus to reach an optimal point for any concrete problems such as arms control, but it brings up the requirements to arrive at the criteria of rationality. Where theory has not provided ground rules for strategic choice to meet optimal goals, game theory serves as an essential instrument. Also, it gives analysis of conflicts for competing values for choices. It assists decision makers to formulate policies and to suggest the likely behaviour of actors in a dispute. Varma (1975) relies on game theory because of its utility in coalition or behaviour, judicial review and dispute circumstances in international transactions between states. Hence, the Nigeria – Cameroun debacle over the Bakassi Peninsula took the form of the zero, fixed-sum games.

Methodology

The survey method was adopted for the study. It is a process whereby required data for a study is elicited from a target population. The ex post facto research design was adopted. The area of the study is the Bakassi Peninsula. An area which Nigeria and Cameroun immersed in territorial dispute over Crude Oil deposits. The sample population was reached through purposive sampling from the population of the study which stood at about 130,000 people. The purposive sampling technique was preferred

because the issue in question borders on foreign policy and should be discussed by elites. 250 Respondents were purposively sampled through questionnaires.

The method of analysis adopted was the Chi-square (χ^2). Thus:

$$\text{Chi-square} = \sum \frac{(\text{OF} - \text{EF})^2}{\text{EF}} \quad \chi^2(\text{df})$$

Where: χ^2 = Chi-square
 Σ = Summation
 OF = Observed frequency
 EF = Expected Frequency

$$\text{Degree of freedom (df)} = (C-1)(R-1)$$

Where: df = Degree of freedom

C = Columns
 R = Rows

Presentation and Analysis

Table 1: Computation of Chi-Square

Items	SA	A	SD	D	Total
1	100	22	40	24	196
2	99	23	29	23	174
3	71	26	54	21	172
4	62	11	50	50	173
5	66	23	37	43	174
6	51	66	26	31	174
7	55	30	60	45	190
8	42	27	70	44	183
9	80	31	41	21	73
10	66	42	35	37	80
Total	692	301	442	339	789

Source: Field Survey, 2020

Testing Hypothesis 1:

H_0 : There is no significant relationship between Nigeria's compliance and the then Nigeria Presidents' personal interests in the debacle between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula.

Table 2: Chi-Square Computation for Hypothesis 1

N0.	RC	O	E	O-E	(O-E) ²	Σ(O-E) ²
1	1-1	58	50.50	11.09	111.05	2.23
	1-3	11	34.00	-24.01	530.36	17.02
	1-2	59	51.60	10.00	91.34	1.80
	1-2	41	37.86	3.30	9.81	0.26
2	2-2	65	34.01	32.10	1024.35	30.00
	2-2	52	50.50	1.50	1.25	0.01
	2-4	20	33.79	-7.10	1022.26	32.00
	2-1	26	50.49	-24.6	652.56	13.86
3	2-3	41	51.86	11.56	121.23	2.45
	3-1	26	34.87	-8.07	81.53	2.46
	3-3	43	38.15	4.83	16.41	0.40
	2-2	31	37.86	-6.95	49.57	1.30
TOTAL						103.79

Analysis: CV = 103.79; TV = 2.6 at 0.05 level of significance;

$$df = (C-I) (R-I) = (4-1) (3-1) = 3 \times 3 = 9$$

Decision Rule: In consideration of the rule, given that the calculated value of 103.79 is greater than the value of 2.6 at 0.05 level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected. It states that there is no significant relationship between Nigeria's compliance and the then Nigeria President's personal interest in the debacle between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula. Consequently, the alternate hypothesis is accepted that, there is a significant relationship between Nigeria's compliance with the then Nigeria president personal interest in the debacle between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership Bakassi Peninsula.

Testing Hypothesis 2

H₀: There is no significant relationship between Nigeria's intention to seek for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and here compliance with the regimes of the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula.

N0.	RC	O	E	O-E	(O-E) ²	Σ(O-E) ²
1	4-3	16	30.59	-15.70	279.45	8.70
	3-4	23	39.66	-17.66	282.13	7.30
	2-4	81	53.03	28.76	777.63	14.80
	1-4	59	52.40	6.01	31.53	0.61
2	4-3	17	31.87	-15.68	227.63	7.01
	3-2	26	38.55	-13.55	161.26	4.35

	2-3	78	511.53	26.45	695.73	13.81
	1-3	53	51.78	1.10	1.24	0.03
3	4-2	49	29.51	19.47	376.47	13.21
	3-2	66	36.00	30.10	899.04	26.58
	2-2	21	47.70	-2.70	733.67	15.65
	1-2	26	47.30	-22.2	498.38	11.41
4	4-1	43	30.77	12.21	2147.78	4.93
	3-1	37	37.44	-6.64	0.31	0.10
	2-1	23	50.43	-27.14	737.13	15.88
	1-1	66	50.40	16.5	244.26	4.92
TOTAL						149.29

Source: Field Survey, 2022.

Analysis:

CV=149.29; TV=8.44 at 0.005 level of significance; $df=(C-1) - (R-1)=(4-1)(4-1)=4 \times 4-16$.

Decision Rule:

Since the calculated value of 149.29 is greater than table value of 8.44 at 0.05 level of significant, the null hypothesis is rejected. It states that there is no significant relationship between Nigeria's intention to seek a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and her compliance with regimes of boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis, that, there is a significant relationship between Nigeria's intention to seek a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council and her compliance with regimes of boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakakssi Peninsula.

Findings

In consideration of the contestable and lawless nature of the international system states are bound to be in dispute over their respective boundaries. In the words of Young (1981), "the absence of a world government requires that the international system is anarchic, where anarchy is a situation in which there is no formal institutions of government at the system level, and that is lightly decentralized with respect to the distribution of authority and power. The International Court of Justice has been identified as that international institution which

arbitrates, mediates and or adjudicates on disputes brought by state parties in conflict situations, with the aim of curbing the unwarranted outcome which may be fratricidal. On the presumption that the ICJ may be viewed as an adjudicator with authority, compliance to its decisions depend upon two basic routes. These are the internal structure and the external structure.

From the foregoing therefore, the judgement of the ICJ, the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) and the notations of the Mixed Boundary Commission of Nigeria and Cameroun, are taken to be compliance regimes in the study. The study observed that the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun is an age long dispute as it is observed in other parts of the world. The dispute is traceable to the incursion of the colonialists into Africa, where they negotiated and delineated portions of Africa into European Imperialists control without recourse to the checkered history of the divergent culture of Africans. It is observed that since the area under study is synonymous to African therefore, any solution to resolve the dispute shall be of great utility to other boundary disputes within the African continent.

The boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun over Bakassi Peninsula is arguably the long-lasting and worst among the territorial challenges that Nigeria has ever been faced with in the history of her existence. Also, the absence of consensus building between both countries was notable in the dispute. Majority opinion had it Bakassi Peninsula was under the watch of the Obong of Calabar before colonialism, when in 1885 he signed the Protection Treaty with Britain. However, there are counter claims over what was agreed by the Germans and the Britain in 1913). The study observed that these countries went into a Pack in 1913 to exchange the area under study with the Calabar water ways. A situation which had remained in contention until the judgement of the ICJ was given in October 10, 2002.

The crisis to claims and counter-claims to the Bakassi Peninsula resulted to the eruption of violence in the area respectively during the reigns of the military juntas of 1981, 1994 and 1996, Nigeria. And in October, 2002 the ICJ judgement ceded the area to Cameroun. It was observed further that the outcome of the ICJ ruling adversely affected the relation between Nigeria and Cameroun. And that, the dispute erupted due to certain

ingredients which are worthy of note. They include, political and economic issues. Politically, analysts are of the opinion that overtly the government inadvertently had to distract Nigerians from poor economic management. economically, it was observed that before the dispute, the area was not a point of attraction not until when deposits of crude oil was discovered in the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroun in the 1970s and 1980s.

It was also observed that the Bakassi people prefer to remain in Nigeria. The study corroborated Ate's (1992) assertion, that "it is unthinkable for Nigeria to surrender control of its oils commercial and defence life-lines to a traditionally hostile neighbour by handing over BakassiPeninsul to Cameroun. On the whole, it was observed that the conceding of the area by Nigeria would result to peace with her immediate neighbour." Similarly, Uba (1998), is in consonance with the above assertion when he observed that, "this country, Nigeria has participated in continental panels to mediate in disputes and should be seen to be practicing what she preaches". Nigeria was known to had contended for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council at the time of the dispute. And that wherefore she rejected the ICJ ruling, and the Green Tree Agreement, the odds would have been against interest. Stating further, the image of Nigeria would had been viewed from a negative perspective should she had negated to abide by the two regimes. The study did observe that since border disputes disrupt friendly relations among states, it was a better methodology for Nigeria to accept the ICJ judgement, and that to jaw-jaw is preferable to war-war.

Conclusion

Notice has been taken into the background reasons for the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakakssi Peninsula and how it was resolved. The manner in which the issue was solved has exposed the injustice of mankind on man. That is how the colonialist partitioned Africa and created bad blood among people who ordinarily are supposed to be brothers of the same descent. Also, that the resolution of the issue serves as a lesson unto mankind to believe that disputes between states can be resolved by way of adjudication but not usually through war only. Irrespective of the fact that Nigeria lost in the debacle,

parties to the dispute are commended in their conduct, as they exercised caution in the application of force. The regimes – Green Tree Agreement and the ICJ ruling must not be left out to be commended as they laid to rest the dispute. Those who survived the dispute must be applauded as well, because a saying goes that, “he who goes and returns from the war is he who should shout the echoes of war.”

Generally, it was also observed that territorial contiguity between states is characterized by two sides of the same coin in of centrifugal forces and centripetal forces – tear apart or pulling together of states. Adjudication results in the zero – sum outcome, whereby the gains of one party is the loss of another party in a dispute. And that it is advisable to adopt dialogue and the principle of diplomacy in the settlement of disputes between states.

The essence of stock-taking on the dispute is to bring to the fore that the affected people in every conflict are the central actors. This shall be a road map to enable actors in disputes to seek and reach liberal resolutions, but where the parties to a dispute refuse to abide to the end result so imposed by a regime, there exist the likelihood of resumed conflicts. Cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroun shall be achieved where the Peninsula is developed and the enforcement of law and order, is guaranteed while further discourse continues for the integration of the inhabitants. In all, certain things are to be appreciated from the dispute. They include the avoidance of war is a key factor to be considered in the face of a dispute; colonial incursion into Africa and its participation stood as remote the cause of dispute, and the African continent should diversify their economies from the sole reliance on forest resources to human capital development.

Recommendations

The following recommendations were proffered.

1. Maritime laws should be reviewed to clear the restrictions on water ways
2. Joint venture agreements should be encouraging between Nigeria and Cameroun to restore confidence and peacebuilding.
3. Strict adherence should be focused at the Nigerian Border Communities Development Agency and Cross

Border Initiatives Programme of Economic Community of West African States.

4. The displaced people of Bakassi should be re-integrated into their environment to avert disputes of settler indigenes.
5. The implementation of the provisions of the Border Communities Development Act shall enhance the Nigerian – Cameroon boundary regions to live in peaceful coexistence.
6. Joint border patrols mechanism shall encourage bilateral interaction between the border towns of both countries.
7. The publication of the ICJ ruling proceedings shall be a model to disputing border states, instead of resorting to war.

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