

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission In Mali (MINUSMA) In Peacekeeping Support Operation In Mali

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Abstract

This study seeks to assess the impact of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and identify challenges facing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The descriptive research design was adopted for this study and the data collected for this study collected from secondary sources such as textbooks, journals and other internet source while content analysis was used to analyse the data collected. This study is anchored on the institutional theory. This study revealed that the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has made significant impact in the area of peace building for instance large numbers of displaced people were able to return home, the stability in northern Mali was improved, and the number of civilians killed in the fighting was reduced. Moreover, MINUSMA helped with the peace process that led to the 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, and aided the organising of the 2013 and 2016. However, MINUSMA is one of the costliest peacekeeping missions in Africa, with a budget of roughly \$600 million and one of the deadliest peacekeeping support operations in the world in recent years considering the numbers of casualties recorded. Others include conflict over authority and labour allocation. Inadequate personal and logistics issues are

among the challenges facing MINUSMA. Lastly, this study recommended among other things that the present peace deal needs to be implemented honestly and successfully, since past peace accords' insufficient execution contributed to the revival of the problem in Mali.

Keywords: Peace keeping, Mali, United Nations, Africa, MINUSMA.

Introduction

On October 24, 1945, the UN was officially recognised and its charter was adopted. It was essential to maintaining international peace. Its membership began to grow gradually. Currently, 196 nations are UN members. These figures will rise in the future. Indeed, the UN's founding opened a brand-new chapter in global history. With the founding of the UN, a significant step towards preserving international peace was taken. The UN made a notable effort by asking for a ceasefire during the Cold War to bridge the gap between Russia and the United States of America. The UN's contribution in carrying out several welfare initiatives around the globe is commendable. However, the rivalry between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies negatively impacted the UN's true collective security, resulting in more than 230 security council vetoes during the Cold War that prevented about one-third of the organization's resolutions from being implemented in any way (Kegley & Blaton, 2011: 392).

The notion of the inviolability of the national borders of independent African governments has historically been backed by the UN. As a result, it has refrained from intervening in the resolution of internal conflicts including secession or irredentism. On the other hand, the UN has regularly endeavoured to participate in diplomatic measures to safeguard that right in instances when it was felt that the right of the people of specific areas to self-determination was being denied. For instance, in the case of Namibia, the UN was able to broker a ceasefire between the parties involved, establish a peacekeeping presence in the nation, and oversee multi-party elections that resulted in Namibia's independence in 1990 despite years of South Africa's procrastination and diverting tactics. Nonetheless, the UN started acting as a genuine collective security organisation during the Korean War through peace enforcement, which it conducted as a novel strategy known as peacekeeping focused at dividing adversaries. Similar to this, the UN General Assembly's uniting for peace resolution authorised the UN emergency force (UNEF) in 1956 to respond to the Suez crisis, which was the first peacekeeping operations.

The UN began to believe that its function was limited to mediating interstate crises through diplomacy after intervening in the former Belgian Congo in 1960 to end domestic hostilities. Also, in the 1960s, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammars practised what is known as preventative diplomacy to manage security by making an effort to resolve problems before they reached a crisis point or a point when they might otherwise erupt into full-blown violence. Besides, Javier Perez de Cuellar, the secretary general of the UN, pursued so-called peacemaking in 1986 as a result of discontent with the superpowers. Although Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, focused the organization's efforts on promoting peace by fostering an environment where a return to war is improbable

This mindset had changed by the 1990s under the leadership of UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali. The UN started to reevaluate the idea of state sovereignty, its ramifications, and the accepted norms of intervening in domestic issues. It made the decision to become involved in Iraq in 1991 to defend the Kurds from Saddam Hussein's genocide attempts. This was the first time the UN made the decision to take sides and categorise a nation's internal issues as a threat to international security. By the time the UN made the decision to enter the Somali civil war, it was obvious that humanitarian concerns had supplanted national sovereignty. In addition, regional powers would need to increase their ability to intervene in the most serious domestic crises in their regions, although with foreign help, according to UN officials.

Moreover, the United Nations has supported peacekeeping efforts in Africa since 1960, including in the Congo on July 14, 1960, Angola on December 20, 1988, Angola on May 30, 1992, Somalia on April 24, 1992, and March 26, 1993, Mozambique on December 16, 1992, and Cote d'Ivoire on May 13, 2003. Other UN peacekeeping missions in Africa include those in Uganda, Rwanda, and Western Sahara (as of 29 April 1991), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (as of July 1999), Sierra Leone (as of 22 October 1999), Ethiopia and Eritrea (as of June 2000), Burundi (as of 2004), Sudan (as of 24 March 2005), and Mali (as of 2013) (UNDPKO, <http://www.un.org/depts/dpko>).

While these conflicts are ongoing, the UN is working to ensure peacemaking (putting an end to the conflict already in progress) and managing the UN's peace operations to police those conflicts where the threat of renewed fighting among rivalry states is high. As a result, peace enforcement operations have relied on UN forces that are trained and equipped to use military force if necessary without the prior consent of the disputants (Gilligan & Stedman, 2003).

Furthermore, Africa has surely offered a significant challenge to the United Nations' involvement in peace operations in the twenty-first

century given the prevalence of intra-state disputes there. For instance, nearly 30% of total UN peacekeeping expenses in 2004–2005 were spent on operations in Africa, of which 70% were connected to missions in Africa (Galadima, 2008). Mali has extremely unsettling aspects to its peacekeeping efforts. Since troops are forced to deal not just with irregular forces and rogue element but also with armed militia with ill-defined hierarchy and command structure, Mali has developed into an increasingly complicated combat zone with an accompanying susceptibility to bodily damage.

On the whole, Mali has faced many serious crises in recent years that have had serious ramifications for the country's politics, security, socioeconomic situation, humanitarian efforts, and human rights. Long-standing structural issues like weak state institutions, ineffective governance, brittle social cohesion, ingrained feelings among Malian society's marginalised and unfairly treated groups, a weak society, and the consequences of environmental deterioration, climate change, and economic shocks all contributed to the crisis (<http://reliefweb.int/sites>). It is against this background this study seeks to examine the role of the United Nations peacekeeping support operations in Mali.

Conceptual Review: Peace Keeping, Peace operation, Peace Enforcement and Peace Making

According to Kegley and Blaton (2011) Peace Keeping, Peace operation, Peace Enforcement and Peace Making in the following ways. peace keeping is “the effort of the third parties such as UN to intervene in civil wars and /or interstate wars or to prevent hostilities between potential belligerent from escalating, so that by acting as a buffer, a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be reached. Peace operation is a general category encamping both peacekeeper and peace enforcement operations undertaken to establish and maintain peace between disputants. Peace enforcement is the applications of military force to warring parties, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant is international authorization, to compel compliance with the resolutions or with sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order, while Peace making is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiations, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to dispute and resolves the issues that led to conflict (Kegley & Blaton 2011: 392).

Stabilization and Security

The NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) was established in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, and this marked the introduction of the word "stabilisation" to peace operations. Since then, the phrase has come to

be used to describe military actions used to stabilise a situation (or perhaps an entire nation) long enough to launch attempts to create long-lasting institutions. When the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti was established in 2004, the phrase was first used in a UN context. During the past 10 years, the term "stabilisation" has taken shape and gained some substance in the context of the UN; in the UN Principles and Guidelines for Peacekeeping (Capstone doctrine), the UN defines stabilisation as the time when a UN peacekeeping deployment is deployed.

However, security is without a doubt one of the most crucial concepts in international relations because it is linked to the life and safety of states, as well as the populations who live within them. It is difficult to define security, though, because throughout human history, the phrase has been used to refer to a variety of things depending on the context and the individual.

The Cold War's end was a turning point for many schools of thought in security studies, and the idea of security has since remained a source of preoccupation for the decades that followed. There are many different aspects to the idea of security. Security is a vague concept because its application is becoming more and more every day. Because of its elasticity, the concept of security is open to several interpretations. Although it defies precise definition, the concept of security is one that every human being values. It has one or two meanings. This supports Barry Buzan's (1991) argument that security is an imprecise, multifaceted notion in which military considerations have gained unwarranted attention.

Security is the process involved in removing any threat to individuals and their valuable possessions. The ability of governments to maintain their independence and their position is what Buzan claims security is all about when he says: One of the elements of the new thinking is the idea that security policy should have political accommodation as a major and persistent purpose. Throughout the cold war, it was clear that equating security with the military almost solely had a detrimental impact. This strategy is known as strategic reductionism, which views security from a technical and mechanistic military perspective as shown by a fixation with military balance and the application of cutting-edge technology (Nwolise, 2008: 349).

The second school of thinking on how security is conceptualised is an unconventional one. The definition of security is being expanded and deepened at this institution. It contends that rather than focusing on the survival of the state, other challenges like as environmental, political, economic, and social threats jeopardise the lives and property of individuals. It does imply that a definition that emphasises the military

does not recognise the fact that the biggest threat to state survival may not come from the military but rather from the environment, health, politics, social, and economic factors.

Literature Review

There is growing research on peacekeeping support operations in recent years. Raji (2021) have argued that the Nigeria Police Force has been adjudged the best in terms of international peacekeeping by both international security expert in variance with its debilitated or effete classification as an unprofessional, inapt, unqualified organization in internal or domestic policing, as characterize by human right abuse, high rate of criminal activities. This showed that the international standard operation procedures and best practices exhibited by the Nigeria Police have not reflected in their domestic policing. However, this study does not assess the impact of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Famoye, (2018) The model for regional organizations across globe placed Nigeria in a more influential emplace in managing conflict at the international level, mostly especially Africa continent. While Nigeria had a high rating in international conflict management, it however, left an imprint on the foreign policy of the nation. Based on the above, this study seeks to appraise why and how the participation of Nigeria in conflict resolution within West Africa was influential to its foreign policy perceptivity, aspiration and design between 1990 and 2000. However, this study does not assess the impact of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Hailu, (2020) asserts that peacekeeping approaches are based on self-perceived interest of the actors in peacekeeping within Africa. Foreign powers have stated that they will not engage their military to settle African discordant of infighting. The foreign world wishes to put liability on African states, rather than participate or partake in it, will make peace in Africa unattainable. This is characterized with the fact that Africans are shying away or are not ready to accept, assume such a weighty responsibility in the absent of direct involvement of western military in African infighting. However, this study does not assess the impact of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

Chudi (2020) Interrogate Nigeria's peacekeeping supports round the world. Nigeria government has contributed both human and material resources in her peacekeeping support. The study assesses measures at intervening and resolving interstate/intra state infighting or conflicts that almost resulted to the verge of absolute disintegration or crash of states

involved. The study discovered that the act or process of keeping peace in one country by extension saves an entire sub-region or region from likely deluge effects. However, this study does not assess the impact of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) enhance this study seeks to make contributions to this research endeavour.

Evolution of the United Nations Peacekeeping support operation

The Security Council approved the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East in 1948, marking the beginning of United Nations peacekeeping. The mission's objective was to oversee the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours; as a result, it was known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The UN has subsequently sent personnel to 1969 peacekeeping missions, 56 of which have been carried out since 1988. Throughout the years, hundreds of thousands of military men, as well as tens of thousands of UN police and other civilians, have taken part in UN peacekeeping operations from more than 120 nations more than 3,326 peacekeepers from more than 120 nations have lost their lives while serving the UN (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/history.shtml).

UN Peacekeeping was established at a period when the Security Council was regularly immobilised by Cold War rivalry. The major tasks of peacekeeping were to uphold ceasefires and stabilise local conditions, which was essential support for political initiatives to settle disputes peacefully. These operations involved lightly armed personnel and unarmed military observers who were largely in charge of observing, reporting, and fostering trust. The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan were the UN's first two peacekeeping missions (UNMOGIP). Both of these missions, which are still in service today, were examples of observation and monitoring operations and had low hundreds in allowed strengths. Military observers from the UN were unarmed.

The First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was successfully deployed in 1956 to resolve the Suez Crisis, was the first military peacekeeping mission. The first large-scale operation was the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which began in 1960 and peaked at approximately 20,000 military personnel. Besides, 250 UN employees, including Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, perished while working on the ONUC mission, which highlighted the dangers associated with attempting to restore order to areas ravaged by conflict.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the UN established short-term missions in the Dominican Republic - Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-

General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP), West New Guinea (West Irian) - UN Security Force in West New Guinea(UNSF), and Yemen - UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), and started longer term deployments in Cyprus - UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Middle East - UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

The strategic environment for UN peacekeeping underwent a significant transformation with the end of the Cold War. From "conventional" missions requiring mostly observational activities carried out by military troops to intricate "multidimensional" businesses, the UN changed and extended its field operations. These multifaceted missions were created to guarantee that comprehensive peace accords were carried out and to help set the groundwork for a lasting peace. During time, conflicts also evolved in nature. Civil wars and intra-state conflicts are increasingly being addressed by UN Peacekeeping, which was initially designed to address inter-State conflict. Increasingly, complicated responsibilities were being delegated to UN Peacekeepers, including monitoring human rights, reforming the security sector, assisting in the development of long-term institutions of government, and facilitating the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants.

The number of peacekeeping missions skyrocketed after the end of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1994, the Security Council approved a total of 20 additional operations, increasing the number of troops from 11,000 to 75,000. This was done with a newfound unanimity and sense of purpose. Angola's UN Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I) and UN Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II), Cambodia's UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), El Salvador's UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), Mozambique's UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and Namibia's UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) are a few examples of countries where peacekeeping operations have been established.

In the meanwhile, UN forces maintained their protracted missions in Cyprus, Asia, and the Middle East. The crucial function of UN Peacekeeping was quickly and loudly reiterated as a result of ongoing crises in a number of nations and areas. The Council approved new UN operations in the following countries in the second half of the 1990s: Angola - UN Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA); Bosnia and Herzegovina - UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH); Croatia - UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) and UN Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG);the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - UN

Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP); Guatemala - UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA); Haiti - UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) UN Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)

(www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml).

In the following years, the Security Council also established large and complex peacekeeping operations in a number of African countries: Burundi - UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB); Chad and the Central African Republic - UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT); Côte d'Ivoire - UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); Democratic Republic of the Congo - UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); Eritrea/Ethiopia - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE); Liberia - UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); Sierra Leone - UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); Sudan - UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in the south of the country and African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Darfur, UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS); Syria - UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)

(www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml).

The UN performed a significant experiment around the turn of the century to investigate the difficulties in implementing change and maintaining peace in the 1990s. Strengthening the ability to efficiently manage and support field activities was the goal. The UN was requested to carry out ever more challenging responsibilities as a result of a better understanding of the capabilities - and limitations - of UN Peacekeeping. This began in 1999, when the UN took over administration of East Timor (now Timor-Leste), which was attempting to secede from Indonesia, and Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia as part of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

(www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml).

The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the newly independent Timor-UN Leste's Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste both welcomed back peacekeepers to continue crucial peacekeeping and peace building activities where the fragile peace had frayed (UNMIT). Many of these operations, such as the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), and the United Nations Mission in the

Sudan, have now finished their missions (UNMIS). UN Peacekeeping was strained more than ever in the first ten years of the century and was increasingly asked to deploy to dangerous political situations and remote, unpredictable operational conditions

(www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml).

Overall, the multifaceted peacekeeping efforts of today will continue to support the organising of elections, facilitate the political process, safeguard civilians, aid in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former fighters, and help restore the rule of law. The field of peacekeeping has always been quite dynamic and has changed as a result of new difficulties.

United Nations Peace Keeping Mandate

Without the veto of the five permanent members namely the US, China, France, Russia, and UK. The UN Security Council may only approve peace operations with the support of nine of its fifteen members. Almost fifty peace operations have been approved by the Security Council in the years after the end of the Cold War. The UN sends out peacekeeping forces to stop or defuse hostilities, stabilise post-conflict areas, aid in putting peace agreements into effect, and support democratic transitions.

To achieve those goals, the UN outlines the following peace building activities:

- a. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- b. Landmine removal and associated activities;
- c. Rule-of-law related activities;
- d. Human rights protection and promotion;
- e. Electoral assistance;
- f. Support for the restoration of state authority; and
- g. Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

The UN generally follows three principles for deploying peacekeepers:

- a. Main parties to the conflict must consent;
- b. Peacekeepers should remain impartial but not neutral; and
- c. Peacekeepers cannot use force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

Yet, UN forces are increasingly dispatched into conflict areas even when not all of the major players have agreed to them, as was the case in Mali. However, there is growing international pressure on peacekeepers to take stronger measures to safeguard civilians. UN peacekeepers have been ordered to conduct offensive operations against specific enemy fighters, such as in Mali, in violation of the impartiality

principle (<http://www.cfr.org/peacekeeping/peace-operations-africa/p9333>).

1. Americas

- a. Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)
- b. United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)
- c. United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
- d. United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)
- e. United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
- f. United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)
- g. United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)
- h. United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)

2. Asia and the Pacific

- a. United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
- b. United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
- c. United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)
- d. United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)
- e. United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET)
- f. United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF)
- g. United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
- h. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
- i. UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)

3. Europe

- a. United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)
- b. United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO)
- c. United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
- d. United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
- e. United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
- f. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)
- g. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)
- h. United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)

4. Middle East

- a. United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)
- b. United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)
- c. United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
- d. United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

- e. United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
- f. United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)
- g. UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) (UN DPKO/DFS Civil Affairs Handbook, 2012).

The core functions of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations, as identified in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines or “Capstone Doctrine” in 2008, are to:

- (a) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- (b) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- (c) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

Under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the mission's broad and vast mandate includes stabilising the key population centres, particularly in the north of the country; extending and re-establishing state administration throughout the nation; supporting the rebuilding of the Malian security sector; developing disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes; supporting the implementation of the transitional road map; and facilitating progress towards an inclusive national dialogue.

Impact of the United Nations (UN) Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

The Security Council's resolution 2100 on April 25, 2013, created the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). In accordance with the resolution's provisions, the mission would assist the political process and carry out a number of security-related stabilisation tasks, with a focus on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, monitoring human rights, creating the necessary framework for the delivery of humanitarian aid and the repatriation of refugees, extending State authority, and preparing free, inclusive, and peaceful elections.

The Mission would be governed by strict rules of engagement, with a mandate to employ all necessary means to address threats to the execution of its mandate, including the protection of civilians from

immediate physical harm and the protection of United Nations personnel from ongoing threats, to the best of its ability and in the areas to which it could be deployed. The execution of activities either independently or in conjunction with the defense and security forces of Mali might fall under this category. The Secretary-General may also invite French soldiers stationed in Mali to act in support of MINUSMA if the latter is facing an immediate and serious threat.

The Security Council's resolution 2085, passed on December 20, 2012, established the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM), which would be absorbed into MINUSMA as soon as resolution 2100 was passed. Subject to a further Council assessment of the security situation in the Mission's operational area, MINUSMA would take over leadership of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) on July 1, 2013. 1,440 police (including established police units and individual police officers) and up to 11,200 military soldiers (including reserve battalions capable of swiftly deploying throughout the nation as and when necessary) would make up MINUSMA. It is envisaged that the majority of the military, police and civilian substantive and support components would operate primarily in the north with a possible logistics base in Gao or Sevare, while a light presence, including civilians, military and police elements would be based in Bamako (Nadin, 2013).

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was a peacekeeping effort that had some success up until 2016. Large numbers of displaced people were able to return home, the stability in northern Mali was improved, and the number of civilians killed in the fighting was reduced. Moreover, MINUSMA helped with the peace process that led to the 2015 Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, often known as the Algiers Agreement, and aided the organising of the 2013 elections. Given the immensity of Mali, the logistical difficulties, the hostile security environment, and the very little resources available for carrying out its expansive mandate despite a \$1 billion budget, many of these accomplishments are still in place and are especially outstanding.

The supervision of the presidential elections on July 28 and August 11 2016 was another of MINUSMA's first actions. Despite several organisational flaws, the election took place under generally favourable circumstances and without significant security issues. With approximately 48% of the vote cast in the first round, Ibrahim Boubac Keita was elected in the second round with around 77% of the vote. His opponents, including Soumala Cissé from the second round, admitted loss and

offered congratulations to Mali's new leader (Gowan, 2013, Carayol, 2013).

The United Nations Development Programme assisted in the creation of the biometric electoral register by supplying the fingerprint and photography equipment needed to create voting cards and by supervising workshops designed to teach civil society organisations how to uphold and advance human rights during elections. A flight was organised by UN personnel to Nema, Mauritania, to provide voting cards to Malian refugees. Kidal, which was governed by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) until June 2013, was taken control of by a Senegalese fast action squad, with the assistance of Beninese, Guinean, and Togolese police. Seven access points into the city were guarded by blue helmets, who also patrolled the area in mixed patrols with Malian and, less frequently, French troops (Autre Presse, 2013).

Nevertheless, after 2016, MINUSMA has become less effective at stabilising the situation and protecting civilians (PoC). While jihadist organisations have been fighting MINUSMA, the Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA), and the signatories to the Algiers Accord, violence has risen. Because of this, MINUSMA has seen a disproportionately high number of casualties when compared to other previous UN peace operations. In addition to the difficult situation in the north, central Mali has become considerably more unstable. The expansion of jihadist organisations' influence and their attacks in the Mopti and Segou districts have led to an already nonexistent state's further retreat. Jihadist activity and government forces' reprisals have fueled the growth of self-defense militias and an intercommunal conflict cycle that has reached previously unheard-of heights. From June 2018, MINUSMA has only been required to assist the Malian government in dealing with the problem, although it has never gotten enough funding to be efficient. There is general agreement that the Sahel area as a whole, as well as the security situation in Mali, would likely deteriorate dramatically without MINUSMA.

Challenges of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

MINUSMA is one of the costliest peacekeeping missions in Africa, with a budget of roughly \$600 million, Special Operations Forces, an intelligence unit called the All-Source Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), and high-tech tools including helicopters. Regarding how these benefits have affected the mission's efficacy, there have been some reservations raised. In this context, this section digs into the nature of the difficulties MINUSMA is

facing in Mali and the likelihood that the mission will succeed in fulfilling its objectives.

A variety of challenges faced UN peacekeeping, including the need to carry out its biggest, most expensive, and increasingly complex missions, the need to develop and implement workable transition plans for missions where a certain level of stability has been attained, and the need to get ready for an uncertain future and set of demands. This in no way suggests, though, that the difficulties the UN faces are getting easier. Even though there may be fewer military peacekeepers on the ground, there will likely still be a significant need for field operations, and peacekeeping will continue to be one of the UN's most difficult operational challenges. However, the extent of peacekeeping operations' missions, especially on the civilian side, remains relatively vast because to the political complexity that they face. There are significant indicators that some specialised skills, such as police work, will be in particularly high demand in the years to come. (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/surge.shtml>).

The UN operation in Mali has been described as one of the three deadliest UN missions. The United Nations' deadliest missions from October 2013 to October 2015, excluding deaths from disease, were in Mali (MINUSMA) with 53 fatalities, Sudan (UNAMID, a hybrid mission in Darfur with the African Union) with 48 fatalities, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with 18 fatalities, South Sudan (UNMISS) with 17 fatalities, and Ivory Coast (UNOCI) with 16 fatalities (www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34812600).

The UN Secretariat has been developing its global field support strategy to better serve its operations, modernising recruitment procedures, and bolstering regional hubs to further systematise and rationalise support for political missions and peace operations, as well as to better handle logistical challenges. However, there are still many important problems and difficulties that face peacekeeping. Maintaining the parties' agreement to a peacekeeping operation is one among them. Others include sustaining UN neutrality, attempting to keep peace when there isn't one to keep, and determining whether to use force within the bounds of a mission's resources and mandate.

The deployment of the UN's largest, most expensive, and most complex operations, the design and implementation of transition plans for operations where stability has been attained, and the empowerment of communities to the greatest extent possible in order to ensure long-term peace and stability were all challenges that UN Peacekeeping had to face. Within MINUSMA, there has been conflict over authority and labour allocation. With French assistance, Bert Koenders of the Netherlands was

chosen to lead the expedition rather than Pierre Buyoya, a candidate for the African Union and chairman of AFISMA and the former president of Burundi. Major General Jean-Bosco Kazuran of Rwanda was chosen to lead MINUSMA's force, replacing Major General Shehu Adbulkadir of Nigeria, who had led AFISMA's force since January 2013. Yet in reality, working with the commanders of Operation Serval, General Vianney Pillet, the leader of the French forces, seems to be in charge of all military activities (Jeune, 2013).

The secondary position assigned to Africans in the mission is said to have led to the withdrawal of some Nigerian troops from MINUSMA, along with the necessity for Nigeria to mobilise all its national forces to combat Boko Haram at home. Although Sweden, Norway, Burundi, China, Bangladesh, Honduras, Burundi, and Mauritania have all pledged to provide soldiers, the application for the missing 6,000 troops has not yet been submitted. In addition, UN member states' help will be essential because the UN is unable to deploy military hardware. Resources are "painfully short" for the goal. It requires helicopters, engineers, and transport planes in addition to its four aircraft (Flynn and Lewis, 2013). MINUSMA will be underequipped and ineffective without the proper aviation assets (transport and assault), engineering people and equipment, intelligence analysis, and suitable ways to transfer soldiers and equipment (Smith, 2013).

The mission of MINUSMA includes the security of its soldiers, allied forces, and civilians. It can occasionally protect itself, though. The United Nations Security Council has authorised Operation Serval (now Operation Barkhane), a parallel force, to "intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means until the end of MINUSMA's mandate as authorised in this resolution." Yet, it appears that Barkhane's efforts are insufficient to counter the risks posed by the armed organisations present in the nation. This is so that, as a parallel army, the French soldiers may pick and choose which conflicts they would participate in.

MINUSMA is working in a hostile and difficult environment where militant organisations deploy asymmetric tactics with mobile militants who now use motorbikes rather than automobiles to avoid being easily discovered. Additional tools and techniques include the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide strikes, the placement of mines along the patrol routes of MINUSMA soldiers, ambushes, and the use of rocket and mortar fire to bombard MINUSMA camps. On of March 25, 2016, 81 MINUSMA

personnel have been murdered and numerous more had been injured as a result of this.

Similar to this, the most hostile northern region—where terrorist organisations are most active—is mostly made up of desert and has few people living there. As a result, even though 90% of the UN soldiers are stationed in the north, they are unable to properly secure the area, leaving the unattended regions as safe havens for terrorists and criminals to effectively launch assaults against UN personnel and civilians. In the meanwhile, MINUSMA forces lack the necessary military equipment to safeguard themselves and civilian workers when they drive over IEDs and landmines. The relevance and sufficiency of MINUSMA's mandate and capacities have been questioned in light of these difficulties. They have also questioned the suitability of conventional UN peacekeeping doctrine, which is dependent on the parties to the peace process' consent, impartiality, and the avoidance of using force except in self-defense and to defend stabilising missions.

The fragmentation of armed organisations with disparate interests is another problem. Armed factions split out and alliances changed while discussions for the present peace deal were taking place. While some armed organisations have legitimate political complaints, others negotiate while continuing to break ceasefire agreements and peace treaties while planning how to get the most out of the process. For instance, some organisations are reforming in the Sahel and battling to be stationed in advantageous locations for drug trafficking before the DDR begins. Certain armed organisations who hide behind political pretensions have a substantial stake in controlling the routes used for drug trafficking. Communication for peace has been hampered by these power rivalries among the various armed factions, which has contributed to the resumption of attacks in northern Mali (Boutellis, 2015).

Finally, the stakes in Mali remain high despite the government and other conflict parties signing the Accord on Peace and Reconciliation. Armed factions have taken over effective military and, to some extent, administrative authority over Kidal and other northern towns as a result of signatory organisations breaking the peace accord and ceasefire procedures. Both pro- and anti-government militia groups have been attacked and have transgressed the terms of the peace accord. Serious human rights and international humanitarian law abuses have resulted from the ceasefire violations. For instance, there were documented instances of murder, summary executions, floggings, amputations, forced disappearances, and other forms of inhumane and humiliating treatment while armed groups were occupying the north. Women's rights were particularly abused; they endured rape, sexual slavery, collective forced

marriage, forced abortions, and public humiliation in addition to arbitrary detentions and rape (Amedzrator et al, 2016). The near total impunity for individuals who perpetrate these crimes has, however, encouraged others to continue their attacks in the knowledge that they are likely to go unpunished.

Conclusion

The UN's most perilous peacekeeping mission is MINUSMA (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali), where jihadist insurgents actively attack peacekeepers. Nevertheless, MINUSMA is now in a difficult position. It will take time for it to be successful, but this is time that Mali does not now have since assaults are killing people and key mission backers like the United States are losing interest in funding an expensive UN peace effort that cannot provide immediate results. If strategic decisions are made about a number of policy conundrums, MINUSMA may be able to restore momentum in its attempts to stabilise Mali and the larger Sahel area. On the other side, the outcomes might be terrible if the UN Security Council takes decisions based on the budget and keeps asking for more without sufficient funding.

Recommendations

Violation of the peace and ceasefire accords, violations of international law and human rights, and a lack of local support for MINUSMA activities all continue to hamper the mission's attempts to maintain peace in Mali. To solve these difficulties that MINUSMA's situation in Mali provides. We suggest the following actions.

First and foremost, the present peace deal needs to be implemented honestly and successfully, since past peace accords' insufficient execution contributed to the revival of the problem in Mali. To establish a strong security sector that can respond to security concerns when MINUSMA inevitably pulls down, it is important to address and monitor requests for political change and reforms in the security sector.

Second, the central government of Mali has to show more dedication to stabilising the nation in order to win over the cooperation of willing members of the factional groups and other stakeholders in order to carry out the peace deal.

Third, extreme elements that have refused to stop firing because of their strategic military, economic, and political objectives in both Mali must be identified and dealt with.

Fourth, to provide adequate monitoring of the Sahel area, Operation Barkhane, a parallel force, has to have its mandate reassessed and its character reformed as a global force.

Fifth, all nations that share a border with Mali should conduct combined border patrols with a variety of security professionals in order to stop illegal criminal activity.

Last but not least, criminals have access to a ready supply of idle adolescents who lack legal means of subsistence. In Mali, stakeholders must offer idle youth appealing and durable employment options in order to stop them from becoming quick recruits for criminal and militant organisations and to stop the growth of militancy.

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