Realising Neo-Classical Security And Development (KESBAN) Concept Against Criminality In Eastern Sabah

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Abstract

Security and Development or Keselamatan dan Pembangunan – KESBAN was a classical counterinsurgency framework applied during the pinnacle of the communist terrorist spearheaded by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). It was a population-centric approach tool impeding communist ideology and militant activities during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989). The objectives of this paper are to analyzed rational of the classical KESBAN concept complement with some value-added elements strengthening the counterinsurgency framework, as a neo-classical approach to confront criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG). It is also aimed to determine the criminality in Eastern Sabah as insurgency and examine the suitability of relocating the water village. This paper adopts qualitative approach research emphasizing textual analysis, with triangulation of primary and secondary data processes. However primary data are used as confirmatory evidence for the secondary data. The finding of the study suggests that the neo-classical KESBAN concept is applicable in any insurgency situation. It also substantiates that the criminal ventures in Eastern Sabah are acts of insurgency and the neo-classical counterinsurgency (KESBAN) approach augmented with comprehensive strategies works to dissolve the criminal insurgency.

Introduction

A new security architecture was legislated in Eastern Sabah with the establishment of the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone) on 27 March 2013. ESSZone is a-1,733-kilometer area covering 10 districts from Kudat to Tawau. The proclamation was made after the nation was shaken by the incursion of an armed group from the Southern Philippines into Kampung Tanduo, Lahad Datu, Sabah. The group, asserting themselves as the "Royal Sulu Army" (RSA) claimed Sabah as part of the "Sulu Sultanate" territory. Aftermath a brief stand-off between the RSA and the Malaysian Armed Forces, a Special Security Area (SSA) was proclaimed on 7 March 2013 on the East Coast of Sabah, before the establishment of ESSZone. In order to reinforce the security zone, a security command structure known as Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) was established on 1 April 2013 to manage the security in the ESSZone.

The security backdrop in Eastern Sabah has been stained by contingencies posed by traditional and non-traditional security threats since before Sabah joined the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The main traditional threat confronting the region is the continuous claim of Sabah by the Philippines and including the 2013 incursion by the non-state actor, the Royal Sulu Army (RSA), originating from the unrecognized Sultanate of Sulu. While, the non-traditional threats confronting Sabah include piracy, kidnap-for-ransom (KFR), and trafficking of drugs, arms, and humans. The security and safety of the denizen in Eastern Sabah particularly resort island employees, tourists, and fishermen were endangered by these activities by criminals and pirates. Most of these criminalities were conducted by non-state actors and armed groups emanating from Southern Philippines. The most notorious non-state actor is the internationally recognised ASG. It is an Islamic Movement founded by the late Abdurajak Janjalani in the late 1980s (Chalk, 2016). ASG has been charging non-traditional security threats and other trans-border crimes as their regime's survivability

and sustainability. Most parts of Eastern Sabah have been transformed into safe sanctuaries for ASG pirates and criminals.

This paper is intended to analyse the application of neo-classical security and development (Keselamatan dan Pembangunan – KESBAN) concept against the criminalities in Eastern Sabah.The paper will attempt to identify the nature of the criminality taking place in the region and its correspondence to classical insurgency behaviour and to transcend in fighting the insurgency through the adoption of the classical KESBAN concept with millennium preference as countermeasures. The paper will adopt a qualitative approach in its methodology supported by secondary and primary data. Most of the primary data are based on the personal experience of the author living through the period of implementation of KESBAN in Peninsula Malaysia and Sarawak during the Second Emergency (1969-1989). Secondary data shall be referred from books, articles, internet sources, lecture notes, publications, and news report online.

Sabah Security Architecture

The establishment of ESSCOM observes the deployment of the main security agencies including the Malaysian Armed Forces, Royal Malaysian Police, Maritime Enforcement, and the Customs Department under a single command to unfold cooperation and maintain integration among the agencies. ESSCOM tasked to dominate and secure the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone) area as shown in Picture 1 below, is a 1,700 km-long special security area along the east coast of Sabah that borders crime-prone southern Philippines. To preserve the security and defence of the ESSZone, the Federal government outlined four strategic and technical approaches to enhance the system in order to provide extra protection to the ESSZone community. They are: first, enhancement of intelligence capability; second, effective 24/7 coastal surveillance system; third, boosting national capability in intercepting incoming threats from the sea; and finally, strict enforcement of the law with immediate response action once threats touched the shores (The Borneo Post, 14 April 2013). Despite establishing ESSZone and intensified security system, crime, and kidnapping incidents were still reported (Borneo Post Online, May 16, 2015). Accordingly, the main weaknesses

were the unpreparedness of the country to face such a security breach and intelligence failure (Jawhar and Sarriburaja, 2016). Before ESSCOM was established, the security architecture in Eastern Sabah was adopting the concept of surveillance, detection, and protection (SDP) under the pretext of OP PASIR. The concept adopted does not guarantee the strategies that have been drawn were attainable in confronting a new form of armed insurgency in Sabah.

Picture 1. General Area of Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone)

Source: 13th Infantry Brigade (ESSCOM)

The national security agencies are providing flimsy attention on their proficiency and expertise in fighting insurgency during the emergency period - the knowledge and skill in counterinsurgency operations. The security forces, especially the military and the police had long forgotten of their mastery in counterinsurgency warfare, specifically on the conduct of classical KESBAN concept against communist endeavour. It also had faded from the curriculum of the professional military education, indeed. The general feeling is that the knowledge and skills in counterinsurgency (KESBAN) against the CPM was a history and it was a classical counterinsurgency skill that is irrelevant today with the demise of the CPM threats in post-Hatyai Peace Accord signed on December 2, 1989.

Notwithstanding, the current security evolution in Sabah requiring the security agencies to rethink on the rebirth of twenty-first century insurgency: the criminal insurgency. In the post 9/11 incident, the American military and defence community began rethinking of insurgency, reviving the old idea of insurgency with a couple of added approaches (Metz, 2007). Hence, Eastern Sabah criminal insurgency threats should be eliminated through neo-classical counterinsurgency warfare approach. The national security community has to restore the old knowledge from classical counterinsurgency to neo-classical counterinsurgency by integrating some value-added variables to enhance the theoretical concept of neo-classical counterinsurgency framework (Hoffman, 2007) in confronting criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah. In the context of criminal insurgency, the researcher had diagnosed in the preceding chapters that a proposed comprehensive strategy associated with the four contributing variables integrated with KESBAN, the classical counterinsurgency concept. These will be detailed in the succeeding paragraphs

The New Form of Insurgency

In the new millennium, more states within regional context are seeing and emphasising on asymmetrical threats as a new dimension in strategic defence. It is envisaged that traditional threats will continue to plague the security sector apart from non-traditional threats that will show a significant increment in the future. Malaysia's state of Sabah has been prone to criminal activities emanating from armed groups from the southern Philippines. It is argued that the nature of the criminal backdrop in Sabah could be categorised as a new form of insurgency especially in the Malaysian environment. In determining criminality as insurgency, the nature of crimes should conform to certain insurgency characteristics. This conformation of insurgency characteristics is based on a guide produced and published by US Government in 2012 (US Government Publication, 2012). It should be recognised that it is rarely confronted with two insurgencies of similar form. Moreover, this analysis guide is not purported to provide a one-size-fits-all template, since insurgencies are unique in all aspects. Nevertheless, they share some common characteristics, tactics, and objectives. This analysis guide emphasises these

commonalities rest on the guidance notes (U.S. Government, 2012). The outcome of the examination on the nexus between crimes and insurgency on the east coast of Sabah, however, will not necessarily disclose or determine the nexus of a whole bunch of the characteristics given in the guide because some may not be relevant or not common to the criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah. Insurgency is a violent political struggle with the aim to control people and resources, and in the case of the east coast of Sabah, it is believed that the perpetrator intended to control the territory so that the authority will not be a hindrance in pursuing their criminal intentions.

Some of the common characteristics are, firstly undermining the ability of the government to provide the population with security and it may be contented to portray the government's impotence in providing protection for their safety and security. This characteristic has been very clear on the east coast of Sabah; the perpetrator creates fear among the locals in order to dominate the territory which they intend to control to supplant government authority. There were a couple of reports on kidnap for ransom activities, sea piracies incidences, and other non-traditional threats within the waters of Malaysia and the Philippines (Fellman, 2011; Abuza, 2008) certifying that the criminal insurgents are undermining the local government's ability providing security and protection to the local population at large. Second, to obtain the active or passive support of the population. Although not all support is obtained willingly from their true sympathisers, this paper is not examining the population support characteristic in terms of the population Sabah but the illegal immigrants and the occupants of the 'water village'. Since the perpetrators were not locals and terrorise the locals, they do not obtain the support of the locals. However, there are several pieces of evidence that some of the 'water village' inhabitants and illegal immigrants in Sabah were alleged to be accomplices (Bernama News, 17 May 2015). Certain inhabitants having kinship relations allow the perpetrators to transit in their 'village' boats, provide shelter in the 'water village', and provide information on security forces' movements to avoid detection by the security forces before the perpetrators launch their assailment on their prey.

The third characteristic is to provoke the government into committing abuses that drive the neutral civilians toward the insurgents. This characteristic is neither significant nor relevant in the case of the east coast of Sabah. So far according to the daily news record, there is no evidence nor reports have been launched against the security forces for their abuses in the ESSZone. Furthermore, it doesn't involve the general civilian population in Sabah. If in case any abuses to happen, it will be in the 'water villages' since the perpetrators originated from the southern Philippines and they have the kinship with some of the 'water village' occupants. Perhaps the best way to show that counterinsurgent forces need to display rectitude toward civilians and prisoners is to consider what happens when right conduct is systematically violated. No dispute that German barbarism in Russia during World War II contributed greatly toward Germany's final defeat (Stahel, 2011). The same applies to the Japanese in China: indeed, Mao Tse-tung predicted early on the eventual defeat of the Japanese precisely because of their atrocious conduct (Felton, 2009). From Spain to Afghanistan the road of warfare is littered with the wreckage of counterinsurgencies that forgot, or disdained morality. Bad conduct creates guerrillas; right conduct saves counterinsurgents. Fourth is insurgency, which is a political competition for legitimacy, it is characterised by lack of front lines, sequenced battles, and a protracted strategy. This characteristic is quite obvious on the east coast of Sabah the perpetrator's attempt to strike its prey may come from any direction to any specific targets at several resort islands or even on the mainland's town or population centres and probably on the fishermen fishing in the open sea. It is totally a guerrilla form of tactic, advocating the "Fabian Strategy" avoiding direct frontal confrontation against the government forces. Insurgents will only seek a confrontation when circumstances are in their favour. The intention will often be to create losses with a view to eroding the counterinsurgents' political will to fight. Clearly, insurgents exercise a protracted strategy as a part of their strategy to prolong the conflicts to degrade government efforts and will to fight (Galula, 1964). The criminals' attempts in Eastern Sabah illustrate the political competition for legitimacy on the part of the insurgents.

Fifth is the distinction between civilians and combatants is blurred in an insurgency. This characteristic is coherent in the case of Eastern Sabah perpetrators. Relating this characteristic to the second characteristic, the perpetrator usually takes cover and disguises as sea nomads living in the 'water villages' around the east coast of Sabah. It is very difficult to identify them with local inhabitants in the 'water village' once they have taken refuge in the community. Mao Tze-Tung envisioned the insurgency as fish swimming in water. If the water is drained, then the fish will die by themselves (Mao, 1961). The same is the case if the fishes are always in the water, it would be difficult to separate them according to their type. On the lateral footing, insurgents once they mixed and mingled with the civilian, it would be difficult to identify them among the population. The British administration and the Malaysian authority were strenuous to determine the Min Yuen and the communist terrorists once they were among the population. Their ability to conceal themselves within the general population is their centre of gravity (Ajaya, 2009). So, the criminal insurgent, as in the classical theory, continues to hide among the population (Kilcullen, 2006) and the distinction between the criminal insurgents and the civilian population will remain blurred. The sixth characteristic stipulates that the insurgents will undermine the government effort to gain support for international recognition and support. In many occasions, the insurgent will reverse the situation in gaining international sympathy for recognition and support. This characteristic is very common among the many insurgencies. In the case of Malayan Communist Party (MCP) as well as the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers have employed to gain international sympathy on their struggle. The MCP received moral support and limited material support from USSR, China and Vietnam through employment of this characteristic. Whereas, the Tamil Tigers effort to undermine the international support is much clearer, when the Sri Lankan government launch the Eelam IV War in February 2009 (Gokhale, 2010). Sri Lankan government ignored the international community call for ceasefire to allow humanitarian assistance access into the warzone due to civilian casualties. This call was initiated by the LTTE to the international community, actually allowing them to rethink, rework, and regroup their organisation, once the LTTE realised that they are losing in the Eelam IV War. This strategy used by

the LTTE to undermine Sri Lankan government international support and obviously the LTTE was gaining international recognition on their political struggle.

These six characteristics are sufficient enough to categorise the criminalities that are occurring on the east coast of Sabah as insurgency–criminal insurgency. A couple of other authors had also identified some characteristics related to insurgency. Galula (1964), a French officer who studied Chinese insurgency while on assignment in China, emphasise the existence of asymmetry between insurgents and counterinsurgents. The insurgent usually employs the 'Fabian Strategy', avoiding direct confrontation with the counterinsurgents. Chandrasekaran (2013) reaffirms in his literature on insurgency, their life with the support of the masses. Through the masses, they constantly update their intelligence on the presence of the security forces, as well as recruit new cadres. Undoubtedly, the six characteristics were the prerequisite in recognising the criminal activities in Eastern Sabah as a form of insurgency, although concretely only five out the six characteristics proved to have met the requirement in Eastern Sabah, except for the third characteristic, which is provoking the government into committing abuses that drive the neutral civilians toward the insurgents. These insurgency analysis characteristics were sufficient enough in categorising the criminalities that were occurring in east coast of Sabah as insurgency, thus it is designated as 'criminal insurgency'. Emphasising on the characteristics, Galula (1964) asserted on the existence of asymmetry between insurgent and counterinsurgent. The insurgent usually employs 'Fabian Strategy', avoiding direct confrontation with the counterinsurgents. It is a military strategy where pitched battles and frontal assaults are avoided in favour of wearing down an opponent through a war of attrition and indirection.

While avoiding decisive battles, the side employing this strategy harasses its enemy through skirmishes to cause attrition, disrupt supply and affect morale. Employment of this strategy implies that the side adopting this strategy believes time is on its side, but it may also be adopted when no feasible alternative strategy can be devised. Chandrasekaran (2013) reaffirm through his monograph that insurgency cannot live without the support of the masses. Through the masses the insurgents'

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constantly update their intelligence on the presence of the security forces, as well as recruiting new cadres. Both the traits as acclaimed by Galula and Chandrasekaran prevails in the criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah.

Criminal Insurgency

Transnational criminal organisations and armed groups seem challenging state institutions throughout the globe with non-traditional threats in the form of drug and weapons trafficking, sea piracy, kidnapping for ransom, and many other petty crimes. They are waging criminal insurgencies as their domain against state authority. The term describes as 'an insurgency movement whose political motivation has been perverted by criminal interests' (Cante & Quehl, 2015). Criminal insurgency varies from the classical insurgency with its political motive to gain autonomous economic control over the territory (Sullivan, 2010). Since criminal insurgency's political motive is different from that of classical insurgency, it does not conform either to the classical Leninist or Maoist model. Criminal insurgency's fundamental struggle is not to take down the existing government nor its intent for regime change, but rather to liberate a specific territory and safeguard its economic gains within the liberated area. A good example is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). It ended its 53 years of insurgency against the Colombian government and secured a peace agreement. The FARC violent insurgency has come to an end and the organisation has ceased to exist as an armed group (Crisis Group, 2017). However, the organisation had switched to a criminal organisation, mainly dealing with the drug cartel.

Criminal insurgency is basically waging a violent encounter against the state authority for the legitimacy of their regime's survival. This violent non-state actor involved in criminal insurgencies has a web of complex bases which are the flexible and transnational focus. The increase of activities in their networks means that power is shifting to them (non-state actors) and these types of actors are capable of organising themselves in large-scale multinational networks with greater facility than the traditional hierarchical state actors (Reeds, 2007). The territorial governance and the authority exercised by the armed groups in the liberated areas are eventually

labeled as criminal insurgency. However, they lack ideological motivations for political opposition and, furthermore, they do not pursue the overthrow of the existing state leaders. Despite that, their engagement in illegal activities, control of the population and territories, and their violent resistance towards the state turn them into distinct types of criminals (Azevedo, 2015). Their employment of violence in pursuing their intent is their political dimension. Their criminal activities have become too rampant with the support of the population by housing and catering for their hideout within the community settlements like the Abu Sayyaf Group in BASULTA (the Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) islands. Criminal insurgencies are rampant in many of the Latin American states like Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador, and others involved in transnational drug trafficking menace and had endured to an unseen level of violence. Apart from the routine use of violence in intimidating the population, a number of the existing armed groups had infiltrated and weakened the public authority by corruption, blackmailing, or coercion of its agents. This is to deny the authority from preventing their illegal business in sustaining the regime's survival. Since the state fails to deliver effective public security, the populace becomes vulnerable to the criminal's violent actions and falls prey to them, and the populace is obliged to tolerate their presence and even to collaborate with them. Most of the time, the populace ends up feeling protected by the same criminal organizations they have fallen prey to in the first place. Failing or failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism (Sullivan, 2010). A similar failed situation exists in Cape Town, South Africa in which poor governance, lack of political access, ineffective policing, endemic graft, and corruption had the city in an unstable situation (Sullivan, 2020).

**The Ratification of Neo-Classical Security & Development**

Fighting insurgency is not an alien exercise, especially for the Malaysian Army. The army had gained tremendous experience and expertise in jungle warfare tactics during the Second Malayan Emergency while combating the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Malaysian authority advocated the dual-prong strategy of security and development concept enhanced by the

'hearts and minds' program in compelling the CPM to surrender their militant activities. However, the nature of the criminal insurgency on the east coast of Sabah is different from the classical or traditional insurgency because the criminal insurgents' overarching political move is to gain autonomous control over the territory (Sullivan, 2010). Today's insurgents are not the Maoist of yesterday (Hoffman, 2007). We cannot confront the realities of a new world shaped by globalisation and the escalation of extremist ideologies, without a necessary merger of the past approach and the present nature of insurgency, which may be categorised as 'neo-classical insurgency'.

Authentically, the Malaysian government had advocated the security and development (KESBAN) concept during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989) on CPM. Momentarily, it is time to reshape the classical counterinsurgency concept into a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach against the criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah. In particular, it has to put forward that there is a need to draw upon the classical counter-insurgency principles and revise them to reflect the realities of today's insurgency. Ratification of classical KESBAN strategy in facing the traditional and non-traditional threats with the view to realise a balance security and development (KESBAN) approach in Eastern Sabah through comprehensive strategy element countermeasures. However, this paper is not intended to discuss the existing countermeasures that had been implemented and those ongoing in Eastern Sabah, such as the Sulu-Sulewasi Sea Trilateral Maritime Patrol (TMP) (IPAC, 2019), Operations PASIR, designated lanes for commercial vessels or passenger boats into Sabah waters, the ban on the use of pump boats, setting up of a new Navy submarine base in Kota Kinabalu and PASKAL base in Semporna, curfew (Ramli Dollah, et.al., 2016) and several other countermeasures in contemplation of strengthening ESSCOM security architecture.

Nevertheless, advocating the KESBAN concept in the Eastern Sabah may require some modifications and adjustments compared to the implementation of KESBAN in Peninsular Malaysia during the Second Emergency. An exhaustive study on criminal insurgency and the necessary countermeasures in confronting such insurgency conducted has identified four

factors that would contribute to the effectiveness of neo-classical counterinsurgency strategy. The framework in the diagram below shows the factors that can potentially explain the nature and relations in counterinsurgency operations. They are comprehensive strategies designed in fighting against criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah. The result is an effect that can improve the effectiveness of counterinsurgency measures, these comprehensive strategies are; Intelligence, Centralized governance, Efficiency of security forces and Dissolution of insurgent networks (ICED). These strategies or factors are the basis in strengthening the fight against modern criminal insurgency. However, it is reiterated that these comprehensive strategies are not new factors or elements in fighting against insurgency. In reality, these factors already in existence in the strategy of counterinsurgency operations, but here they were given novel weightage in reinforcing the strategy in combating criminal insurgency. The four strategies are elaborated in Figure 1 for further understanding and implementation.

Figure 1. Neo-Classical Conceptual Framework

Neo-Classical Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework starts with comprehensive strategies which consists of elements of intelligence, centralize command, efficiency of the security forces, and the dissolution of insurgent network contributing to intermediator strategy, the classical KESBAN concept. The comprehensive strategies augment and strengthen the classical KESBAN concept resulting in the formulation of neo-classical KESBAN concept used to countering the criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah. The neo-classical KESBAN concept dependant on the implementation of the comprehensive strategies which reinforce the classical KESBAN concept. The four main elements or factors that shape the comprehensive strategy are as follows:

The first factor is intelligence which is being the main determining factor in which it drives the operational requirement against the insurgents. Intelligence is as an umbrella term implying a range of activities from planning, information collection, analysis, and dissemination, conducted secretly, and aimed at maintaining or enhancing relative security by providing forewarning of threats or potential threats in a manner that allows for timely implementation of preventive measures or strategy, including, as deemed desirable, covert activities. The lack of efficient intelligence service was one of the many causes of the Spanish failure in Cuba (Callwell, 1996). During peacetime, the state collects intelligence through its diplomatic assignment. Embassies and diplomats are assigned to other states to collect and gather data on receiving state's political, military, economic, and social status and intelligence (Berridge, 2010). During the Napoleon's time, diplomats often assumed the roles of spies while serving as representatives of the monarchs and prime ministers (George, 2016). The Japanese during the Pacific War, attacked American Fleet based in the Pearl Harbour and the intelligence on the timing of American fleet move-in and out of the harbour is collated by the Japanese Consulate-General on the island through the American naval staffs stationed on the island and managed to destroy the entire fleet on the specific time as per the intelligence. Collection and gathering of information and intelligence have long been recognised as one of the most

important functions of resident embassy today.   This information and intelligence are being used to assess the foreign states intention as well as their weaknesses to avoid being surprised and protect state's national interests.

Intelligence is complementary to having a good strategy. Philosophers like Sun Tzu and Clausewitz acknowledged that no strategy can be formulated or implemented without assessing the challenges and opportunities (George, 2016). These are obtained through a detailed intelligence coalition plan. Intelligence is often secret information, collected through covert means or through technical system (satellite, monitoring communications, or electronic signatures).   The means employed to possess the information are always risky, expensive and fragile. Therefore, their unauthorised exposure to adversaries would weaken the national security.   In an insurgency situation, normally the principles of intelligence remain constant, but since the nature of the conflict is different from a conventional warfare, the application of the principles will vary (Manual of Land Warfare, 1988). Many scholars like Mao Tze-Tung (1961), Templer (1985), (1966), Kilcullen (2010), and Galula (1964) have argued and underscored that military action alone will not defeat insurgency.

Edwards (1989), the official historian of Australia's role in the Malayan and Vietnam conflicts, commented in his study on Malayan Emergency that 'the most important weapon in counter-insurgency was intelligence.' The British administration in Malaya and continued by the Malaysian administration as independent state used intelligence to disrupt the communist insurgent organisation by Police Special Branch (SB) infiltrating into the organisation. The intelligence is supported by psychological operations and propaganda against the communist terrorists. It plays an important role in countering insurgency in the context of KESBAN approach. In the classical mode, scholars have come to agreement that intelligence drives operations (Nordin, 1981). In the classical counterinsurgency context, security operations were conducted mostly based on intelligence input. On a similar footing, security operations against criminal insurgents in Eastern Sabah should be driven by intelligence. In such a case, the counterinsurgents can concentrate and economise its effort at the point of interest. The security architecture must

not be reactive to insurgent's action but it should be proactive. The intelligence system must be predictive with early warning system in-place. The security system must not ever be working blindly, but rather alert at all time (Arditti, 2015).

Though ESSCOM has been designed allowing a multi-security agency to function under a single command in order to unfold cooperation and maintain integration among the agencies (Jawhar and Sariburaja, 2016), thus reinforcing security arrangement, the occurrence of crimes and kidnapping incidents were still reported, which prove failure in the intelligence system within the organisation. This led to the argument that the inter-departmental relation between the Police (Special Branch) and the military during the Emergency period was not as close as it should be especially in cooperation, sharing information and intelligence. The relations turn to be better since 1952 onwards, when the British army intelligence officers (MIO) were attached to the Police Special Branch to provide a channel for the effective transmission of Special Branch operational intelligence to the army. The Military Intelligence Officers did not collect intelligence themselves but they worked under the SB unit to which they were attached (Comber, 2008). The Royal Malaysian Police (Special Branch) undercover agents had also infiltrated into the CPM organisation during the Emergency and manage to divide CPM into three different factions through spread of rumours and allegation of spy infiltration. The broken CPM organisations then outmanoeuvre each other to remain prevalent (Chin, 1994). By end of 1980s, before the Hadyai Peace Accord was signed, there was only one faction out of three remained for surrender agreement. History is full of cases of infiltration by the counterinsurgents into insurgent's movements and splitting the organisation from inside. The Czarist in Russia infiltrated the Bolshevik Party, while the Okhrana succeeded in infiltrating the American Communist Party by the FBI (Galula, 1964). Based on the historical narrative, the intelligence architecture must be centrally commanded but decentralised execution. Military should not be given the responsibility for internal security intelligence, and the best organisation for all internal security intelligence is the Police Special Branch (Thompson, 1972). Therefore, Malaysia's efforts to infiltrate the perpetrator's criminal organisation must be seriously

considered and executed dedicatedly. Anthony Short stressed that successful intelligence is largely cumulative and it is the first step to any real progress in counterinsurgency (Short, 1975).

The second factor, which is centralised command would foresee the unified command structure that centrally authorised the various agencies involved in the counterinsurgency operations for effective coordination, control, decision making and optimisation of effort. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available forces. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat (U.S. Joint Publication, 1994). So as the operational command and control of countering criminal insurgency should be managed at the strategic level. The National Security Council (NSC) at the Federal level should take command and control the operations in Sabah for effective outcome. Likewise, during the emergency the NSC commands and controls all classical KESBAN operations and activities at the federal level. The decision endorsed at the federal level with regards to KESBAN activities were channelled down to the State NSC and further to districts level, which were chaired by the District Offices. This hierarchical chain of command has proven effective, secured and successful in handling the KESBAN programmes in the four northern states that borders Thailand. However, managing KESBAN operations by NSC at Federal level is befitting in monitoring the activities for four states, but in the case of Eastern Sabah, it is only a portion of the state. It is strongly prescribed that the management of conflict resolution with regards to criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah should base on the principle of 'centralise control and decentralise execution', which means the planning and decision making should be done at Federal level but the execution of the operations is accomplished at State level as Galula (1964) has put it as the primacy of the territorial control.

Doctrinally, unity of effort necessitates for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available manoeuvre assets.

Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat (US Joint Publication, 2003). Centralized control is defined as a hierarchy decision-making structure where all decisions and processes are handled strictly at the strategic level. Operational and tactical level in the chain of command are limited in executing the planning and putting in place the activities to ensure the departments below the chain of command follows the direction of the top executives. In simple terms, decentralise execution are to execute assign tasks and maintain a very open communication. In combatting criminal insurgency, which is commonly regarded to be more complex than normal conventional combat operations, the decentralisation in executing the activities that have been translated at strategic level by NSC are needed to generate solutions suited to unique local conditions. This explains the call for decentralised control of assets employed in combating the insurgents.

Centralised command provides a command-and-control structure at the highest level allowing exceptional coordination and collaboration between various agencies as in ESSCOM in dealing with criminal insurgency. In Malaya during the Emergency, centralised command under the director of operations formed the centralised or unified command. This enabled the prosecution of policies and avoided duplication of effort; it also provided better coordination and synergies between agencies especially in sharing and interpreting intelligence, hence, reducing inter-agency rivalry and competition. Briggs employed centralised command in advocating the reorganisation of the government machinery against the communist terrorists (Boyini, 2010). Reemphasising Briggs efforts, Templer centralised the offices of the High Commissioner and Director of Operations by establishing Federal War Council to plan and coordinate the insurgency campaign at the national level. This had given Templer the additional centralised authority and allowed decentralised execution of authority through the establishment of State and District War Council respectively (Cloake, 1985).

The third factor, efficiency of the security forces emphasises on the capacity of the security forces in dealing with the criminal

insurgency. The security forces include the armed forces, the police, maritime enforcement agency, the Customs department, and the Home-Guard alike organisation known as Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia (RELA). The capability of the security forces is determined in terms of specialised training, tactics and equipment of the forces to deal with the criminal insurgents using appropriate tactics on water and land environment. Similarly, in Malaya, a new training school was established to enhance the training quality especially in jungle warfare, as basic requirement to confront the communist terrorists. Likewise, the British established the 101st Special Training School (STS) in Singapore in order to provide training to improve capability of the Force 136 and the Malayan People Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) in jungle warfare against the Japanese invasion forces during the Second World War (Chin Peng, 2003). The key element of British success in Malaya was the establishment of a Jungle Warfare School at Kota Tinggi in 1948 (Corum, 2006). As Malaya was covered in dense jungle which provided a superb sanctuary for insurgent bands, the security forces had to acclimatised to the environment. Thus, when Templer succeeded Briggs and the arrival of new Police Commissioner, Arthur Young revamped the training of Malayan Police and military forces with good leadership and quality training. Young recalled (Corum, 2006).

"The lack of training was everywhere evident. The pressure of the Emergency to increase the numbers of police and auxiliaries had allowed no time to train the thousands of newcomers who were employed almost exclusively upon guard and static duties. I considered the need for training as of top priority and arranged for training depots to be set up in regional areas with a program to complete the training of the force within 12 months so that the police could be progressively employed on active antiterrorist duties rather than on their existing passive ones."

As the Briggs Plan was carried forward energetically, Templer and Young insisted on a complete overhaul of the Malayan police and military training and leadership, as well as a reorganization of the Malayan military and police forces (Boyini, 2010). London committed to maintaining a large British military force in Malaya until the new civil affairs strategy could take effect, and until the Malayan military and police forces

could be trained systematically and prepared to take responsibility for Malaya's security. It was a tall order to fight the insurgency as a prolonged war (Porch, 2013). However, getting a thorough jungle training program up and running was a systemic and slow process. For the Malayan Police in the early years of the insurgency, the most serious deficiency was the shortage of trained officers with a suitable background for intelligence work. The Malayan Police had only the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and the police were facing other daunting problems that had limited their ability to gather intelligence. There were very few police personnel of Chinese ethnic background, and almost no Malayan or British intelligence personnel who knew Chinese. This greatly limited the amount and quality of intelligence that the police could collect on the insurgents (Weichong, 2015).

The military, however, was not affiliated for intelligence collation, but more to conducting intelligence-driven 'small-unit' security operations. Nevertheless, security forces efforts were frustrated due to limited flow of intelligence from the civilian counterparts (Arditti, 2015).   The subsequent establishment of a new Police Training School in Taiping brought-in the cream of Police training experts from Britain to take charge of the Police training. Apart from sending young Malayan for military training in Sandhurst, England, Templer also established a new officer school at Port Dickson where the future officers of the Malayan Army could be trained along Sandhurst lines and subsequently the establishment of the Federation Military College in Sungai Besi in 1952. All these efforts had apparently increased the Police and military capability in fighting the communist threat (Boyini, 2010).

The last factor, dissolution of insurgent network is achieved through resource control measures and targeting insurgent's networks. This normally accomplish by working closely with the intelligence network. The sole purpose is to deny any resources available to the insurgent especially financial and fighting capability. Resource control measures are about controlling and limiting the resources getting to the insurgents such as finance, weapons, explosives, and other items and equipment (Boyini, 2006). During the Malayan Emergency, the British as well as the Malaysian authority targeted the resource network

based on intelligence operations and populace and resource control measures (PRC). The Briggs plan, curfew, introduction of individual identity card, legislative measures and military security operations were meant to control the population and resources reaching the insurgents, Thompson termed this as 'isolation of guerrilla' (Thompson, 1972). This had apparently reduced the insurgents' capability to exert threat and their will to intimidate.

On targeting insurgent's networks simply means the elimination of insurgent's organisational structures and its hierarchical chain of command. This is achieved by conducting police and military operations collectively known as internal security operations. During the Second Malayan Emergency, the internal security operations were directed towards the destruction of insurgents, their underground and subversive infrastructures, their logistics arrangements, communication systems, base camps, and sanctuaries within the country. It was designed to establish control over the contested areas, destroying their organisations so that internal developments programs could take place without hindrance (Nordin, 1981). Like the American in Vietnam, Malaysia's initial response to Communist Party Malaya (CPM) was using 'big guns' paradigm of the Vietnam War relying heavily on artillery and air-power as the solution (Weichong, 2015). The Malaysian government initial reaction to the communist revolution threat was reflexed by its state action, a recognised military threat responded by military counter-actions.

On the lateral basis, the dissolution of the criminal insurgent's network by finding, disrupting and destroying the insurgent's safe havens located on the islands of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi in the Southern Philippines must be initiated through bilateral agreement with the Philippines authority. In fighting the criminal insurgency, it is absolutely necessary to include the Southern Philippines territories as the security forces 'area of influence'. According to Kilcullen (2006: 119).

"in modern insurgency, the security force 'area of influence' may need to include all neighbouring countries"

The classical single-state paradigm for counterinsurgency may no longer apply in contemporary situation, since insurgents operate across boundaries and exploit a global 'virtual sanctuary'. Legal and political considerations will probably prevent military activity outside a single-country 'area of operations'. However, the border security, illegal fund transfers, ungoverned areas, minority issues, refugees and media in neighbouring states may all play key operational roles for the insurgent. Similarly, the insurgents' supporters, money, cadres, and assistance may be connected globally. Therefore, the counterinsurgent international cooperation and soft-power diplomacy should focus to counter the insurgent's propaganda and disrupt its funding and recruiting. This implies a vastly increased role for diplomacy, global intelligence liaison and information operations (Kilcullen, 2006).

Acknowledgements

Conclusion

The eventual defeat of the CPM politically and militarily in the First Emergency (1948-1960) has consequently pushed the outlawed organization to reconsolidate itself in the jungles of southern Thailand. The British had employed a combination of civil countermeasures, military responses, and 'hearts and minds' program to frustrate the communist intention. Malaysia appraised that the communist influence and ideology has been buried after their failure to establish a communist ideological state in Malaysia. CPM's resurgence of their armed struggle in 1968 initiated with an ambush on the security forces on the Kroh-Betong Road marked a new pace to security turbulence in Malaysia. Malaysia began to realize that in order to fight against the insurgent it needs to formulate a grand strategy with the population and society involvement to deny the existence of communist ideology practices. The battle cannot be entirely military-centric, but the integration of balanced development, and 'hearts and minds' schemes to permanently isolate the insurgents' support from the population. The solution was the implementation of KESBAN as a classical counterinsurgency

strategy and it was this game plan that propagated the success of Malaysia's fight against communist insurgency that led to the Hatyai Peace Accord in December 1989.

At present, Malaysia is confronted with a new form of security threat in Eastern Sabah within the ESSZone area. A twenty-first-century security crisis with the fusion of insurgency, criminality, and terrorism, popularly classified as criminal insurgency. The threat largely in the form of kidnap for ransom, sea piracy, and transnational crimes differs from the classical insurgency in contrast to its political intention to gain autonomous economic control over a territory. Since criminal insurgency's political motive is different from that of the classical insurgency, its fundamental struggle is not to take down the existing government or change of regime but it has been perverted by criminal interests. Since the establishment of ESSCOM, the security threats in Eastern Sabah have been able to be regulated but not completely deposed. Since KESBAN was a successful corrective remedy for the classical counterinsurgency model, the same approach should be implemented in Eastern Sabah with some value-added comprehensive strategies to effectively resist criminal insurgency classifying the new approach as a neo-classical counterinsurgency framework.

Intelligence is the most important comprehensive strategy because everything else must be prompted by intelligence, nevertheless, it does not take precedence over the other comprehensive strategies. There are many sources of intelligence but the most significant is HUMINT through embedding agents or spies within the enemy organization. The second comprehensive strategy of the neo-classical counterinsurgency approach is the centralize command, by which the organization controls the activities and commands the implementation at the strategic level. In such a way, the top management monitor and influence the activities involving intelligence, military operations, 'hearts and minds', and development projects. The next comprehensive strategy is the effectiveness of the security forces. The security forces must be trained and exposed to the techniques of fighting counterinsurgency warfare, it was only the Malaysian army training, exposure, and mastering of jungle warfare during the Second Emergency, they count on success against the CPM. The

last comprehensive strategy is the dissolution of the enemy network. This strategy emphasizes the destruction of the enemy organization and it's the final attempt to destroy the enemy organisation and its network.

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